Ukraine’s protest movement of 2013–14, known as the Euromaidan, and its culmination, the people’s uprising in late 2013–early 2014 became one of the most dramatic world events in recent years. The accession of Crimea to the Russian Federation and military conflict in the Donbas demonstrate that the dramatic dynamics of the country’s ongoing transformation are still far from predictable. This book examines the manifold aspects of Ukraine’s current crisis and its political upheaval. The contributors to the book, Ukrainian experts in a variety of disciplinary fields, explore social, political and cultural reasons and factors behind the country’s transformation in its national and regional dimensions, the impact of Ukraine’s revolution on European and global politics, and also the new challenges of tough reforms with which the country is faced. The contributors share the view that the Euromaidan brought new opportunities for Ukraine’s modern development and the greatest historical chance for the country’s European future since independence in 1991.

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This book presents the findings of a multidisciplinary research team examining the manifold aspects of Ukraine’s Eurorevolution of 2013–2014 and the country’s transformation. The contributors to the book, Ukrainian scholars and experts from a variety of backgrounds, disciplines and regions of Ukraine (Lviv, Lutsk, Chernivtsi, Kyiv, Odessa, Dnipropetrovsk and Luhansk), explore social, political and cultural reasons and factors behind the country’s transformation in its nation-wide and regional dimensions, the impact of the Ukraine’s Euromaidan revolution on European and global politics, and the new challenges of tough reforms which with the country is faced.

The idea for this book came during discussion at the Ukrainian-Swiss seminar on Ukraine’s Euromaidan in late June 2014. The editors are grateful to Professor Nicolas Hayoz from the Interfaculty Institute for Central and Eastern Europe at the University of Fribourg (Switzerland) for his strong encouragement and support of this initiative. We are grateful also to the excellent Swiss team (Denis Dafflon, Andrej Lushnycky and Magdalena Solska), whose support we enjoyed during the preparation of this book. And the work on this volume would hardly have come to fruition without the efforts and attentive management of Tamara Brunner (University of Fribourg). Our special thanks also go to John Heath, whose valuable help in proof-reading has lent an English touch to the contributions while retaining the Ukrainian voice. Furthermore, we highly appreciate the financial support for the production of this volume from the Academic Swiss Caucasus Net (ASCN), an initiative of the GEBERT RÜF STIFTUNG in cooperation with the University of Fribourg.

Finally, we would like to thank the authors who, often sacrificing their summer vacations, have prepared their texts for the volume. This book is the product of their collective insights, and it represents their shared view on the unique chance and the opportunities the Euromaidan has brought for Ukraine’s European modernisation.

Our hope is that this collection of essays will contribute to a better understanding of the complex transformation which is underway in Ukraine and for which there are by no means neat and simple solutions.
Ten years after the 2004 “Orange” revolution, Ukraine again came to be in the main focus of European and world politics. The wave of protest movements, known as the Euro-Maidan, arose in Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities. The longest nation-wide protest marathon in the country’s modern history, lasting from November 2013 to March 2014, with the Kyiv’s Maidan Nezalezhnosti (the capital’s central square) as its epicentre, became the trigger for the people’s uprising in January–February 2014 and the subsequent dramatic, albeit long-awaited, transformation of the country. The chain reaction of this transformation, concentrated in a brief period of time, involved many dramatic events: the killing of over a hundred protesters by special police, the collapse of Yanukovych’s repressive state apparatus after his flight from the country, the accession of Crimea to the Russian Federation, the pre-term election of the new president Petro Poroshenko in one electoral turnover (for the first time in Ukraine’s complex political history), radical separatism and the ensuing strange, “hybrid” war (officially still called an “anti-terrorist operation”) with many hundreds of militants and civilians killed on the Donbas, and all the complex socio-economic consequences of the country’s radical geopolitical turn towards Europe.

If the Maidan, a sort of Ukrainian contribution to the arsenal of the worlds’ protest movement and direct public engagement in policy-making, has repeatedly occurred over the last ten years, there must be deep and latent public dissatisfaction with the governmental politics, with the social, economic and political situation and with the conditions of the political regime in the country. The phenomenon of Ukraine’s Maidans also proves that Ukrainians, despite the historically rather lengthy corruptive impact of Russia’s imperial domination and the country’s Soviet heritage, still preserve the virtues of dignity, freedom and justice and cherish their love of independence and individual rights. And many of these characteristics
are usually associated with the European concept of natural rights. In our mind, the European identity is still retained deep in the Ukrainian psyche. Those feelings of being a part of Europe in many ways were also combined with the people’s striving for their own independent state. Indeed, the pro-European and pro-independence parallels have closely coincided in many glorious and tragic episodes of national history, from the tradition of the early medieval Kyivan Rus’, the Cossacks’ glory of the seventeenth century to the Ukrainian People’s Republic of 1917–1920, and continued in the struggle for an independent state by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army during the Second World War and in pro-Ukrainian activities by many hundreds of members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia and Soviet dissidents, imprisoned and killed by the communist regime in the period from 1920 to the 1980s. In this national historical continuity, following Ukrainian independence in 1991 the Maidans of 2004–2005 and 2013–2014 became another stage for Ukrainians’ striving for their freedoms and also for a European future.

Indeed, without knowledge of the national historical context, it is hard to understand why the Ukrainians once again surprised both the Western world and national policymakers with their determined support of European Association. Democracy has always been an integral part of life of Ukrainian communities since the Middle Ages. We should remember that village residents elected not only a Viyt (from the German, Vogt), but also a priest for the local church, as well as a teacher who taught all the children in the community. It is also worth noting that this word of German origin referring to the mayor elected by the town or village is directly connected to the prevalence of Magdeburg Law in Ukraine from the fourteenth century onwards – a system of local self-government that at that time was widespread throughout Central and Eastern Europe. The easternmost city in Ukraine to follow this democratic legal system from 1664 onward was Glukhiv, 300 kilometers northeast of Kyiv. The traditions of managing local self-government and living according to the law rather than the will of a master were inherent to the majority of the Ukrainian population for centuries.

For hundreds of years, Ukrainians have considered themselves part of the cultural and legal landscape that is currently called the European Union. That is why the manifestations in support of European integration that took place in winter 2013–2014 in almost all big cities in Ukraine from East to West were entirely natural and logical.
The European-oriented part of Ukrainian society (according to sociological surveys, the major part of the population) generally accepted the growing deterioration of life in Ukraine over the last three years, in their hope that the Association Agreement would oblige the authorities to reform the state according to European standards. Instead, the authorities headed by President Yanukovych conducted their own rather simple game based on the principle of “who will give more”, while trying to cheat all.

In order to better understand the power dynamic in Ukraine in late 2013, it is worth recalling the joke that was widespread during the presidential elections of 2010, especially in business circles: in essence, the contest between Yulia Tymoshenko and Viktor Yanukovych for presidency was the contest between a dairymaid and a butcher, in which the first was willing to acquire a cow (the country) to milk it for a long time, while the second intended to kill it and sell the meat. Such a collision was beautifully depicted at the end of the 1990s by Mancur Olson1 comparing the authorities in post-communist countries with stationary and roving bandits.

One of the main problems of modern Ukraine has always been a weak economic policy. Over the last three years, President Yanukovych sequentially refused any attempts to restrain deterioration of the economic situation. The Ukrainian government kept an artificially overstated exchange rate of the national currency, which led to a significant deficit. Ukraine’s economy also suffered from the decline of exchange reserves, excessive exchange control, and high interest rates that made both foreign and domestic investment almost impossible. Additionally, Ukraine had almost no access to international financial markets. The general budgeted deficit made up 8% of the GDP, which is predicted to decrease by 1.5% in 2013, while industrial production already decreased by 5.4%.

Most likely, the main goal of the economic policy of the previous regime was to transfer financial resources and companies into the possession of the “Yanukovych family” – a group of young businessmen that quickly bought up private and state companies for next to nothing. They were the only “sanctioned” buyers in the key industries, and the worse the economic situation was, the cheaper these companies were.

If we accept this assertion as the most probable motive for Yanukovych’s behavior, his tactics in late 2013 become clear. Indeed, he was not

really planning to sign the Association Agreement with the EU, but was essentially playing poker with both the EU and Russia, trying to bargain for the highest possible stakes for himself. Although bargaining with Russia was not so much about entering the Customs Union as about refusing to sign the Association with Europe. It is also important to understand that for most Russian leaders and also for most Russian people, the loss of Ukraine is not considered from a pragmatic and economic viewpoint, but from an irrational, emotional one. This attitude is barely understandable for either Europeans or Americans, who mostly think in the categories of community, region (state) and nation, in contrast to Russians, who think in the categories of empire. For Russians, symbolic trophies like having countries bow to their imperial might are much more important than any economic advantages or losses.

Those who believed that the crisis in Ukraine would soon end as a temporary phenomenon, or that everything would just “dissipate” if Ukrainian rulers received the Russian 15 billion grant or if “the Maidan got mugged” were deeply wrong, for better or for worse.

In recent months, the systemic crisis in Ukraine that preceded the Maidan has been mentioned by many observers. And this book is also an attempt to explore various factors and reasons that led Ukrainians to their Euromaidan. Although here we can suggest one of many other explanations of (and justifications for) the Ukrainian revolution in 2013–2014, a reason of an existential nature: the response to the threat to a fundamental human right, the individual right to one’s own life.

In our opinion, the main problem of Ukraine, as a certain community inhabiting a certain territory, is that we have become dangerous for ourselves. The danger emanated from our streets, squares, fields and roads. Soon, staying in one’s home would feel dangerous as well. It is this enhanced sense of danger that brought large masses of Ukrainians to the streets and to the Maidan. That is why no one would detect linguistic, confessional or any other phobia – the danger was so real that it basically leveled all other contradictions between people and united them not for money or even for the sake of an idea, but for joint survival.

For decades, Ukraine has been a safe haven for its citizens; at least the overwhelming majority of its residents born after Second World War saw it as such. After Stalin’s death, totalitarian reprisals were a thing of the past. Arbitrary actions of repressive bodies were limited by the government’s monopoly on violence; therefore, criminals were penalized under
the law, while dissidents were proclaimed either insane or criminal, leading the majority of the population to believe that if they didn't violate a set of certain rules proudly called “socialist justice”, they would be completely safe. The Communist Party would not share its right to institutionalized violence with anyone – that is why it kept all the official repressive bodies under its rigid control.

After the USSR collapsed, all the government institutions of the new independent states, inherited from the Soviet era, underwent gradual dissolution. In some places, it was a quicker process, in others, slower, but it was inevitable once the socialist slogans of equality and the socialist umbrella were replaced by the slogans of freedom and enrichment, long banned in the USSR.

After a short break in the early nineties, an overarching commercialization of everything began in Ukraine. Under Kuchma’s presidency, when the first oligarchs appeared in Ukraine, the fact that everything in the state was for sale, including high offices, even those in law-enforcement bodies, became evident. Everything had to bring profit; this was the main goal of the leaders during that period, as it remains today.

But nothing is free. Ukraine paid with the loss of its citizens’ sense of safety, and the Ukrainian state lost, or, rather, sold its monopoly on violence. Ukrainian rulers ceded or sold some share of the prerogative to the lower echelons of power – district courts, militia departments, district prosecutors’ offices, customs, tax inspections etc. As a result, a rather thick and hermetic social stratum considering itself above the law rapidly came into being. This process can be compared to the formation of different estates in Europe in the early Middle Ages, when a knight had to pay only a small fine for killing a peasant or might avoid a penalty altogether. If and when an official position of any significance becomes first and foremost a source of enrichment, the notion of law-abidance becomes nonsense. In real life, a dispute could be won by anyone who could pay more than the opposing side.

So, with the police, the prosecutor’s offices, and courts all becoming commercial structures, and with public offices turning into a source of considerable profits, the state ceased to perform its functions of protecting security, property, freedom and life. This means that anyone with enough money could endanger freedom, private property, and even the lives of Ukrainian citizens without any punishment. Meanwhile, the process of decomposition affecting the law-enforcement system kept gaining momentum and led to the imprisonment of Tymoshenko and Lutsenko, the
rejection of the 2004 Constitution, and the “tax maidan”, which, although it scared the authorities, still failed to stop the assault on the rights, freedom, and safety of the public at large.

Eventually, it became clear that more and more citizens found themselves helpless in the face of the arbitrary nature of those in power, specifically those in repressive bodies. Federal workers’ feelings of helplessness and dependence only increased with the impunity of the officials, who incessantly and openly embezzled state money. Ukrainian citizens were especially unprotected when a motor accident involving an official occurred. For example, a driver fatally hitting a pedestrian (especially a woman or a child) on a crosswalk is charged with “neglect” and gets a suspended sentence if, for example, he happens to be the prosecutor’s son. The death of two physicians in an ambulance hit by a police vehicle at an intersection goes unpunished, to speak nothing of the handling of the rape and attempted murder of a woman committed by policemen in Vradiivka (Mykolaiv oblast’). All of these incidents demonstrate the virtual impasse in which Ukrainian society found itself.

A frivolous promise made by Yanukovych, on the one hand, and a no less frivolous attitude of EU leaders, on the other, plunged Ukrainian society into turmoil. For many years, Ukrainians have cherished a dream or a myth that one day they would live as people do in Europe. And for many people, Europe was not an abstract and unknown, though positive concept, but rather a specific territory where supremacy of law reigns, and where one can be safe unless one breaks the law. To make this dream come true, Ukrainians kept a low profile, expecting that if the Ukrainian government signed the Association Agreement with the EU, they would be forced to harmonize Ukrainian law with European legislation, and Ukrainians’ lives would improve incrementally and become safer, without any outbursts or revolutions.

That is why, when, in late November 2013, Ukrainians were deprived of their dream of gradual improvement, they took to the streets for the first peaceful protest. The regime, however, concerned about its own safety and, specifically, about the legitimacy of the 2015 elections, decided to preempt further developments by brutally stifling the protests. It aimed to prove to itself that it still controlled the country and had no fear of its own people and to show Ukrainians that it would go to any lengths, even violence if necessary, to ensure its own survival. In doing so, however, it overestimated its influence in society, and failed to take into consideration
the potential for a violent civilian backlash. That was one of the most powerful emotional motives and existential reasons why the Maidan, as the center of opposition and the symbol of many Ukrainians’ fearlessness, came into being.

This book, written by Ukrainian scholars and experts in different disciplinary fields, explores social, political and cultural reasons for and factors of the country’s transformation in its nation-wide and regional dimensions, the impact of Ukraine’s Euromaidan revolution on European and global politics, and also the new challenges of hard reforms which the country faces. Our purpose was not only to examine the Euromaidan as a historical event, but rather to understand its processes in the complex social and political transformation that is underway in Ukraine.

The Structure of this Book

The book consists of five parts that thematically cover the multidimensional character of Ukraine’s Euromaidan, the revolution and the post-Maidan challenges.

In Part I, The Euromaidan and Ukraine’s Revolution: Politics, Democracy and Civil Society, the authors explore social and political aspects of the Euromaidan protest movement and seek to reveal the political factors, reasons and dynamics behind Ukraine’s democratic revolution. The major part of papers in this section was published in their brief versions in the Journal Religion and Society in East and West. For this book the authors have substantially updated and revised their texts.

Viktor Stepanenko examines Ukraine’s revolution as the complex and often inconsistent process of de-institutionalisation of the post-Soviet political and social order. He considers the Maidan a social institution of the new type, implying, above all, a certain set of values, and examines the transformation of its agendas and social functions during the protests (from the free oppositional public space, a sort of agora to a militant camp, compared to the Cossacks’ republic, the Sich, and then to the institution

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of publics control over the government). The author highlights the emergence of various conflicting institutional factors for Ukraine’s current transformation – those preserving the post-Soviet order and the factors for its de-institutionalisation.

Mykola Riabchuk and Andrej N. Lushnycky interpret the Maidan as the third attempt since Independence in 1991 and the 2004–2005 Orange revolution to overcome the post-Soviet heritage in Ukraine. They persuasively argue that the political demarcation lines in Ukraine do not run between the country’s Eastern and Western parts, but along opposite sets of values: post-Soviet, paternalistic and authoritarian (now associated with Russia’s “Putinism”), and liberal, democratic and pro-Western. In the authors’ view, these values are “fundamentally divided by the very idea of what Ukraine is and should be.” And the challenge for the country’s future is to work out how to integrate these different Ukraines into the common state.

A valuable historical and factual analysis of the dynamics and meanings of the Eurorevolution is presented in the paper by Andriy Portnov and Tetiana Portnova. As historians they reconstruct carefully and in great detail the events that turned the Maidan into a peoples’ uprising and examine how the Maidan’s symbolic and psychological resource of identification with the idea of a new Ukraine was created. A resource that, as the authors argue, “no politician can afford to ignore.”

Olexiy Haran and Petro Burakovskyi continue the logic of opposite value systems revealed in various public attitudes, particularly in the sphere of peoples’ geopolitical electoral sympathies, before and after the Euromaidan. Summarising the results of many sociological surveys and electoral statistics, the authors identify pro-European/Western and pro-Russian political spectrums of Ukrainian politics and show the complex dynamics in shifting electoral support for pro-European/Western choice among Ukrainian citizens since the 2012 parliamentary elections. The Eurorevolution and Russian aggression towards Ukraine have strengthened this choice, while “Russia has emerged as a main threat to the sovereignty and integrity of the country for the majority of the population.”

Part I is concluded by Yuriy Shveda’s in-depth analysis of the Eurorevolution in the context of social theory of revolution. The author seeks to answer the principal question: Was the “Revolution of Dignity” (as the Euromaidan and subsequent peoples’ uprising were often named) a revolution in its conceptual shared meaning? In the author’s view, even though
many characteristics of a revolution can be found in the events of 2013–2014 in Ukraine, “it is obviously too early to define them by the categories of a social revolution.” The author provides a broad analytical examination of various factors and reasons – institutional, social, economic, political – that led Ukrainians to take to the streets. And he concludes that only “time will show the real readiness and ability of the new power to implement in life the slogans of revolution.” And this is, indeed, the realistic approach to estimating the Euromaidan’s revolutionary significance.

Part II of the volume, *Ukraine’s revolutionary challenges in the European and the global contexts*, combines three papers (by Sergiy Fedunyak, Sergiy Glebov and Iryna Maksimenko) focusing on the international contexts of Ukraine’s Euromaidan events. The authors explore various aspects of new global challenges that Euromaidan and further post-revolutionary dynamics brought into European and global politics. In SERGIY FEDUNYAK’s view, “the revolutionary events in Ukraine have become a serious test of the post-Cold War system of international relations. They have many implications for regional and sub-regional processes and have brought about the collapse of the existing mechanisms of stability and security.” At the same time, the Ukrainian political crisis, the author argues, has led “to intensive efforts on the part of the western states, foremost the USA, to consider new security concepts in the light of neo-imperial Russian aggression.”

SERGIY GLEBOV, in his analysis of the new challenges to the global system of security following Russia’s violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and the aggression towards the country, comes to the conclusion that the previous post-bipolar system of international relations has ceased to exist. He argues that the new “post-post-bipolar” period of international relations is already taking place and “whether it develops into a ‘neo-Cold War’ or not the next developments will show soon.” IRYNA MAXSIMENKO seeks to answer the important question of whether neutrality (or the status of a non-aligned country) is a solution for Ukraine’s security. It is worth bearing in mind that the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, aimed at international guarantees for Ukraine’s security and territorial integrity and violated by Russia as one of the guarantors, was the international response to the country’s decision to abandon the world’s third largest nuclear weapons arsenal after the dissolution of the USSR. Examining the European and global dimensions of the security issue, due to various reasons she doubts that Ukraine will follow the model of neutrality adopted by Finland or
Switzerland. She sees the solution for Ukraine’s security in developing “new powerful mechanisms” on the international scale in order to guarantee the sovereignty and security of nations like Ukraine.

The issues of challenging and often unpopular reforms with which post-Maidan Ukraine is faced certainly deserve special focus and indeed a separate book. In Part III, Social Economic, Legislative and Humanitarian Issues of the Reforms, we have only partly covered this complex subject. However, firstly, we would like to note that official declarations of the need for reforms has been repeated continuously by virtually all Ukrainian governments since independence in 1991. (And the case of the “endless story” in local self-government reform is analysed by Valentyn Malinovskyi in this section). But in reality, too little has happened. What were the problems with reforms in Ukraine? Why were they slow or ineffective? And will the Maidan provide further stimulus for them? In answering these questions we would underline the point made by the renowned Ukrainian economist Olexander Paskhaver: “First the values, then the reforms, otherwise this will not work.”

Paskhaver explains this point this way: “the most radical actions aiming at the change of power and the reforms of institutions (rules) will not succeed if a society does not adopt the social values that would stimulate this society’s urgent need for a new power and new institutions.” The Euromaidan became society’s positive sign of its readiness for reforms, although they are unlikely be easier because of that. Olexander Baranovskyi clearly demonstrates this in his text on the inevitable risks and challenges of economic reforms, providing us with a realistic picture of the tough situation in Ukrainian economics aggravated by the loss of important infrastructure in the Donbas and burdened with heavy budget expenses as a result of the “hybrid” war in the region. Olexander Kopylenko and Olexander Kostylyev in their paper and Valentyn Malynovskyi in his account focus on the sensitive issue of decentralisation and of the separation of power, the highly centralised model for which Ukraine mostly inherited from its Soviet past. Kopylenko and Kostylyev examine this issue at the level of central government and discuss the challenges and risks of the constitutional reform concerning decentralisation, while Malynovskyi examines this issue on the level of local self-government reform. These authors share the position of choosing a wise path of governmental

decentralisation that would take into account the historical context and geopolitical realities of Ukraine’s current development and would also prevent, or at least minimise, the real threat of disintegration of the state.

A demographer, Olexiy Pozniak, raises the important question of human capital, which is crucial not only for the country’s reforms but also for its future, and examines the issues of Ukraine’s migration and the demographic situation in the context of foreign intervention. The author analyses the current demographic transformations, including Ukraine’s migration situation in the context of the Russian annexation of Crimea and developments in the East, and tries to foresee their potential demographic implications for Ukraine. He concludes that foreign intervention in Ukraine will have direct, complex and barely predictable demographic implications due to increased mortality and emigration, as well as the movement of the population inside Ukraine.

In Part IV, Regional and Ethno-Cultural Dimensions of the Ukraine’s Transformation, the contributors examine the complex nature and dynamics of Ukraine’s ethno-cultural and regional diversity in the context of the Euromaidan and post-Maidan political realities. Olexander Vyshniak provides the solid introduction to the section. Basing his conclusions on his own rich professional expertise in conducting and organising many sociological surveys, he rejects the cliché of Ukraine as a “divided country.” Instead Vyshniak identifies four “significantly different types of Ukrainian regions”: Western Ukraine, Central and North-Eastern Ukraine, the Donbas and Crimea and other areas of the South East. The Maidan and post-Maidan events made this regional typology even more complex and subtle, because “the political and electoral views of the population in the southeastern region changed significantly, and previously existing types split into several different ones.” In our view, the most important part of the author’s account is his conclusion that “there were no evident internal reasons for separatism in the country, for separatism that would grow from “below”, from the peoples themselves, in any of the country’s regions, including even Crimea and the Donbas” and that “sociological research provides strong factual evidence to insist that the separatist “movements” in Crimea and the Donbas were hardly internally grown themselves, but were inspired, organized and strongly supported by the predominantly external factor, namely through direct military, organizational, financial and propagandist-informational interference by Russia in an attempt to influence Ukraine and its sovereign state policy.”
Ilya Kononov and Svitlana Khobta continue this line of Ukraine’s regional diversity through their analysis of the results of a survey conducted in two of Ukraine’s regional “poles”: the Donbas and the Halychyna. This case study is mostly the result of the authors’ survey conducted in spring-summer 2014 in those regions. The contributors conclude that the publics’ attitudes to events of the Ukrainian crisis of 2013–2014 such as the Maidan and the war in the Donbas have been formed on “the basis of different value platforms connected with concepts of the future of the state and nation that envision the combination of ethnic, cultural and civil solidarities.” Due to many factors, including the peculiarities of the historic development of the region, the demographic composition of the population, the structure and features of economics, “the proto-Soviet (‘internationalist’) project dominates in the Donbas, while the Halychyna is national-democratic and pro-European.”

Sergiy Danylov analyses the Crimean Tatars’ national institutes under the occupation. And we would like to note that following its annexation by Russia, Crimea did indeed become a challenging subject not only for studying the broad spectrum of Ukraine’s regional policy, its successes and its faults. The author focuses particularly on the Crimean Tatars’ religious institution, the Muftiyat. Danylov documents various tactics of the occupiers towards the Crimean Tatars and their institutions – from “carrots to sticks.” And if the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people and also its leaders found themselves under ongoing aggressive attacks and repres- sions, the Tatars’ religious institutions, particularly the Muftiyat, as Danylov demonstrates, are engaged “in a more sophisticated political game, the aim of which is to achieve the loyalty of the Crimean Tatars to (or, at least, their recognition of) the new Russian authorities in Crimea.”

For our part, we would like to add that the phrase “Russian Crimea” (which is often used manipulatively in order to justify the annexation) is no better than “Russian Finland”, the “Russian Baltic” or even “Russian Poland.” And in the twenty-first century this sounds as absurd as, for instance, British India or French Africa. Moreover, Crimea always was and still is a special case: before World War II, the peninsula was exclusively multiethnic. And Russians constituted the minority there. Most Crimean toponyms of that time were Tatar, Greek, Ukrainian or German. All big cities on the peninsula – Feodosiya, Kerch, Yalta, Simferopol, Sebastopol, Inkerman – had been founded long before it was conquered by the Russian Empire, as is evident from their names.
This section is completed by Sergiy Klymovskyi’s challenging paper written in the style of a political anthropological account. The author seeks to answer the question whether the turmoil and militant separatism in the Donbas were “an uprising of the people” or “a putsch by slaveholders.” Using rich statistical and factual data, Klymovskyi reconstructs the history of the creation of the Donbas’s “special” status (echoing from the Soviet period) and of its somewhat peculiar local identity, donetskiye. The author argues that the ideology of the new ‘Donetsk-type communism’ was formed by the synthesis of Donbas nationalism, Orthodoxy in the format of Moscow’s Russian Orthodox Church, the Soviet version of class peace and the heroic cult of the USSR with its holidays and symbols. That ideology, in the author’s view, not only was used to justify the initial accumulation of capital in the early 1990s by the mafia-type local elite (later united under the political cover of the Party of Regions), but also became a fertile ideological ground for the myth of the exclusiveness of donetskiye and of Donbas particularism. The author argues, in our view persuasively, that “while the ‘people’s rebellion’ was a fake, the putsch of ‘regionals-slaveholders’ and the mass psychosis of the Donbas were real.”

The book’s final section, Part V, Language, Media and Culture under the Transformation, is very important for an understanding of the processes underway in Ukraine’s cultural and media spheres and for estimating society’s values and identity transformation in the Euromaidan and post-Maidan periods. Yaroslav Pylynskyi opens this part with his in-depth analysis of the issues of language politics and of bilingualism in the Ukrainian historical and contemporary contexts. It is worth noting that these issues are often the focus of the country’s most heated political debates. And in the author’s view, the language issue has, indeed, much broader significance and application than a mere “subject of attention for linguists, educators and cultural workers.” In reality it is a question of “the fundamental right of the speakers to certain territories, along with the right to manage their land, finances, human resources.” One of many insightful conclusions the author comes to is that “the war that Russia has unleashed against Ukraine is not only a war concerning the economic assets of Putin’s clique or against Ukrainians’ European choice. This is a war against the alternative ‘Russian world’ that has emerged in Ukraine, in which most Russian-speaking citizens have consciously stood in favor of the rule of law, freedom of choice, and free mass media.”
Olexander Shulga explores phenomenological and sociological approaches in examining the transformation of the symbolic sphere and the value-matrix of Ukrainian society during and after the Euromaidan revolution. He interprets the Maidan as “the culmination and the strategic turning point in the war of symbols which has been waged for the last 20 years in Ukraine.” The symbolic sphere is important for any society in its construction of shared and significant meanings. And it is no wonder that the war of symbols is often reflected in the real war. Lyudmyla Pavlyuk continues this line of thought in her brilliant analysis of conflicting discourses of the Maidan, the war, the annexation of Crimea and other events constructed and framed in the Ukrainian media. Based on the premise that the struggle for resolution of the conflict is a struggle for meanings, she demonstrates “how the gradual clarification of distinctions between the concepts of war/crisis, rebels/terrorists, rights of regions/separatism, as well as the creation of argumentative systems focused on facts contribute to adequate decision making, enhance resilience, and consolidate society in Ukraine.”

An insightful account of the Maidan as an artistic imaginative act and of the important role of artists in its symbolic construction is presented by Natalia Moussienko. She argues that “the unity of academic analysis and artistic vision will offer the right approach to understanding the Ukrainian events of winter 2013–2014, which went down in history as the Maidan and drew modern comprehension of Europe anew.”

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As we write this introduction, the ongoing Ukrainian crisis is still far from clear perspectives concerning an easy solution. The country faces the tough challenges of unpopular reforms in many spheres. The economy and national financial system are being destroyed in the ongoing war in the Donbas, still called an “anti-terrorist operation.” Following the annexation of Crimea and the undeclared “hybrid” war on Ukraine’s eastern borders, the problems of Ukrainian-Russian relations have become a serious factor of instability, not only in the region, but also globally. And the whole system of international security has been deeply undermined following Russia’s violation of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum.

However, the contributors to this book, aware of many uncertainties and difficulties facing Ukraine’s future development, share the view that the Euromaidan brought new opportunities for the country’s renewal. It also saw the people place their faith in the new authorities, giving them
the historical chance to modernize the country along European lines – the first opportunity for such reform since Ukraine gained independence in 1991. In other words, the Euromaidan was and still is both the challenge and the hope.

As Denis Dafflon and Nicolas Hayoz persuasively argue, “the Maidan revolution opens a new era of thinking about the relationship between citizens and the state, about national identity, and about the past in Ukraine.”

And we would also add: “… and about the country’s future.”

But we do not believe in any “magic political keys” or in a sort of “strategic leap” that would make Ukraine a prosperous European and true democratic country overnight. We would rather rely on the increasing majority of Ukrainian people who already share and apply in their daily practices the values of patriotism, responsibility, solidarity and trust that the Maidan has strengthened.

Kyiv, October 2014

References

Part I
The Euromaidan and Ukraine’s Revolution: Politics, Democracy and Civil Society
Viktor Stepanenko

Ukraine’s Revolution as De-Institutionalisation of the Post-Soviet Order

The reasons for and the lessons and significance of the long-term historical effects of Ukraine’s protest movement and its culmination, the people’s uprising in late 2013–early 2014, still require in-depth study. This is so due to the ongoing process of the country’s dramatic social-political changes, the final outcomes of which are hardly predictable. Indeed, at the beginning of 2014 nobody would have been able to predict the ignominious flight of former president Yanukovych and the rapid collapse of his authoritarian state machine over the following couple of days, the accession of Crimea to the Russian Federation, the pre-term election of the new president Petro Poroshenko in one electoral turnover (for the first time in Ukraine’s complex political history), radical separatism and the ensuing strange, “hybrid” war (officially still called an “anti-terrorist operation”) on the Ukrainian Donbas, and all the complex socio-economic and financial consequences of the country’s dramatic geopolitical turn towards Europe. The new historical challenges, unknown since Ukraine gained independence in 1991, and social-revolutionary upheaval on an unprecedentedly high level undermined a conservative evolutionary transformation of Ukrainian society. Moreover, it seems that the controversial and strategically inconsistent model of the country’s post-Soviet development has collapsed.

It is clear that the streets begin to “speak” whenever and wherever the conventional political mechanisms of at least formally democratic and consensual regulation are either broken or substantially corrupted. In examining the case of Ukraine, I will refer to two interconnected concepts explaining the Ukrainian political situation and the country’s revolution of 2013–2014: post-Soviet politics and (de-)institutionalisation. “Post-Soviet politics” are understood as mechanisms and logics of administratively centralised decision-making, which is heavily burdened with institutional memory of the historical Soviet (and now the present
Russian) state-bureaucratic and one-party-ruled machinery. The purpose of these politics is the reproduction the post-Soviet social order, albeit now blended with a post-modern mixture of some ingredients of democracy and of capitalism. “Institutionalisation,” in its sociological meaning, implies shaping the system of formal and informal rules, norms and values regulating social interaction, particularly political ones. In this context one also should understand institutionalisation not only as the formation of the system of organisational networks but also as the production of social meanings structuring actions that define stable social patterns of behaviour through formal and informal practices, discourses, norms and values. Consequently, de-institutionalisation is the erosion and destruction of given institutionalised patterns, the change of social meanings and rules, and the open (or latent) rejection of requirements imposed upon social activities.

My general thesis is this: the Maidan protest movement and the subsequent people’s revolt were the most radical attempt at the de-institutionalisation of post-Soviet politics and order since 1991. The wave of dismantling Lenin monuments throughout the country, including in the capital Kyiv, during the protests was only the simplest action, albeit, importantly, a symbolic one, in the complex process of de-institutionalisation of the Soviet and communist legacy. And this process is still underway. Making the changes in the publics’ mentality and attitudes are a much harder task however. In this sense the Maidan and its practices were a challenging experience in constructing new institutions, rules, and values that were not “post-Soviet” in their essence. One may regard them as elementally democratic, European, based on the rule of law, respecting individual rights and human dignity, appealing to human justice. In the political sphere the Ukrainian “revolution of dignity” also appeared to be the unique experience of mass public engagement in searching for new forms of both direct and representative democracies as well as for statehood in their ideal-normative social imaginations.
Institutional Traps of the Old Order Heritage

The institutional trap (or “institutional hypocrisy,” as Nils Brunsson1 puts it) of any radical social movement, including revolution, lies in the inevitable split between the ideal public aspirations and their practical (or rather possible) realisation. Various aspects of social continuity and change are analysed in many institutional approaches and concepts such as “path dependence,” “institutional isomorphism,” “logic of appropriateness” and others. Despite all the variations, these concepts focus on the social inertia of institutions, that is their objective rather than subjective characteristics. Many of these traps have already been revealed in the social practices of the country’s post-Maidan development. The demands of “rebooting the whole system” and of “cleaning out power” (lustration) appear to be challenging, or at least not acts that can be realised rapidly. One obstacle to these aims is represented by institutional restrictions. For example, immediate presidential and parliamentary elections would have been unconstitutional and were barely realistic, given the alternative to the continuity of elemental governance would have been a state of anarchy. The old legislation for new parliamentary elections on October 2014 was preserved and many legislative decisions were also adopted by the acting parliament, which while politically controversial was constitutionally legitimate. These are only some examples of post-Maidan institutional traps concerning legislative procedures. But the diversity of these traps, particularly regarding corruption, involves not only formal and legislative cases but also much more complex informal rules and regulations touching upon social, psychological and political-cultural aspects.

An institutional approach is often used by researchers to analyse and understand post-communist transformations. In this context Ukraine’s development has its own institutional peculiarities. The slowness of reforms and inconsistency in the country’s modernisation are among them. Moreover, this institutional inertia concerning modernisation was often presented in the Ukrainian official discourse of “stability and order,” as a kind of national virtue and a special achievement of a country whose political leadership was able to avoid for a long period wars, tense social

conflict and revolutionary upheaval. There developed a certain consensus between oligarchic clans and a considerable part of political elite in their shared corporative interests in conserving such a stability. And the new social and political effects of post-Soviet stagnation and of the “immobility of the state” have become apparent. A high social price for such stability without modernisation was the domination of corporative interests in decision-making, corruption and a populist social economic policy that was justified only for short-term electoral cycles but not for strategic perspectives of the country’s development. Corruption and political populism in public policy stimulated mass paternalistic orientations and an escalation of promises that could hardly be fulfilled in practice. This was also fertile ground for public feelings of apathy and cynicism regarding politics and ideas concerning the possibility of profound changes during a long period of the country’s independence.

Institutional reasons for the “immobile state” implied many factors and restrictions that were inherited by Ukraine from the long historical period of Russia’s imperial domination and from the country’s Soviet communist past. Although some of these factors are also reinforced with the “immobile” state policy during the independence period. Taras Kuzio summarises three main institutional factors that could shift the country from a path of immobility and dependence to mobility and modernisation. These are: 1) evolution of oligarchs in support of changes; 2) growing pressure from domestic actors, such as civil society, the middle class and youth activists; 3) the role of the European Union (EU) as the external factor in assisting and supporting the reforms. In my view only the second factor is decisive. Although even the pressure of active citizens will be effective as the pre-condition of popular demands for reforms and of persistent and effective control of the government performed by a robust civil society. Lacking these conditions, the wave of citizens’ activity, the enthusiasm and hopes of millions people for reform and the renovation of the country during the Orange Revolution of 2004–2005 again turned to disappointment, distrust and apathy. From 2010 onwards, Ukraine returned to a state of institutional stagnation, at least in the political sphere.

The people’s protests and the 2013–2014 revolution became another attempt (after independence in 1991 and the Orange Revolution of

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2004–2005) to “reboot” the state and modernise the country along European lines. In the current attempt two factors mentioned above – pressure from domestic civil society and the external support of global civil society, Europe and the USA – are combined. And this attempt is much more radical than the previous ones. This is not least because many hundreds of Ukrainians have already sacrificed their lives for their new European country, because part of the national territory has been lost and because a “hybrid” war is being fought in the Donbas region for the future existence of Ukraine as an independent and sovereign state. And there are also some signs of real de-institutionalisation of the former immobile post-Soviet order. One can characterise the impact of the 2013–2014 Maidan events, concentrated in a short period of time, as an institutional explosion that is comparable with the period of East European revolutions whose agendas and, mostly importantly, results were delayed for twenty years in Ukraine.

Let us summarise some institutional factors that preserve the post-Soviet order (or are favourable for its reproduction) and the indications of de-institutionalisation of this order due to the impact of the Maidan protest movement, of the “revolution of dignity” and of the war for the territorial integrity of Ukraine.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Institutional factors for preserving the post-Soviet order</th>
<th>The Maidan/revolution/war factors for de-institutionalisation of the post-Soviet order</th>
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<tr>
<td>Geopolitical aspects:</td>
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<tr>
<td>– the country’s geographical location along the cleavage lines between Europe and Eurasia;</td>
<td>– the Maidan movement was triggered by the previous government’s refusal to sign the Association Agreement between Ukraine and EU;</td>
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<td>– the state’s lack a consistent and articulated foreign policy;</td>
<td>– articulation of the clear European choice by the current pro-Maidan government and the newly elected president, mutual ratification of the Ukraine-EU Association Agreement;</td>
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<td>– conflicting geopolitical orientations of the population;</td>
<td>– the accession of Crimea and the “hybrid” war in the Donbas region have helped increase the public’s pro-European orientation;</td>
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<td>– persistent geopolitical pressure from Russia.</td>
<td>– the move to drop the country’s non-aligned bloc status has already reached the official level</td>
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<td><strong>Institutional factors for preserving the post-Soviet order</strong></td>
<td><strong>The Maidan/revolution/war factors for de-institutionalisation of the post-Soviet order</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Structural economic factors:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>– extensive type of economy including a large part of old</td>
<td>– motivation for economic modernisation due to the opportunity to the highly competitive</td>
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<td>industrial Soviet infrastructure with huge waste of energy;</td>
<td>European and world market;</td>
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<td>– heavy energy dependence;</td>
<td>– the need for energy-saving strategies because of high prices on energy, development of</td>
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<td>– still a relatively small sector of highly technological</td>
<td>independent energetic infrastructure including atomic energy and shale gas recourses;</td>
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<td>and competitive enterprises;</td>
<td>– increasing orientation towards European and the world trade market because of economic</td>
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<td>– traditional linkages of industrial infrastructure, above</td>
<td>and trade wars initiated and led by Russia;</td>
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<tr>
<td>all in Eastern and Southern regions, to the former Soviet</td>
<td>– pushing new legislation for easing entrepreneurial activity and improving the business</td>
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<td>economic bloc and market;</td>
<td>climate, the need for reforms for a civil open economy with real competition.</td>
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<td>– oligarchic privatisation of the larger part of the economy</td>
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<td>with the vague obligation to modernise.</td>
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<td><strong>Political cultural factors:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>– still ongoing formation of the modern civic Ukrainian</td>
<td>– the national democratic consolidation of the larger part of the country during and after</td>
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<td>nation;</td>
<td>the Maidan and as a response to Russia’s military aggression;</td>
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<td>– an electoral equilibrium in the peoples’ orientations</td>
<td>– the presidential elections proved a considerable shift of the voters’ electoral</td>
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<td>between pro-European modernisation and pro-Eurasian</td>
<td>orientations towards the democratic pro-European political spectrum; Ukraine’s former 35</td>
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<td>immobility in regard to the country’s regional differences;</td>
<td>million-strong electoral resource decreased to about 30 million (more than one million</td>
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<td>– social paternalism inherited by older generations from the</td>
<td>Crimean voters and apparently more than two million Donbas voters are self-excluded from</td>
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<td>Soviet period and also cultivated by politics during</td>
<td>the Ukrainian electoral process);</td>
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<td>independence;</td>
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<td>– the lack of developed democratic political culture and of</td>
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<td>respect for the rule of law;</td>
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<td>– corruption spread in daily-routine practices;</td>
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### Institutional factors for preserving the post-Soviet order

- The immaturity and irresponsibility of a large part of the political elite, heavy but ineffective state bureaucracy and big business clans engaged in the state's decision-making;

### The Maidan/revolution/war factors for de-institutionalisation of the post-Soviet order

- The new generation that has never been under the Soviet rule and was born during independence is coming;
- The Maidan brought the mass experience of active citizenry;
- The law on lustration is adopted, the anti-corruption institutions and initiatives have emerged partly as the government's obligations to EU association, the media activity in the sphere;
- The ongoing process of rejuvenation of the political elite and of state officials with newcomers from the Maidan and war frontline.

### Social structural and demographic factors:

- A still weak and not particularly large self-reliant middle class,
- Negative trends in decreasing and ageing of the population, the large share of the older generation and of pensioners, who are usually oriented towards the paternalistic or left-wing political spectrum

- There are hopes that the impact of political modernisation will be also accompanied by economic reforms including easing the tax burden and de-regulation for business activity and investments – this could be a favourable condition for strengthening and developing the self-reliant middle-class.

The Maidan protest movement appeared to be the main point in this chain reaction for de-institutionalisation of the post-Soviet ancien régime. But it is even more important that the Maidan and its practices proclaimed the birth of a new powerful institution in Ukraine's political sphere. And the impact and institutional memory of this are and will be found in many characteristics of Ukraine's current and future development. Let us examine why and how all this began.
What was Wrong and Why the Maidan?

Even though Ukraine’s democracy after the 2004 Orange revolution was still inconsistent and not fully consolidated, the country’s socio-political landscape had been drastically changing from 2010 onwards with the presidential victory of Viktor Yanukovych. These changes were about de-democratisation, shrinking constitutional human rights and freedoms (above all freedom of the press and freedom of assembly), and total political and administrative control by the Party of Regions (often ironically called ‘the party of one region’), since it was mostly used to represent the interests of the Donbas financial oligarchic clan close to Yanukovych’s family circle). At the institutional level this authoritarian shift was associated with the manipulative decision of 2010 by the Constitutional Court, whose majority was controlled by Yanukovych. The decision meant the return to the tough presidential power monopolising control over the whole spectrum of executive and legislative authorities and also over the judicial system, the army and the police. There were no actual check and balance counter-weight options under this rule. And the political opposition in the parliament had no real impact on decision-making, at least regarding politically strategic issues. Needless to say, there was an absence of real mechanisms and procedures of public control of the authorities. The regime, even though it nominally preserved some democratic trimmings, had been consistently leaning to authoritarianism. The control of monopoly positions by the Donbas regional clan and Yanukovych’s family circle in the socio-economic sphere resulted in a worsening economic situation and in a poor standard of living for the majority of the population, the country’s low positions in international rankings for corruption, ease of business activities and investment climate. The “wild capitalism” of the racket type and the “blackmail” state are useful terms with which to describe the situation.

Lacking clear democratic orientation in the ideological sphere, the regime actively reproduced the former Soviet identity and historical memory, involving the broad spectrum of propagandist myths and rituals of the Soviet historical past. Although one must admit that the pro-Soviet identity is still predominant for the significant part of the population in Eastern and Southern Ukraine and also for Crimea. The substantial part of the regime’s ideological Sovietisation is also reflected in the course of
de-Ukrainisation undertaken in language and educational policies and in the culture and media sphere.

The rape and attempted murder of Iryna Krashkova by two policemen in the village of Vradiyvka in Mykolaiv oblast, southern Ukraine, in summer 2013 became, along with other similar cases, the remarkable episode that characterised the country's social climate under Yanukovych's presidential rule. The arbitrary “selective justice” in the courts, an unchecked repressive state apparatus, the massive army of greedy bureaucrats demanding bribes for their functions in providing social service and dealing with even the most elementary administrative cases turned the country into a large “Vradiyvka.”

For Yanukovych, the ideal model for Ukraine’s future political construction was apparently the Russian “sovereign democracy.” However, the attempt to reproduce Putin’s authoritarian model and practices in Ukraine lacked at least two premises of Russian authoritarianism: 1) large economic and financial recourses; 2) strong historical traditions of étatisme also involving specific mass sentiments towards the authorities and the state as almost sacred objects. The former Ukrainian president Kuchma’s famous phrase “Ukraine is not Russia” also reflects other differences between the two countries. Ukraine's political and cultural complexity and the various interests of the regional political elite and oligarchs could hardly be fit into the schematic authoritarian design of “one party rules.” The socio-demographic factor also appeared to be important. In the decade of the 2010s a new generation of Ukrainians, who were born in an independent country and had never been members of the communist youth organizations in their schooldays, came into active social life.

Thus, by 2013, due to various reasons – a worsening socio-economic situation, mass distrust of the state and political representative institutions, the people's discontent regarding routine injustice and corruption, the dissatisfaction of many interest groups isolated from decision-making, small and medium-sized businesses' indignation at administrative and tax pressure, nationalists' resentment of Sovietisation and de-Ukrainisation in the cultural sphere – Ukraine was heavily burdened with an inevitable and steadily growing major political conflict. Under normal circumstances this conflict would have arisen in the late 2015 presidential elections and in a number of facets might have resembled the scenario of the 2004 “Orange” electoral revolution. But the dilemma of the orientation towards the European Union versus the Russian-governed Customs Union added a new
geopolitical drama to Ukraine’s political crisis. For the majority of Ukrainians that dilemma was perceived as a choice between the pro-European chance for the country’s modernisation and the pro-Soviet authoritarian model echoing from the past. Yanukovych’s refusal to sign the European deal just a week before the event was to be announced became the initial trigger for the Euro-Maidan in late November 2013. Gatherings and manifestations at the Maidan (the Independence Square in Kyiv) were rightly considered by pro-European civic activists to be the only remaining, most effective and already proven political mechanism for the expression of mass public discontent.

The Maidan as an Institution of a New Type

It is important to stress that the initial and spontaneous pro-European manifestations on the Maidan were initiated by the civic activists and students, not by the oppositional parties’ leaders. One of the first was the call to assembly made by journalist Mustafa Nayem through social networks. And the algorithm of predominantly public self-organising rather than protest driven by the political elite appeared to be characteristic of the entire long-running Maidan movement and its most decisive episodes. This also reveals the important dynamics in the recent Ukrainian socio-political process: 1) the extremely low level of public trust in the state and political institutions, including oppositional parties and, 2) the trends of “de-partisisation” (if not of de-politisation) of Ukrainian civil society’s manifestations in the 2010s. The consequence was the protesters’ moves (at least during the initial period of the protests) to distance themselves from institutionalised political structures and the people’s persistent criticism of the later attempts by politicians to monopolise the Maidan voice. The publics’ scepticism toward the political opposition was also based on the experience of the 2004 “Orange” Maidan. For many reasons and mostly due to unfulfilled promises, particularly regarding corruption issues, Viktor Yushchenko’s rule was disappointing for the majority of Ukrainians. We shouldn’t repeat the mistakes of 2004–2005, one should never rely on politicians, and civil society has to control them – those were the main lessons of the 2004
Maidan. And the protesters of 2013–2014 often articulated that in their slogans, actions and manifestations.

Most of the Maidan participants (92 percent), according to the survey conducted among the protesters in the beginning of December 2013, were not members of any political parties, civic organisation or movement. And even though political opposition and civic groups united later on the Maidan shared the same space, one can say that this was due to a pragmatic decision taken in the mutual interest of both sides. For its sustainability and successful proceedings the Maidan protest needed resources (technical, financial, organisational). It also required the institutionalised political channels for the representation of its own demands. The parliamentary political opposition and its three leaders could provide or at least facilitate all of these. For its part, the political opposition found in the Maidan the most powerful political tool that could be effectively used to change the country’s governmental configuration in its favour.

The divergences of both sides’ positions manifested themselves during the protest. The people repeatedly demanded from politicians a clear plan and vision, the selection of one principal leader from the oppositional pool and also open public discussion of all positions in negotiations with the authorities. However, in the turning points of the protests, it was the people, not the politicians who made a decisive, though often unpredictable impact on the situation. After two months of “staying and talking” on the Maidan, it was the initiative not of politicians, but of some protesters (mostly from the “Right Sector” and groups of soccer fans) to move to the parliament through Grushevskogo street on January 19–20. And then the final, radical stage of the conflict began. After the mass killing of protesters on February 20, 2014 it was Volodymyr Parasiuk, a leader of one of many Maidan self-defence groups, not a politician, not a member of any political parties, who on the Maidan stage expressed mass dissatisfaction with the deal with Yanukovych and made the ultimatum for his resignation within eight hours. Parasiuk publicly swore he would otherwise attack the presidential office even if he and his comrades were not supported by the rest. In these and similar episodes the Maidan used its final say in decision-making concerning actions, it itself defined the protest agenda.

and pushed it forward. And the political opposition leaders had no choice other than to accept and represent these demands, though often in their own way.

When speaking of the Maidan as a social actor and an institution of a new type one should understand, however, that the Maidan itself was not a uniform hierarchical organisation. It was rather an open and diverse community representing, even by means of their flags, symbols, and tents virtually all Ukrainian regions and many representatives of the globe. It was combined of various social groups (students, Chernobyl’ and Afghan War veterans, owners of small and medium-sized businesses, the intelligentsia, anarchists, nationalists, rockers, soccer fans etc.). All these groups had their own interests but they were united in their dissatisfaction with the situation in the country under Yanukovych’s rule and wanted changes.

The Maidan as a voluntary self-organising social network and a nationwide protest movement had been developing and regularly enriching its agenda in response to the political situation: from the first slogans for Ukraine’s Euro-integration to the demands for justice and the investigation into officials responsible for the orders for the police to brutally beat peaceful demonstrators on November 30, 2013 (the elemental appeal that, if it had been answered by the authorities, might have allowed them to gain a compromise at the beginning of the mass protest wave) to the demands for the release of arrested participants of the Maidan, for an end to political repression and for the resignation of the government and President Yanukovych.

The Transformation of the Maidan

During the four months of protests the Maidan also underwent a transformation of its own. Firstly, in the initial stage of the protest, it was mostly the public arena on the Kyiv’s Independence square where activists stayed and citizens gathered to discuss the current situation and plan activities. From December 2013 to March 2014 more than ten Maidan-viches

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were conducted – named after a historical east Slavic tradition of direct democracy through tribal assemblies, predating the Kyivan Rus state (in Ukrainian: віче). Usually held on Sundays, these rallies were attended by many thousands of Kyivans and people from other regions. The Maidan’s communicative focal point was its stage, from which the speeches were given, various announcements were made and regular morning prayers were held. Besides the direct channel of information and face-to-face communication, the Maidan had also been realising its informative and mobilising functions through the only remaining oppositional fifth TV channel and some Internet editions and also through the plethora of virtual focal points created by activists and supporters on social media networks.

After the brutal beating of protesters by the police on November 30, 2013, which resulted in the radicalisation of protests, the Maidan underwent another incarnation and became transformed into a self-defensive camp surrounded by rapidly growing barricades. Indeed, this Maidan appeared to resemble the Cossack republic, the sich.5 From December 2013, as a response to violence by the authorities, the self-defence initiative of the Maidan developed rapidly. This self-defence turned into the Maidan’s army, which was self-organised on a voluntary basis with its own divisions (the Hundreds), structure, and central command which coordinated all the activities with the headquarters of national resistance. The self-defence’s direct and basic functions protected the Maidan’s activists and citizens and kept order and security at the territories under the control of protesters. However, even though the self-defence was a paramilitary network, its members were not equipped with firearms, at least not during the period when the police began to use guns against protesters. Self-defence hundreds were organised on the basis of regional locality (the Л’вівська, Волинська and other hundreds) or on the profile principle (the “Afghans,” the Cossacks, the Right Sector and other hundreds). By the middle of February 2014 about 40 hundreds of the Maidan’s self-defence were created. Besides self-defence groups, the Maidan’s sustainability was kept by various units that provided medical, information, logistical, food-supply and other services. One of the most effective Maidan structures was also the Auto-Maidan, a self-organised mobile group of activists who were car-owners.

5 Ibid.
Another important function of the Maidan, namely the institute of public control over the authorities, appeared to be especially relevant after President Yanukovych’s flight from the country on February 21 and after the new interim government was appointed by the Verkhovna Rada, the parliament. But firstly the approval of each member of the new government took place at the Maidan’s viche. Some active leaders of the protest movement, such as the head doctor of the Maidan medical unit Oleh Musiy, the leader of the Auto-Maidan Dmytro Bulatov, the rector of the university most active in student protests, “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy,” Sergiy Kvit, and others took the positions of heads of ministries. The commander of the Maidan’s self-defence Andriy Parubiy was appointed as the new National Security and Defense Council Secretary. Two newly created institutions, the Anti-Corruption Bureau and the Lustration Committee were also headed by the Maidan activists. However, the new authorities are only partly aligned with the Maidan’s demand for changing not the faces, but the system. And not only because the principal ruling positions – the country’s acting president before the May 25 elections, Oleksandr Turchynov and the Head of Cabinet of ministries Arseniy Yatsenyuk – are both from Yulia Tymoshenko’s Batkivshchyna (Fatherland) party. The main risks in preserving the strong core of the former corrupt political and governmental system are in the firm convergence of big business and politics and in the persistence of old corrupt relations in the country’s state machinery. In the post-revolutionary Ukraine currently rocked by separatist clashes in its South-Eastern regions and spiraling into deep economic trouble the authorities are also faced with the pressing challenge of searching for inevitable compromises with various influential interest groups whose values and orientations are hardly democratic, transparent or pro-European.

The Maidan as the Ideal Civic Community?

The victory of the Maidan as a decisive and radical step in cutting an umbilical cord of post-Soviet order and politics came at a high price for Ukraine. Hundreds of deaths, Russian military occupation of Crimea and its accession, the rise of armed separatism inspired and supported by Putin’s Russia and the former president’s clans in the South-Eastern regions, a tough
economic and financial climate – these are the current characteristics of post-revolutionary Ukraine. Moreover, armed anti-Ukrainian separatists allegedly use the same motives and tactics of the Maidan with the argument “how come could Kyiv do this, but we are not allowed to?” In the ongoing “hybrid” war on the Donbas the manifestations of the self-proclaimed separatist “Donetskaya and Luhanskaya peoples’ republics” can also be characterised as a vivid anti-Maidan reaction aimed at preserving the ancien régime against which the Maidan rose and stood.

Was the Maidan an ideal institution? Apparently not, like all the ideal dreams in our hard and prosaic social reality. The tempting idea of direct public democracy could also bring with it the risk of its ochlocratic vulgarisation. When the war in the Donbas began many Maidan participants went to fight and the empty tents at the city center were occupied by people who were hardly engaged in the movement. In August 2014 the Kyiv government took a decision awaited by the majority of Kyivans to clear the city center of tents and barricades. Having justified that, one of the initiators of the Maidan movement, journalist Mustafa Nayem, reminded his compatriots of the core ideas behind the Maidan revolution, which began as a bid to bring Ukraine closer to Europe. On his Facebook page Nayem wrote that the exemplification of the Maidan ideals should be “reforms, victory in the East, support for our guys on the front lines – never a bunch of drunk and aggressive unemployed people, stuck in tents in the center of the capital.”

Understanding the Maidan not as a physical space but above all as values, it is true.

And now the most important question arises: whether Ukraine needed its Maidan. Was too high a price paid (and is still being paid now) for the country’s only chance of true modernisation? And what did Ukrainians get from the Maidan and the subsequent people’s uprising in 2014? I think so far, the answer lies in the sphere of values, particularly in the actualisation of social relations of honesty, responsibility, trust, solidarity, dignity and openness in many episodes of the protest movement, in gaining mass experience of real democracy and of patriotism. On the historical scale these values and norms could even be more valuable social achievements than gaining a decent level of national economic wealth. Indeed, for

the first time since 1991 Ukraine as a nation should now actually affirm its right to exist. The country’s independence of 1991 was taken without bloodshed and with no large civil conflicts, simply by dividing the former Soviet inheritance and institutionalisation of a new independent country within the borders of the former Soviet Republic of Ukraine. Now not only must the country’s borders be protected, but also the real intention of society to live in a new way should be proven.

Many Maidan activists were enthusiasts and romantics who strongly believed in the possibility of changes for the country’s better future and shared the ideals of democracy, human rights and freedoms, justice and personal dignity. One of the Maidan’s programmatic texts was written by Sergiy Kemsky, a young political scientist who was killed by a police sniper. Among the positions of the document were the new relations between a society and the state and the demand for empowering a society through the actual realisation of the constitutional provision (article 5 of the Constitution of Ukraine) of “the people as the only source of power in Ukraine.” The voice of the Maidan argued that the legislative mechanisms of direct democracy should enable the people not only to elect the authorities but also, if necessary (in the case of lost public trust, corruption, misdeeds etc.), to initiate their resignation at central and local levels. As Kemsky wrote, “the citizens’ demand is in turning the state from feudalistic scourge to the tool of a society’s self-organisation, we don’t need herdsmen any more, we need servants of the people’s will, who would effectively coordinate social recourses for the achievement of shared purposes.”7

The Maidan was a radical and often desperate attempt at mass public engagement in the project for the country’s social reconstruction. But even so, Ukrainians are now faced with another task – if not fully realising the Maidan’ ideals in practice (that is hardly possible because of the inevitable divergence of the ideal and reality), then at least proving that the sacrifice of many romantics and patriots was not in vain. And the everyday routine work on civilising life is a much harder challenge than throwing a dictator from his throne.

References

Shaking off the shackles in post-Soviet countries has proved extremely troublesome. Responding to the failures of societies in the former Soviet Union has presented challenges that few, apart from the Baltic States and Georgia, have had the courage to address head-on. Ukraine has been struggling to break free from the chains of colonial subjugation since independence. For many Westerners, especially those increasingly skeptical of the EU, the mere fact that thousands of young Ukrainians took to the streets in the bitter winter of 2013 to defend an agreement with the EU that did not promise any immediate gains may look somewhat incongruous. Timothy Snyder, in his *New York Review of Books* blog,1 put it straight: “Would anyone anywhere in the world be willing to take a truncheon in the head for the sake of a trade agreement with the United States?” Certainly not, and Snyder clearly knew the answer to his rhetorical question: it was not the Agreement per se that mobilized the protesters but their hope for a “normal life in a normal country” which the Agreement had symbolized and envisaged. “If this is a revolution,” he wrote, “it must be one of the most common-sense revolutions in history.”

In November, when the unscrupulous Yanukovych government stole people’s hope for a “normal life,” they felt deceived not solely about this shameless act but about all their lives, with the state of development of their country stuck for 22 years in a grey zone between post-Soviet autocracies to the east and increasingly prosperous and democratized neighbors to the west.

There had been too many hopes and too many disappointments within the past 22 years – starting with national independence, endorsed in 1991 by 90% of the citizens but compromised eventually by the predatory elite, and culminating in the 2004 Orange Revolution that also betrayed its high

expectations. The 2010 election of the clientelist puppet regime of Viktor Yanukovych and the dismissal of the feckless Orange government changed things only from bad to worse. Quickly the narrow circle of the president’s allies, nicknamed “the Family,” usurped all power, accumulated gargantuan resources via corruption schemes, destroyed the court system, encroached thoroughly on civil liberties and violated human rights. To give an idea of the extent of the embezzlement, cash flows out of Ukraine since 2010 are estimated by the Prosecutor General’s office to amount to nearly $100 billion. This nefariousness was accomplished as the ruling elite tauntingly proclaimed themselves to be pro-European and anti-corruption.

The dire results of their rule became evident not only in economic stagnation and the virtual collapse of the financial system, under the burden of international and domestic debts, but also in Ukraine’s dramatic downgrading in various international ratings – dropping from 89th place in 2009 to 126th in 2013 on the list of “Freedom of the Press”; dropping from 107th to 144th in “Corruption Perception,” and going from 142nd to 152nd place in “Doing Business,” and relegated from a “Free” to a “Partly Free” country in the Freedom House rankings. However, probably the most damaging consequence of their misrule became the complete distrust of Ukrainian citizens in every single state institution, primarily those that ensure legality and law enforcement. By the end of 2013, only 2% of respondents fully trusted Ukrainian courts (40% declared no trust at all), 3% trusted the police, the prosecutor’s office, and Parliament (fully subdued by Yanukovych’s supporters), and 5% trusted the government. The only institutions with a positive balance of trust/distrust appeared to be the Church, mass media, and NGOs.

Indeed, it might be a blessing in disguise that the Ukrainian government shelved the Agreement and that a country with such a ruling ‘elite’ was not brought “into Europe.” However, this would be to completely miss the point, as members of the government, their oligarchic cronies and families have long been in Europe – with their sumptuous villas, stolen money safely tucked away in major banks, their children enrolled in the finest pri-


vate institutions and diplomatic passports for trouble-free travel rendering a visa-free regime for the rest of their fellow citizens superfluous. Ironically, these elites have fully benefited from the rule of law and property rights in the West, while systemically undermining these same things in their home country, effectively rendering its business and investment climate rife with hostility and risk. It was not them, but Ukraine – its forty-six million people – who were excluded “from Europe,” whereas the ruling elite enjoyed *la dolce vita* in what they mockingly call “Euro-Sodom” or “Gayropa”– Putinesque pejorative nicknames for the European Union.

For many Ukrainians, the Association Agreement was the last hope to fix the things peacefully, i.e. to make their rulers abide by laws and to gain the EU’s support in attempts to reestablish the rule of law in the country. Most of them had few if any illusions about the ruling clique, and the last thing they had wished for was to see them “in Europe.” For many, the Agreement had two clear meanings. On the government side, it was meant to be a commitment to not steal, to not lie, and to not cheat so much and so unscrupulously, whereas on the EU side, it was meant simply to protect this commitment and help Ukrainian citizens, wherever possible, to enforce it.

Viktor Yanukovych’s decision to not sign the Association Agreement was an explosive moment of truth, a catalyst, and mass protests in Kyiv and other cities were simply a reaction to that truth – a farewell to illusions and a recognition of reality. In fact, Maidan meant a confrontation of two diametrically opposed worlds, two political systems and sets of values – the “Europe” embodied by the EU and the “Eurasia” embodied by Putinist Russia, Yanukovych’s “Family,” and the hired thugs, “titushki,” that harassed, tortured and killed the protesters.

Maidan, indeed, was neither “nationalistic mutiny” nor “election technologies” applied by the opposition, as Viktor Yanukovych and his Kremlin patrons claimed. Rather, it was a classical social revolution, an attempt to complete the unfinished business of the 1989 East European anti-authoritarian and anti-colonial uprisings. Euro-Madian was rather like, as Vaclav Havel said of the earlier revolution, “the power of the powerless” or civic self-empowerment. The looming threat, beyond the removal of the clientelist and corrupt Yanukovych regime, were the liberal values expressed on the Maidan that could contaminate Russia and imperil Putin’s system and neo-imperialistic myth.

As Anatoly Halchynsky, a renowned Ukrainian economist argued, “the goals of 1991, of Maidan-2004, and of the Euro-Maidan are the same.
They are of the same origin, related not only to the assertion of Ukraine's national sovereignty but also to putting an end to the Soviet epoch, freeing our mentality from the remnants of totalitarianism. European integration is merely a designator of these changes.”4 If one accepts Ben Judah’s idea that “communism falsified the meaning of good,” then it makes perfect sense to speak of Euro-Maidan as the “Revolution of Dignity,” composed of magic, miracle and mystery with myriad moments of madness.

Revolutions are complex enough events made even more complicated when authoritarian parties from outside try to destabilize them with “little green men” and Putin’s other acts of altruism. The meddling of the Kremlin in Ukraine has proved to be the main subversive factor of the Euro-Maidan. Lilia Shevtsova of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace argues convincingly that Ukraine is Putin’s “personal project” and that he has been craving vengeance since the Orange Revolution: “Ukraine now represents an opportunity for the Kremlin to exact revenge for both past and present Maidans, to teach the rebellious Ukrainians a lesson, and to warn Russians about the price of insubordination or attempts to escape the Russian matrix.”5 The catalysts of factors in pursuit of reform, rule of law, the end to corruption and a general normalization of Ukraine, arguably in accordance with the will of the majority, are hard pressed to counter the disinformation and destabilization efforts from Moscow.

Significant support for Putin’s Weltanschauung comes from some very unlikely sources in Europe: 1) misguided left-wing parties, like the so-called “Putin-Versteher,” Social Democrats in Germany and their shameless apologist Gerhard Schroeder (who just happens to be on the payroll of Nord Stream AG for some 250,000 Euros a year) and 2) duped far-right parties, like the BNP in Britain, Marine le Pen’s Front National in France, ATAKA in Bulgaria, the SNS in Slovakia, Jobbik in Hungary, and other Euro-disgruntled anti-American far-right groups. According to an analysis by the Political Capital Institute in Hungary, the far-right attraction to Russia stems partially from their “respect of its authoritarian system, its great-power rhetoric, suppression of basic freedoms and defense

of national interests”\textsuperscript{6}. In addition their goal is to substantially weaken the European Union by rejecting the Euro-Atlantic alliance and pressing for national self-reliance and isolation. All in all this makes for quite a motley crew riding Putin’s bear singing his song of Europhobia in some delusional, paranormal tour and consequently grants even more moral primacy to the Maidan.

As an economist, Halchynsky praises the Maidan’s non-mercantile character, which, in his view, is fully in line with global trends from economic determinism toward moral and spiritual values. Importantly, he contends, it is not a Bolshevik-style revolution of marginals, lumpen or social outcasts, but the contrary; it has been carried out primarily by educated people – the middle class, students, professionals, and businessmen (nearly two thirds of the Maidan protesters, according to sociological surveys, were people with higher education).\textsuperscript{7} It resembles, in a number of ways, the 1968 democratic revolutions that spread in Europe and over the globe introducing a radically new, non-materialist agenda.

If these observations are true and a gradual shift from materialist to post-materialist values is a reality in Ukraine, any attempt to install a fully-fledged authoritarian regime in Ukraine is doomed from the very beginning. To the extent that Ukrainian society is becoming a “knowledge society,” and the new generations grow up taking survival for granted, further increases in demands for participation in decision making in economic and political life are inevitable.\textsuperscript{8}

One may refer here to Ronald Inglehart’s and Christian Welzel’s analysis of cultural links between modernization and democracy and, in particular, to their two-dimensional map of cross-cultural variations that reflects correlations of a large number of basic values drawn from the extensive data of the World Value Surveys. (Ukraine was an object of these surveys in 1995, 2000, and 2006).

The WVS Cultural Map positions each country according to its people’s values. In one dimension it reflects predominance of Secular-Rational values versus Traditional values; in the other dimension it represents different

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{7} Fond Demokratychnoi Inizijatyvy. \texttt{<http://dif.org.ua/ua/events/vid-ma-zmindilosj.htm>} (accessed 20 April 2014).
\item \textsuperscript{8} The WVS Cultural Map of the World. \texttt{<http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs/articles/folder_published/article_base_54>} (accessed 20 September 2014).
\end{itemize}
countries’ drive from Survival values to Self-Expression. The former shift coincides primarily with the process of modernization and industrialization; the latter is characteristic primarily for postindustrial development. This is also reflected, as Welzel and Inglehart demonstrate, in a substantial difference in both dimensions between less-educated and university-educated members of the same society.9

Yaroslav Hrytsak, a prominent Ukrainian historian, argues that Ukraine rather disproves Inglehart’s pessimistic conclusion that the peculiar set of values entrenched in the mentality of the post-Soviet people makes all these countries very unlikely to achieve a trajectory of sustainable development in the foreseeable future.10 He refers to a noticeable shift in values in the Survival/Self-Expression dimension that has occurred in Ukraine in the past decade – in a sharp contrast to the virtual stagnation of the 1990s.

Indeed, even though the last WVS data come from 2006, all the recent Ukrainian surveys confirm that the shift of values in the country, however slow and sometimes incoherent, is rather persistent and probably irreversible. First of all, it is most noticeable in the attitudes of different age groups to various value-charged issues. Last year’s national survey11 reveals a strong correlation between the age of respondents and their attitude toward some fundamental issues such as “democracy versus a ‘strong hand,’” “freedom of speech vs. censorship,” “planned economy vs. the free market,” and, the most general, “regretting/not regretting the collapse of the Soviet Union.” But one may also discern a significant correlation between all those issues and people’s ethnicity as well as education. (In the table below only “yes/no” answers are shown, whereas “difficult to say / no answer” is omitted. Also, the middle age groups besides the youngest and oldest are omitted, as well as the middle group of Russophone Ukrainians – between ethnic Ukrainians and Russians, and all the middle groups between those with higher and basic education.)

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question / Education &amp; Ethnicity &amp; Age</th>
<th>Does Ukraine need more democracy or a “strong hand”? (%)</th>
<th>Does Ukraine need more freedom of speech or more censorship?</th>
<th>Does Ukraine need to develop market relations or come back to the planned economy?</th>
<th>Do you regret the collapse of the Soviet Union? (yes/no)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic</td>
<td>9/75</td>
<td>31/27</td>
<td>23/46</td>
<td>62/20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>32/55</td>
<td>47/25</td>
<td>58/25</td>
<td>31/57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>14/66</td>
<td>21/40</td>
<td>32/44</td>
<td>55/31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>28/58</td>
<td>47/24</td>
<td>54/28</td>
<td>38/47</td>
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<tr>
<td>60+ years</td>
<td>19/67</td>
<td>36/31</td>
<td>35/43</td>
<td>61/27</td>
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<tr>
<td>18–29 years</td>
<td>32/52</td>
<td>49/22</td>
<td>61/19</td>
<td>20/60</td>
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</tbody>
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This clearly shows that Ukraine is divided but, more significantly, hardly split. The conspicuous differences between the proverbial West and East are mitigated by (a) the vast intermediate regions of Central Ukraine, and (b) the heterogeneity of any sociologically significant group that makes intra-group differences and cross-group similarities nearly as important as inter-group differences and dissimilarities. For example, as we see from the date above, ethnic Russians have a greater tendency to regret the collapse of the Soviet Union than ethnic Ukrainians. But this means only a statistically significant correlation and not iron-clad dependence and determinism. Whereas 47% of Ukrainians express no regret for the demise of the Soviet Union, 38% express it to various degrees. Whereas 55% of Russians (in Ukraine) regret the collapse of the Soviet Union, 31% do not. Both groups are divided internally as much as externally between themselves. The same intra-group divisions can be discerned in people’s attitudes toward other political options.

Ethnic Russians and/or Russian speakers are more likely to support a “strong hand” vs. democracy, censorship vs. freedom of speech, or planned economy vs. the free market. But this is only a likelihood, not determinism. The reason is simple: for Russians and Russophones it was much easier to internalize Soviet ideology as “ours” than for Ukrainophones who strove to preserve their cultural identity under the pressure of Russification and therefore had more reasons to distance themselves, to various degrees, from the Soviet officialdom.
There are many other important differences that run across regional, ethnic, or ethno-cultural divides. Higher education is one of the crucial factors: in all groups and regions it strongly correlates with pro-Western, pro-democratic orientation and more civic behavior. The same correlation also works with age: the younger the people the more likely they are to support Ukraine’s European integration and everything it entails.\(^\text{12}\)

Nicu Popescu, a senior analyst at the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris, aptly recognized the complexity of Ukrainian divisions when he contended at the very beginning of the Maidan uprising that “the fault line runs not just between east and west, but also within the Yanukovych support groups. Some of them will continue supporting him, and some of them are disappointed by the way he misgoverned Ukraine over the last, almost four years.”\(^\text{13}\) Indeed, even though Ukrainians are still divided over geopolitical orientations, there is something close to a national consensus on the ousting of Yanukovych. (In a recent poll, 94% supported it in the West and 70% in the South East; by the same token, 91% of Westerners and 70% of Easterners condemned the Russian invasion of Crimea).\(^\text{14}\)

It might be a good time to get rid of propagandistic stereotypes and to re-conceptualize Ukrainian cleavages as primarily ideological rather than ethnic or regional. “There are two political nations, with different values and development vectors, that cohabitate in Ukraine,” Vitaly Portnikov, a renowned Jewish-Ukrainian publicist, argues.\(^\text{15}\) These two overlapping nations – the Soviet and the anti-Soviet, the Eurasian and the European, the nation of paternalistic subjects and of emancipated citizens – bear the same name but are fundamentally divided by the very idea of what Ukraine is and should be. All this makes reconciliation of “two Ukraines” highly problematic. For two decades, as another Ukrainian author, Yevhen

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Zolotariov, comments, two social realities, Soviet and non-Soviet, had coexisted in one country side by side, in parallel worlds, encountering each other only during elections. Each time, the non-Soviet Ukraine achieved a minimal but never firm victory over its Soviet rival, until Viktor Yanukovych, who managed within a few years to reestablish most of the Soviet practices and symbolism. The problem, however, is that Soviet Ukraine has neither the raison d’être nor the resources to exist beyond the USSR or as a kind of substitute for it.16

An American journalist employed the same metaphor of “two Ukraines,” with a remarkable parallel to the U.S. conflict between abolitionists and slave-owners (even though he ascribed, contrary to Zolotariov, some reconciliatory intentions to the Ukrainian ruler): “For three years as President Viktor Yanukovych has tried to balance the two sides, roughly comparable to the way pre-Civil War U.S. presidents tried to keep America’s house together by waffling on slavery […] Time will tell if President Yanukovych can keep Ukraine’s two nations under one roof.”17

Vitaly Nakhmanovych, a Ukrainian historian and Jewish-Ukrainian activist, argues that the reconciliation between these ‘two nations’ is barely possible in the foreseeable future because the shift of values is occurring very slowly, if at all. Instead, he contends, Ukrainian politicians should think about accommodation. It might be possible if one group manages to guarantee some autonomy for the other group, with due respect to its values. It is very unlikely that authoritarian Ukraine can provide such autonomy for democratically minded, Europe-oriented citizens. But it is quite possible that democratic Ukraine would find a way to accommodate its paternalistic, Sovietophile, and Russia-oriented fellow countrymen.18 This is actually what both Latvia and Estonia have rather successfully done for their Sovietophile/Pan-Slavonic co-citizens.

In a value-based context, all the arguments that Maidan and the post-Maidan government do not represent the whole of Ukrainian society but

rather deepen Ukraine’s ideological divide and political polarization\textsuperscript{19} make little sense. There are some fundamental issues like human rights, civil liberties, and rule of law – everything we subsume under the catch-all rubric of “European values” – that cannot be solved by a simple majority vote. To put it bluntly, no majority can legitimize slavery, and no society split can justify preservation of totalitarian values.

“The real political divide in the country is not that which supposedly separates Ukraine’s western and eastern regions,” contends the Russian political analyst Igor Torbakov. “It is a fault line, where on one side stands a host of emerging and assertive identities (including liberals, the champions of a Ukrainian civic nation, radical and less radical nationalists, and others); on the other side are found those clinging to a post-Soviet identity, one characterized by political passivity and a reliance on state paternalism. This post-Soviet identity is spread unevenly across Ukraine, being concentrated predominantly, but by no means exclusively, in the east and south.”\textsuperscript{20}

He believes that the best framework for analyzing Ukrainian developments is not a West vs. East, or Ukrainophones vs. Russophones paradigm but a withering away of the post-Soviet foundation upon which a peculiar system of authoritarian political practices and crony capitalism rests. He defines it as “Putinism” – probably because it was Putin who perfected the system and made it not just exemplary but also mandatory for all the post-Soviet authoritarians. Ukrainians’ break with the system poses an existential threat for the Kremlin and Putin himself, hence the hysterical reaction of the Russian media and the brutal invasion of Ukrainian territory by the Russian military. “The toppling of the Yanukovych regime,” Torbakov argues, “created an opportunity for a bold political experiment, one largely aimed at accommodating Ukraine’s multiple identities and opening up political and economic possibilities to a much broader slice of society. This desire to open up society is what strikes at the very heart of Putinism, a philosophy that needs a tight lid to be kept on political expression and economic opportunity.”


Russian aggressive actions may seriously frustrate Ukraine's latest attempt at de-Sovietization and profound reforms, but the very persistence with which Ukrainians are trying once again to complete the unfinished business of the 1989 East European revolutions implies that Ukraine's westward drift is rather irreversible, and the best thing Russia can do is to follow the move rather than try to obstruct it. Conceivably the national symbol of Ukraine, the trident, is a good omen that the third attempt is the right one.

References


The Ukrainian “Eurorevolution”: Dynamics and Meaning

The events in Ukraine that followed the decision of the Yanukovych government not to sign the Association Agreement with the European Union at the November 2013 summit in Vilnius came as a surprise to both Ukrainian society and the international community. Meanwhile, the dynamic situation has shown that significant parts of the Ukrainian people desire a principally new (“European”) political and economic structure to their lives. In this article we will reconstruct a chronology of the most significant events from November 2013 to February 2014 and examine various aspects of a political and economic crisis that is without parallel in Ukraine’s post-Soviet history.

The Initial Spontaneous Protests

The first protest on the Kyiv Maidan, Ukraine’s independence square, took place in the night between 21 and 22 November. As early as Saturday 23 November, tens of thousands of people, the largest assembly since the “Orange Revolution” of 2004, gathered to demonstrate and shout slogans in support of European integration. The majority of the demonstrators were angered not so much by the “abandonment” of negotiations with the EU as by the way it was communicated: society was confronted with the decision without public mention of the question, and after representatives of the government had confirmed only the previous day that they would most certainly be signing the agreement at the EU summit in Vilnius. It was this cynical manner of going about things that brought about a wave of protests of such magnitude.
In the first night of protests, it was not political activists who assembled on the Maidan; not a single political leader had called for a demonstration. It was a spontaneous act of protest on the part of outraged users of social networks amounting to a few hundred. Originally, even at the meeting on the Saturday that mobilised thousands of people on the “Euromaidans” of Kyiv and other cities the demonstrators stressed that they only demanded that the EU Association Agreement be signed and that this demand would not become subordinated to any other political goal. It must be emphasised that the text of the agreement provided neither for the prospect of Ukraine joining the EU nor for visa-free travel. That is, the demonstrators’ expectations vastly outweighed the document’s content.

At the EU summit in Vilnius of 28–29 November, President Yanukovych did not even sign the declaration of intent, and in a corridor conversation with the German chancellor Angela Merkel he complained that he alone was being manoeuvred into facing a “very strong” Russia.1

At 4 a.m. on 30 November the special police unit Berkut entered the central Kyiv square – Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) – under the pretext of safeguarding the erection of the New Year’s tree and mercilessly beat the students who had spent the night on the square. News of the violent clearing of the Maidan along with the news of the resignation of the director of the president’s office and the resignation of a number of parliamentarians from the government Party of the Regions saw up to a million outraged citizens gather in Kyiv on the Sunday. The protest was directed firmly at the government: the idealistic slogans of European integration were now joined by demands for the resignations of both the president and the prime minister.

The leaders of the three opposition parties represented in parliament – Arseniy Yatsenyuk (Bat’kivshchyna), Vitaliy Klychko (Udar) and Oleh Tyahnybok (Svoboda) – were prepared neither for the organisation of such a mass protest nor for media reports whose goal it was to show horrific scenes of violence.

But who was behind the “bloody New Year’s tree”? Who gave the order to storm the Maidan? Although both President Yanukovych and the

Prosecutor-General condemned the use of violence the next day, there were no resignations from the police command. Political responsibility certainly lay with the president, who at the very least had proven incapable of stopping the violence.

The Failed Storming of the Maidan

On Monday, 2 December 2013, after thousands had demonstrated in Kyiv and other cities throughout Western Ukraine, President Yanukovych remained silent. Yet the opposition leaders merely demanded that parliament take a vote on the withdrawal of the government. The practical consequences of millions protesting in Kyiv were that a few administrative buildings (including the mayor’s office) were occupied and that people returned to the Maidan. On Tuesday, 3 December, a parliamentary majority did not support the government’s withdrawal. On the same day Yanukovych left on a state visit to China. Meanwhile, the Kyiv courts arrested nine people suspected of being involved in the storming of the president’s office. Thus innocent people became hostages of the regime, to be used in later negotiations.

No less importantly, President Yanukovych ignored the advice of the representative of the United States state secretary Victoria Nuland and the EU high representative for foreign affairs and security policy Catherine Ashton to urgently call a roundtable and form a coalition government that would be responsible for the inevitably painful economic reforms. At the very time high-ranking guests from the EU and the USA were visiting Kyiv, and after a roundtable had taken place with three former Ukrainian presidents, during which Viktor Yanukovych was clearly annoyed by the critical contributions of his predecessors, in the night between 9 and 10 December another attempt was made to clear the Maidan with the use of force and to dismantle the barricades erected by the demonstrators. The official version of events declared that there had been a “clearing of the streets” for city traffic. It was possible to follow the events on television. As the police approached, the bells of Mikhailovskii Cathedral rang out the alarm. Within a few hours thousands had gathered on the square. As a result, the police ended their efforts before the morning.
The Maidan celebrated. Thus the protest had become, finally and irreversibly, a movement against the Yanukovych regime. After the failure of the “storm on the Maidan” new, more solid barricades were erected. Eventually, on Friday 13 December a roundtable discussion took place between President Yanukovych and the three opposition leaders. The meeting was not broadcast by a single national television station.

The Anti-Maidan

The next day, on 14 December, a mass event in support of the president took place 200 metres from the Maidan. Its participants had been specially bussed in to Kyiv. Here Prime Minister Mykola Azarov declared that Ukraine did not need a visa-free regime with the EU if that meant it would have to legalise gay marriage. The official message of the Anti-Maidan however was more or less: “For Europe, but later and on better terms!” Nevertheless, one of the representatives of the Party of the Regions called for the assembled masses to chant “Putin! Putin!”

In a parallel step, the state prosecution announced it suspected a breach of authority in the case of the violent clearing of the student Maidan on 30 November, implicating three high-ranking officials, including Kyiv mayor Oleksandr Popov. Virtually at the same time one could read on the internet copies of his interview, in which he named a person whose orders he appeared to have followed: the secretary of the National Security and Defence Council, Andrii Klyuev. However, that Klyuev was not involved in the events of 30 November was confirmed by both the state prosecution and the politician himself, in an interview not with Ukrainian, but with German journalists.

The Anti-Maidan was clearly the government’s attempt to show that it was not the people protesting against the government, but one part of the Ukraine against the other. This manipulation was made easier by the circumstance that in the east and in the south of the country distrust of the

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government was not reflected strongly in regional voting, since in these regions the “national democratic” opposition parties were not perceived to be the people’s “own” parties. The governing Party of the Regions could thus claim that people should vote for them so that “the nationalists don’t get in.”

That is not to say, however, that there are, in a sociocultural or political sense, two geographically defined “Ukraines,” one of which dreams only of “re-unification” with Russia while the other will do anything to combine pro-European attitudes with a “cult of ultra-nationalism.” The constantly invoked theory that Ukraine is not a single cultural entity or that a “peaceful division” would be desirable is to confuse present-day Ukraine with Czechoslovakia.

Pressure from Russia

On 17 December President Yanukovych departed with a state visit to Moscow, where Ukraine was promised a loan of 15 billion US dollars and the reduction of gas prices from 400 to 268.5 US dollars per thousand cubic

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metres. President Putin, obviously enjoying the role of fairy godmother, spoke of help for a “fraternal country” without “any conditions.” Of course, the gifts from Moscow were nothing if not serving self interest, and certainly were not open-ended (for example, the gas deal was to be reviewed on a quarterly basis), and they were quite clearly dependent on Ukraine behaving “correctly.” There was no talk of formal membership of the Customs Union; instead a new integration model was drafted involving Russian control of strategic areas of the Ukrainian economy – and it would have only been a small step from this to demanding a “concordance” of foreign policy.

It would appear that Russian financing bought Yanukovych some time. But Ukraine was teetering on the brink of bankruptcy not because of the impending signing of the EU Association Agreement but as a consequence of the excessive burden the state had placed on the economy, an unfavourable trading climate, total corruption and the irresponsible populism of the country’s leaders. To understand the significance of the December agreement to Russia, it helps to recall Putin’s oft-repeated conviction that Ukrainians and Russians are “one people” as well as the conflict of interpretations: while for Brussels the Association Agreement represented an alternative to Ukrainian membership of the EU, Moscow considered it EU expansion by alternative means.

The Organisation and Content of the Maidan

At the Sunday evening gathering on 22 December, an event that had already become an established routine, the opposition leaders announced from the Maidan stage the creation of a societal organisation, the “National Maidan Association” (NOM). This amorphous structure with a committee consisting of parliamentarians, journalists, musicians and the rector of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy under the *de facto* leadership of the opposition, created without public discussion, immediately raised many questions. Above all, the suspicion was that the opposition was trying to give the impression

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of activity while in fact lacking a strategy and resolve. It became increas-
ingly clear that the opposition could not satisfy the Maidan’s demands for a programme of reforms and a new socio-political force.

How can the phenomenon of self-organisation on the Maidan be explained? Most of the Sunday events on the Maidan were organised by educated and enterprising middle-aged people who combined the hopes for transformation with a broadly conceived Europeanisation. Most of these people were united by their rejection not only of the corrupt govern-
ment but also of the entire political and economic situation in post-Soviet Ukraine. The positive content of the Maidan consisted primarily of elements of nationalism and a European mythology. The Maidan served to legitimise nationalist slogans (“glory to Ukraine – glory to the heroes!”) and flags (the black and red symbol of the nationalist underground during the Second World War) as symbols of pro-European protest. It is telling that the black and red flag was raised on the spot where on the evening of 8 December the Lenin monument in Kyiv was toppled. The right-wing extremist party Svoboda proudly claimed it was responsible for this action. As far as the slogan “Glory to Ukraine” is concerned, it shifted in meaning; on the Maidan it came to be a non-party slogan in support of the European revolution. And the mythology of Europe as a space of rule of law, social justice, freedom of movement and expression could be compared with the positive images of Europe in the new EU member states before the accession.

Repressive Legislation and the Outbreak of Violence

On 16 January 2014, despite the attempts of the opposition to block the benches and the speaker’s box, the parliament voted for a state budget in line with the agreement between Yanukovych and Putin. In the course of

a few minutes a majority, loyal to the government, agreed without discussion and by a mere raising of hands to a whole series of openly repressive laws resembling Russian legislation. Yanukovych immediately added his signature to these laws but did not hurry to make them public.

On Sunday, 19 January, tens of thousands once again assembled on the Maidan awaiting a plan of action from the opposition leaders and the election of a leader of the resistance. Instead they received emotional speeches devoid of content, and the leader of “Bat’kivshchyna,” Arseniy Yatsenyuk, declared that the “only leader is the Ukrainian people.” One of the activists then called from the stage for the people to move towards the parliament building (which at this time was empty). On Hrushevsky Street, a few meters from the parliament, the demonstrators were awaited by a police cordon. And here the protest immediately lost its peaceful character.

Within a few hours one of the streets of central Kyiv became a battlefield with Molotov cocktails, pyrotechnics, stun grenades and gas. The clashes were initiated by a group of young people who some called activists from right-wing extremist groups, others simply provocateurs. What is clear is that the attempts of both Arseniy Yatsenyuk and Vitaliy Klyuchko to call the people back to the Maidan failed. In the night between 19 and 20 January Klyuchko negotiated with Yanukovych about discussions on how to end the crisis. The next night the scandalous and unlawful laws were published in the government newspapers. (Incidentally, one photograph of the voting shows two fewer hands than the 235 that were recorded.)

The First Deaths and the Regional Expansion of the Protests

22 January was a black day in the history of Ukraine. On Hrushevsky Street some demonstrators were shot dead by snipers: Sergiy Nigoyan

and Mykhailo Zhyzhnevsky; Roman Sedyk died a few days later from his injuries. There were no words of condolence or official mourning from the government. Instead, Prime Minister Azarov described them as “marauders, terrorists and criminals.”

During the negotiations between the president and the leaders of the opposition on 23 January a ceasefire on Hrushevsky Street was agreed to. At the same time, demonstrators in Ternopil occupied the regional administrative headquarters. The same was soon to happen in other cities of Western Ukraine. The following night on the Maidan, the opposition leaders presented the results of the discussions with the government in a fashion that was incomprehensible. The minor concessions suggested, lacking any structural transformation, were not accepted by the assembled masses. The opposition leaders then announced that they would not take part in further discussions with the government, only to continue them the next day while the protests grew in the provinces. As early as the third day of these protests, they crossed the boundaries of Western Ukraine and reached the eastern part of the country in Sumy, Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv. In the East and the South the protests did not end in the occupation of administrative headquarters, but in open clashes with the police and “titushki” in which many were injured and arrested. The deployment of “titushki,” (i.e. informal groups of hired young people who used force under the protection of the “organs of law and order” – the term comes from the “sportsman” Vadym Titushko, who had been in the media spotlight) provides the clearest illustration of the Yanukovych regime’s departure from legal measures.

Unsuccessful Negotiations

On 25 January, in an atmosphere in which the violent clearing of the Maidan and the declaration of martial law were expected at any time, at a time when the government’s resources were limited and, just as significantly,
the opposition leaders were neither willing nor able to fulfil the Maidan’s expectations, President Yanukovych offered Arseniy Yatsenyuk the position of Prime Minister and Vitaliy Klychko that of Vice-Premier for Humanitarian Affairs. Many suspected this unexpected proposal to be a trap, while others viewed the beginning of negotiations as the government capitulating. The next day Yatsenyuk announced that he would not be accepting the office of Prime Minister.

On Tuesday 28 January parliament began an extraordinary meeting. Shortly before the parliament convened, Prime Minister Azarov’s resignation was announced. The Party of the Regions and the Opposition voted to repeal most of the dictatorial laws of 16 January, conveying, for a short while, the impression they were prepared to compromise. But the “Amnesty Law” (concerning the release of the “instigators of mass rioting”) shattered all premature illusions. After unfruitful talks behind closed doors and Yanukovych’s speech in parliament that evening, in the night of January 29 the parliamentarians loyal to the government supported a law that only provided for amnesty on the condition that the demonstrators leave the occupied government buildings within 15 days. And the opposition’s bill concerning the unconditional release of the state’s hostages did not even make it to the vote.

The next day Yanukovych went to hospital. But his unplanned appearance in parliament demonstrated that great tension had developed within the hitherto monolithic Party of the Regions, in particular since many of its members did not accept the idea of violently clearing the Maidan and declaring a state of martial law. Without the resources necessary for the overt use of force, the regime waged a peculiar partisan battle with the protesters. The most horrific images of these clashes were the murder of the seismologist Yuriy Verbytsky (his body was discovered in the woods outside Kyiv on 22 January) and the torturing of Dmytro Bulatov (found alive on 30 January).

Death of the “Heavenly Hundred”
and the President’s Flight

The temporary ceasefire did not solve any problems: the government still rejected genuine talks or concessions, and the people on the Maidan were
clearly fed up with the opposition speeches. The peaceful procession to the parliament on 18 February quickly escalated into another clash with the police. Once more, people died on Kyiv’s streets. The police attacked and were on the cusp of storming the Maidan with military assistance. That did not happen however. But on the morning of 20 February snipers began to shoot at demonstrators in the centre of Kyiv. Within a day no less than 80 people died – they have become known as the “Heavenly Hundred.” Ten police officers were also shot. These events have yet to be investigated thoroughly.

Following further negotiations involving the foreign ministers of Germany, Poland and France and a special representative from Russia, Yanukovych signed an agreement with the opposition leaders. The most important point was the bringing forward of the early presidential elections to no later than December 2014. The Maidan could not accept this agreement and Yanukovych as a president for one more year after people had been mercilessly gunned down in the centre of Kyiv. Even if the snipers on the Maidan had been an act of provocation, the government completely delegitimised itself by its failure to unequivocally condemn and investigate these actions.

The Ukrainian political elite reached consensus on the night of 22 February, when it agreed to depose Yanukovych. The following day Yanukovych left his residence and then Ukraine itself. The leader of the Party of the Regions faction, Oleksandr Efremov, then appeared in a video message to say that Yanukovych had “deceived, robbed and betrayed” the country."10 Yanukovych’s representative in the parliament, Yuriy Miroshnichenko, burst into tears during his live TV interview and begged for forgiveness for the president’s crimes.

Yanukovych’s flight with his closest companions (the minister of defence, the minister of the interior, the general-prosecutor, the head of the state security service and others travelled to Russia) created a situation in which the parliament remained as the sole legitimate body of government. A deep crisis of sovereignty and the state provided ideal conditions for the annexation of Crimea by Russia and the subsequent military operations in the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk. As James Sherr put it, Putin’s Russia links its security with the limited sovereignty of its

neighbors and designates its ‘compatriots’ (any Russian-speaking person) abroad an instrument of politics.\footnote{Sherr, J. Compare: The new world order. The Economist, March 22\textsuperscript{nd}–28\textsuperscript{th} 2014.} According to Joerg Forbrig, Russian interventionist strategy enables the country to interfere with any of its post-Soviet neighbors, should they chose a political model at home or affiliations abroad that differ from what Moscow wants.\footnote{Forbrig, J. Crimea crisis: Europe must finally check the Putin doctrine. CNN, 2014. <http://edition.cnn.com/2014/03/14/opinion/ukraine-russia-putin-doctrine-joerg-forbrig/> (accessed 17 August 2014).}

By annexing Crimea and provoking and supporting separatism in Donbas, Putin, on the one hand, secured his short-term popularity, but, on the other, brought Russia into a military conflict with no happy ending and highly dangerous long-term implications. He hoped for the mass support of the people of the Donbas, underestimated Ukrainian identity and the Ukrainian army as well as the capacity of the US and EU to resist his politics. When the plans for the swift formation of two quasi independent ‘people’s republics’ in Donetsk and Luhansk failed, Russia apparently accepted the strategy of turning the East into a constant source of trouble which keeps Ukraine chaotic, dysfunctional and unpalatable to West, and transforms Ukraine into a buffer state with a level of disorder Russia can turn up or down.\footnote{Boys from the blackstuff. The Economist. April 19\textsuperscript{th}–25\textsuperscript{th}, 2014, p. 20.}

Conclusion

During the twenty years of its post-Soviet existence Ukraine avoided physical violence in solving political conflicts. The lack of a uniform national public consensus on the memory or language issues has often been not so much a force for division as a stabilizing factor in a state characterized by so much diversity. It maintained ambiguity as a way of avoiding social conflict, and an obstacle to the monopolization of the public sphere in the service of one political force or another. Until January 22\textsuperscript{nd} 2014 not a single Ukrainian had been killed in mass protests or demonstrations. The violent agony of Yanukovych’s regime and the Russian intervention in the eastern parts of the country dramatically ruined the Ukrainian tradition of
the non-violent solution of political problems and called into question the distinctive pluralism of post-Soviet Ukraine’s public space.

It seems that Putin misinterpreted the nature of the Ukrainian-Russian language and cultural coexistence within Ukraine, thinking that speaking Russian automatically meant political loyalty to his project of a “New Russia.” At the same time, Russian intervention and the ongoing war intensified the formation of the Ukrainian political nation. The curious phenomenon of diverse interpretations and definitions of “Ukrainianness” within post-Soviet political reality supports Rory Finnin’s observation that “the thesis of Ukraine’s ‘weak’ national identity is not only conceptually vague, but analytically useless.” Instead of unrealistic and inevitably violent scenarios of a “split,” Ukraine should seriously embrace the challenge of full recognition of its hybridity as autonomous complex subjectivity, of reconceptualizing the country’s diversity as its greatest treasure and as a way of preserving pluralism and ambivalence as preconditions of freedom and democracy.

References

Andriy Portnov and Tetiana Portnova


Before and After the Euromaidan: Ukraine Between the European Choice and the Russian Factor

The three-month-long mass civil protests in Ukraine resulted not only in regime change but also in a fundamental shift in the popular attitudes toward the country’s largest geopolitical neighbors: Russia and the European Union. The proxy war in the eastern regions of Ukraine, sponsored by Russia, and the weak European response could make Ukrainians reject the idea of full integration into the EU but stick to European and Euro-Atlantic standards in building new political and security institutions.

The issue of foreign policy orientation was usually low on the list of political priorities of the Ukrainian people compared with the urgent political, economic and social welfare issues. However, it served as an indicator of which political, economic and social practices and standards, European or Russian, a given political force or leader would implement if elected. In the 2012 parliamentary elections pro-European and pro-Western oppositional parties received 49.94% of the vote, and gained unprecedented support in several important Eastern and Southern industrial regions (see Table 1.). For instance, in the Dnipropetrovsk and Kherson regions they achieved 40% of the vote.
Table 1: Voting for pro-Russian and pro-European political parties and blocs 1998–2012 in the Eastern and Southern regions of Ukraine.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dnipropetrovsk</td>
<td>30.52% / 524</td>
<td>6.24% / 119,7</td>
<td>36.44% / 671,9</td>
<td>6.35% / 117,1</td>
<td>55.77% / 915</td>
<td>27.26% / 447,2</td>
<td>55.17% / 766,9</td>
<td>38.17% / 530</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zaporizhia</td>
<td>43.71% / 456,4</td>
<td>9.4% / 98,3</td>
<td>38.61% / 388</td>
<td>7.93% / 79,7</td>
<td>63.75% / 593,7</td>
<td>19.38% / 180,5</td>
<td>62.11% / 496</td>
<td>31.18% / 249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Odesa region</td>
<td>38.44% / 477,6</td>
<td>7.79% / 96,9</td>
<td>30.38% / 344,1</td>
<td>6.62% / 74,9</td>
<td>58.38% / 588</td>
<td>20.21% / 203,7</td>
<td>60% / 520,6</td>
<td>32.56% / 282</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mykolaiv Region</td>
<td>48.52% / 321,9</td>
<td>8.42% / 55,9</td>
<td>34.24% / 216,9</td>
<td>5.99% / 37,9</td>
<td>61.58% / 344</td>
<td>22.43% / 125,4</td>
<td>59.6% / 281,7</td>
<td>33.74% / 159,5</td>
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<td>Kherson region</td>
<td>49.69% / 309,8</td>
<td>6.82% / 42,5</td>
<td>35.55% / 213,4</td>
<td>11.82% / 70,9</td>
<td>52.32% / 259</td>
<td>32.13% / 159</td>
<td>52.68% / 226</td>
<td>40% / 172</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kharkiv region</td>
<td>51.48% / 791</td>
<td>4.26% / 65,7</td>
<td>35.86% / 535,2</td>
<td>5.92% / 88,4</td>
<td>57.89% / 769</td>
<td>24.46% / 325</td>
<td>61.82% / 700</td>
<td>31.86% / 361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donetsk region</td>
<td>41.47% / 1001,8</td>
<td>5.8% / 140,4</td>
<td>34.36% / 853,3</td>
<td>2.69% / 66,9</td>
<td>81% / 1934</td>
<td>5.55% / 132,8</td>
<td>83.95% / 1664,2</td>
<td>11.17% / 219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luhansk region</td>
<td>55.58% / 753,7</td>
<td>3.49% / 47,4</td>
<td>46.1% / 591,5</td>
<td>3.62% / 46,4</td>
<td>84.85% / 1076,4</td>
<td>6.83% / 86,6</td>
<td>82.2% / 834,9</td>
<td>11.52% / 116,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimea</td>
<td>53.11% / 519,5</td>
<td>7.55% / 73,9</td>
<td>43.47% / 418,6</td>
<td>9.77% / 94</td>
<td>72.7% / 639,7</td>
<td>15.16% / 133,4</td>
<td>71.75% / 526</td>
<td>21% / 156</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


At the same time, pro-Russian forces, the Party of Regions and the Communist Party of Ukraine lost some ground in their stronghold areas: Donetsk region (220 thousand votes), Luhansk region (206 thousand votes), Dnipropetrovsk region (146 thousand votes), Zaporizhia region (97 thousand votes), Crimea (75 thousand votes), Odessa region (68 thousand votes) and Kharkiv region (69 thousand votes).
In 2013 opinion polls and sociological surveys did not register significant changes in the citizens’ attitudes. The growth of the protest sentiments, compared to 2012, was visible but the share of people ready to protest was lower than in the years of the presidential electoral campaigns in 2004 or 2009. In May 2013, one of the polls\(^1\) showed that people could go to protest against the decline in welfare (34.5% of respondents), delays in payment of salaries or pensions (32%) and unpopular economic decisions of the government (24%). Meanwhile, only 13% of respondents were prepared to protest against the deterioration of democracy, 8.7% would take to the streets to force Yanukovych to resign, only 5.7% of those questioned saw a legitimate reason to protest against the establishment of the Russian language as the second official language and 4.5% of respondents were sure they would oppose Ukraine’s accession to the Customs Union with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan.\(^2\)

Division between supporters of the Association with the EU and proponents of membership of the Customs Union did not completely overlap with the lines dividing voters of opposition and pro-presidential forces as well as Russian- or Ukrainian-speaking respondents. In May 2013 the poll\(^3\) showed that 36% of Ukrainians looked forward to entering the Customs Union, 33% thought Ukraine should develop itself to approach to the standards necessary for EU membership, while 18% considered staying out of both, and 13% were undecided.

In September 2013, after Russia had introduced customs restrictions halting imports from Ukraine, public opinion changed. The new


\(^3\) Opinion poll, conducted by the Kyiv International Sociology Institute between 21–30 May 2013. All-Ukrainian sample of 2030 respondents, representing adult population of Ukraine. Sample statistical error: 3.3% for figures close to 50%, 2.8% – for figures close to 25%, 2.0% – for figures close to 10%, 1.4% for figures close to 5%, <http://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=175&page=10> (accessed 20 August 2014).
poll revealed that if asked to vote in a referendum, 41% of Ukrainians would back EU membership (73% in the Western regions, 45% in the Central, 26% in the Southern and 18% in the Eastern regions) while 35% would say “yes” to the Customs Union (57% in the Eastern regions, 46% in the Southern, 25% in the Central and 13% in the Western regions). Sociologists also noted there was a generation gap between proponents of the “East-West” choice. While people aged 18–49 tended to support the EU, respondents aged 50–70 and older were more pro-Russian.

Considering the results of the elections of 2012 and sociological data we can assume that neither the people nor the opposition parties intended or planned in advance mass protest movements to demand choosing between the EU or Russia or to overthrow the government. The opposition leaders hoped that after singing the Association Agreement with the EU, the president and the government would have to adapt to European demands and liberalize political and economic conditions in the country.

Maidan vs. Anti-Maidan:
How Ruling Elites Used Pro-Russian Sentiments to Fight Against Pro-European Protesters

The start of the protest movement against the government decision to break off negotiations with the EU had a distinctive regional character. The biggest rallies of several thousand people between November 22 and 30 gathered in Kyiv and the western city of Lviv. At the same time there were virtually no significant mass events in the Eastern and Southern cities in support of the Customs Union or against the EU. On 30 November the forceful crackdown against pro-European protesters in Kyiv triggered the largest protests in the capital since 2004 and mobilized citizens from the western and central regions of Ukraine to move to the city and participate in the permanent civil non-violent resistance actions called “Maidan.”

Opinion poll, conducted by the Kyiv International Sociology Institute from 13–23 September 2013. All-Ukrainian sample of 2,044 respondents, representing the adult population of Ukraine. Sample statistical error: 3.3% for figures close to 50%, 2.8% – for figures close to 25%, 2.0% – for figures close to 10%, 1.4% for figures close to 5%, <http://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=196&page=8> (accessed 20 August 2014).
Not until the middle of December did the Party of Regions organize an alternative “Anti-Maidan” camp near the parliament. However, it proved ineffective, since the government couldn’t control media coverage favorable to “Euro-Maidan” protesters or prevent dissemination of information about the staged and pre-paid nature of the “anti-Maidan” protests.

When mobilization of supporters appeared to be insufficient, the Yanukovych administration decided to strengthen its position and force protesters to stop civil resistance by applying criminal code penalties for protests and rallies. However, public opinion polls warned that the president’s decision to halt the protest movement by use of force could be counterproductive from the point of view of maintaining law and order and national unity. According to a December survey⁵, 50% of Ukrainians supported “Euro-Maidan” (80% in western Ukraine, 63% in the central regions, 30% in the East and 20% in the South, including Crimea) while 42% opposed it (71% in southern Ukraine, including Crimea, 65% in the eastern regions, 28% in the Center and 7% in the West).

On the other hand, 57% of Ukrainians did not support the “Anti-Maidan” movement (89% in western Ukraine, 75% in the central regions, 38% in the East and 22% in the South) and only 27% approved of it (54% in the South, including Crimea, 43% in eastern Ukraine, 14% in the central regions and 3% in the West). At the same time, the majority of the population (72%), regardless of regional division, looked to the “round table” option as a way out of crisis. This idea was supported by 73% in the West, 64% in the center, 80% in the South and 78% in the East. Also, the majority of respondents from all regions agreed with the statement that the police force were biased and more violent toward opposition protesters than in comparison with their treatment of the pro-governmental supporters.

In January, after the first violent clashes and the capture of the administration buildings in Kyiv and ten western regions, the Maidan was supported by 80% of respondents from the western regions, 50% in the central regions, 20% in southern and 8% in eastern Ukraine. Meanwhile President Yanukovych was backed by 52% respondents in the East, 32% in the South, 11% in central and 35% in western Ukraine. At the same time

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39% of eastern Ukrainians and 41% of southern Ukrainians said they did not support any side of the conflict. At this point, two opinion polls, conducted between January 24th and February 18th showed that the majority of Ukrainians (63.3%) favored negotiations as a tool for realizing protesters’ demands.

This widespread sense of disregard in the regions that were once loyal to the president can be explained if we look at how people understand the causes of the protests.8 26.8% of respondents from the southern regions and 20% from the east mentioned indignation with the corrupt Yanukovych regime, 19% of the southern and 4% of the eastern respondents pointed to the unlawful actions of the police force, 14% and 5% said that protesters are driven by their sense of civil dignity, and 14.7% and 11.5% of respondents believed that the protesters wanted to make Ukraine a European civilized country.

Hence, despite uneasy and fragile temporary agreement between the opposition and the president, both sides continued their ideological battle for the country. In this situation, Yanukovych and his team developed tactics of creating and deepening divisions between the East and West of Ukraine. Unable to mobilize supporters after three years of poor management, corruption and misuse of state resources and undelivered electoral promises, the president and his loyalists in the Party of Regions played the card of “nationalistic threat” and “Western collusion” against the “brotherhood of Ukraine and Russia.”

According to a survey, 57.4% respondents in the East and 44% in the South were already persuaded that the Western influence fueled protests, while 45% of easterners and 35% of southerners were afraid that the protests were inspired by the nationalistic sentiments of the participants.

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8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.
The role of propaganda in sustaining a sense of hatred should not be underestimated. From the very beginning, the Maidan protesters were described by the mass media, loyal to Party of Regions and Yanukovych, as “radicals,” “terrorists” and “outlaws.”

In the case of Crimea and the eastern regions bordering with Russia, these propaganda clichés were disseminated by the Russian media. In January and February, especially after the protests turned violent, the Russian TV channels, press and Internet media concentrated their attention only on the far-right participants of the protests, comparing them to German Nazis and accusing them of “anti-Semitism” and “nationalism.”

The accusations that “radical nationalists” and “western agents” were involved in staging protests and using violence in Kyiv were repeated by all regional heads of the Party of Regions and governors in all the regions of Ukraine. However, only in the eastern and southern parts of the country were these messages followed by the establishment of paramilitary organizations, motivated by money or hatred towards people from Western Ukraine or just Ukrainian-speaking men and women.

On 24 January 2014, Vladimir Konstantinov, speaker of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (ARK) and a member of the Party of Regions, appealed to all the heads of state administrations of the eastern and southern regions to fight against what he called a “coup d’état.”

On 1 February 2014, Mykhaylo Dobkin, governor of the Kharkiv region and the regional organization of the Party of Regions, announced the establishment of the civil movement “The Ukrainian Front” and backed the radical pro-Russian paramilitary organization “Oplot.” Dobkin stated that almost “150 thousand volunteers” from the “Ukrainian Front” and “Oplot” would protect Kharkiv from the “fascists” and “liberate” Kyiv from the Maidan “radicals.”

In Zaporizhia, Vyacheslav Bohuslayev, a member of the Party of Regions and owner of the “Motor Sich” (a huge military industrial enterprise tied to the Russian market) warned that any repetition of the protests in the city would be crushed. He speculated that unrest in Zaporizhia on January 26 was organized by the “nationalists” and “remnants of outlaws” from western Ukraine.

The opposition was slow to react to these allegations even when it took power after President Yanukovych had escaped from Kyiv. The new leaders lost the opportunity to visit Crimea before it was invaded by the Russian
troops and explain their future policies addressing concerns about the economic, social and cultural development of the peninsula. As a result, the people in Crimea remained without any real choice, regarding “friendly” Russian military occupation as a way to protect themselves from the “fascist coup” in Kyiv.

How Russian Aggression Destroyed Support for “Russkiy Mir” in Ukraine

By mid-March it became clear that the separatist sentiments in the eastern and southern Ukraine were too weak to receive wide popular support and justify Russian invasion. On the other hand, a new interim government failed to win a minimal degree of loyalty from the population in Donbas. Thus President Yanukovych and Russia used this vacuum of legitimacy in the eastern and southern regions and a fear of retaliation from “radical” Maidan protesters to stage mass protests and to capture the administrative buildings.

Comparing voting patterns (Table 1) with recent separatist activity we can argue that only in three regions with the highest level of support for pro-Russian political rhetoric (Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk oblast) did separatists manage to achieve temporary local success and secure substantial initial backing from the population.

However, the situation became more controversial in April, when the massive protests, called the “Russian Spring,” were used by the Russian security agents and mercenaries to launch clandestine operations against Ukrainian law enforcement structures and establish their own “independent people’s republics” in Donetsk and Luhansk.

According to the poll, conducted on the eve of the so-called “referendums on self-determination” organized by the self-proclaimed authorities of “Donetsk people’s republic” and “Luhansk people’s republic,”

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10 Opinion poll, conducted by the Kyiv International Sociology Institute between April 29 and May 11, 2014. All-Ukrainian sample of 2,022 respondents, representing the adult population of Ukraine, except Crimea. Sample statistical error: 3.3% for figures close to 50%, 2.8% – for figures close to 25%, 2.0% – for figures close to 10%, 1.4% for figures close to 5%, <http://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=347&page=1> (accessed 20 August 2014).
the number of people with a positive attitude toward Russia fell in the eastern (from 92% in February to 77% in May) and southern regions (from 85% to 65%). It is important to mention that only 25.8% of respondents in the Kharkiv, Donetsk and Luhansk regions and a marginal 6% in the southern regions of Odessa, Mykolaiyv, Kherson, Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia wanted to see Ukraine and Russia united in one state, while 70% in the South and 58.9% in the East wanted to see Ukraine remain a friend of Russia's while retaining its status as an independent state.

Another May poll\(^\text{11}\) showed that the share of proponents of EU integration grew to 28% in the southern regions of Odessa, Mykolaiyv and Kherson and 30.5% in the eastern regions of Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia and Kharkiv, while the number of supporters of the Customs Union fell to 25% and 29.5% respectively. Only in the Donbas (Donetsk and Luhansk regions) did a majority (68%) continue to support Ukraine's integration into the Customs Union. Moreover, only 17% of people in the eastern and southern regions were in favor of a military alliance with Russia, while in the Donbas this idea was supported by 50% of respondents.\(^\text{12}\)

The dramatic change in attitude toward Russia in Ukraine's southern and eastern regions, except the Donbas, can be explained by the popular reaction to the separatist terror actions in the cities of Slovyansk, Horlovka and Mariupol in the Donetsk region during April and May. Tragic events in Odessa on May 2, when 48 people died and hundreds were injured in the street clashes provoked by the militants from Russia and the unrecognized Transdnistrian republic were especially traumatic for the moderate pro-Russian public.

The results of the early presidential elections on May 25 also proved that the Russian influence has diminished proportionally to the Kremlin's involvement in the unrest in Ukraine. Petro Poroshenko won a landslide victory campaigning for urgent military action against pro-Russian separatists, stressing the necessity of seeking new opportunities provided by the Association Agreement with the EU and promising to secure the


economic and cultural rights of the Russian-speaking population. As a result, Poroshenko won all electoral districts in eastern and southern Ukraine, except one in the Kharkiv oblast and the separatist-controlled areas, defeating even the moderate pro-Russian candidates Serhiy Tihipko and Mykhailo Dobkin.

In June and July the Russian authorities showed virtually no interest in promoting peace talks with the new Ukrainian president and halting their military assistance to separatists and hostile actions against Ukrainian troops on the borders. Thus we can expect that pro-Russian sentiments would be even lower by the end of the conflict in the Donbas, where people have suffered most from the war and the separatist terror and have seen no substantial help from Russia in contrast to immediate reconstruction efforts by the legitimate central government. On the other hand, weak EU support for the Ukrainian struggle against Russia could influence many who favored closer ties with Europe and force them to seek the path to democratic development outside any alliance.

Since December 2013 Ukraine has been experiencing painful transformation of its political and social structures, which has also been indicated by changes in public opinion concerning foreign policy choices. For the majority of the population, Russia has emerged as a main threat to the sovereignty and integrity of the country. Meanwhile, EU integration, due to the military conflict in the Donbas and economic decline, may become less attractive. However, after Euromaidan, in the eyes of Ukrainians meeting European standards of governance, regulation of the economy and management of the complex social and cultural problems will be a principal factor for the legitimacy of power.
The actions of civil disobedience which started with the protests of Ukrai-
nian students against the president’s decision not to sign the European Union
Association Agreement and grew into opposition to the government have
been named “The Revolution of Dignity.” This article examines the aptness
of this term from the point of view of the general theory of social revolu-
tions and the international context of these events.

Revolution or Munity?

The first basic question which arises for every politics researcher analyzing
the events in Ukraine is: what is actually happening and with what notions
should it be characterized? And although the events in Ukraine have been
called “The Revolution of Dignity” it is obviously too early to define them
by the categories of a social revolution.

There are a lot of definitions for the term “revolution,” but it is possi-
ble to summarize them in the following way: “A revolution is a successful
attempt to subvert an existing political regime, the fundamental transfor-
mation and the legitimization of political power which is implemented
by illegal or violent actions of popular movements and at least partly in
accordance with the demands made by them.”¹

Obviously the current events in Ukraine are aimed not only at chang-
ing the power, but first of all at making fundamental social and political

¹ Tsirel S. Revolutsionnyie situatsii I volny revolutsii: usloviya, zakonomernosti, primery.
Oykumena, Issue 8, 2011.
transformations, but time will show the real readiness and ability of the new power to implement in life the slogans of revolution.

Today with great certainty the notion “revolution” can be used for those unexpected changes which occurred to the social consciousness of the people. Despite the dramatic growth of revolutionary spirit in the national consciousness, such a powerful and massive outbreak of national activity actually became an unexpected and in that sense truly revolutionary phenomenon.

The Upper-strata Can’t, the Lower-strata Don’t Want

The reason for the development of the protest movements was the Ukrainian president’s decision not to sign the European Union Association Agreement. Precisely this unexpected solution of the Azarov government moved thousands of demonstrators (predominantly young students) take to the streets. After the “Berkut” special forces had brutally beaten the peaceful protestors on Maidan Nezalezhnosti, the protest gained another qualitative form – student protests against not signing the European Union Association Agreement turned into a mass action against the existing power.

The reason for such a rapid transformation of the direction of civil resistance is an extremely critical attitude of the people towards the policy which was being implemented by the government and towards the government itself.

Thus, in the 2012 Social Survey conducted in 26 European countries, for some items, particularly people’s trust in public institutions, Ukraine had the lowest rating. The index of confidence in the parliament was 1.99 on a ten-point scale (last place among European countries). Dissatisfaction with the government stood at 2.25 points, confidence in the judicial system at 2.26 points (in last place), confidence in the police at 2.50 (in last place) (Table 1). Moreover, according to the survey results, the confidence in the government institutions had been decreasing from 2005 to the period 2009–2011.2

Table 1: The dynamics of Ukrainians’ trust in legal power and international organisations

according to the four waves of the European Social Survey (2005–2011) (an average point as for the scale: 0 – “do not trust at all,” 10 – “absolutely trust”).

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<td>The second wave (2005)</td>
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<td>The third wave (2007)</td>
<td>2.32</td>
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<td>The fourth wave (2009)</td>
<td>1.66</td>
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<td>The fifth wave (2011)</td>
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And it tells us that, in fact, the current power has lost its legitimacy because we understand it not only in terms of the legality of its formation, but rather in terms of how it is perceived by broad social classes. In modern societies lacking a clear distinction between the elites and the people, for a revolutionary situation to occur it is enough to delegitimize the power in the eyes of the representatives of urban areas. According to some studies, if the amount of those convinced exceeds 10%, the idea gains nationwide prevalence.

While the delegitimizing of a democratic regime does not mean an automatic delegitimizing of the regime itself (it is possible to change the power during the next elections), in the case of authoritarian regimes the delegitimizing of power automatically leads to the delegitimizing of its entire structure. In particular, this concerns so-called artificial democracies, where power is based on the belief that the ruler enjoys the people's support (although this is falsified through elections), habit, the fear of dramatic changes and repressive measures.

A serious escalation of the social and economic situation, total corruption, systematic curtailment of democratic rights and freedoms, an inability to solve the existing problems in a legal way and to follow dem-
ocratic procedures are the factors that pushed people into revolutionary actions. This led to the formation of a revolutionary situation in Ukraine, the classic features being: 1) the “crisis” of the ruling elite and its inability to govern in the old way, 2) an aggravation of people’s suffering beyond what was considered normal, 3) a significant increase in the political activity of the masses and their commitment to revolutionary activity.3

Reasons for the Revolutionary Crisis

In Ukraine, GDP per capita is less than 7,500 dollars and for this indicator the country ranks 136th in the world. Behind us lies only Iraq, destroyed by the war (7,200 dollars). Even states such as Albania (8,200 dollars) and Turkmenistan (8,900 dollars) are above Ukraine for this indicator. In 2012 Ukraine returned to its 2006 GDP per capita.4 It is interesting that during the economic crisis of 2008–2009 GDP was higher than in the period of the “improving” policy of Mykola Azarov’s government.

Source: compiled from World Bank materials.

Ukraine lies in fifth place among CIS countries for the average wage indicator, at $398.60. Russia occupies first place (870 dollars), in second place is Kazakhstan (685 dollars) and in third place are Belarus (572.4 dollars) and Azerbaijan (543 dollars). Ukraine occupies the last place for wage increases among the CIS countries. For example, Russia has exceeded Ukraine in the growth rate of wages for the previous year more than twice (12 and 5.6%).

According to international institutions, since the last parliamentary elections democracy in Ukraine has “slipped” from 53rd place (incomplete democracy) to 79th (hybrid mode). Of all European countries, the biggest setback in the field of democracy was registered in Ukraine. For this indicator, Ukraine is placed seventh – it was “outdone” by only six countries: Fiji, Iran, Ethiopia, Egypt and Gambia. In terms of freedom of speech, Ukraine took 131st–133rd place beside African states such as Zambia and South Sudan.

National experts also gave an extremely negative evaluation to the status of development in the country. Thus, in the expert survey of the “Democratic Initiatives” Fund named after Ilko Kucheriv, on a ten-point scale the lowest score was obtained for a legality index of 1.6. Experts also gave a very low rating to the levels of free enterprise (2.8), democracy (2.9), the economic situation (3.0), and freedom of expression (3.1). Indeed, experts have noted a very high level of corruption (8.4). Commenting on the study, the director of the “Democratic Initiatives” Fund, Irina Bekeshkina, said that “Ukraine is not rolling, but has already slipped into authoritarianism, and the main question that remains to be raised next year is whether authoritarianism will remain of a soft type, or whether it will be that of a dictatorship.”

All these factors were the reason that caused those people to perform acts of resistance to the current ruling power. However, usually a decline in only one area of the social and economic situation and a critical level of civil rights and liberties are not sufficient reasons for social revolution. There are no such outbreaks in other countries with even worse

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indicators. Social revolutions usually start when people are completely disappointed by the ability of the power to improve their life (the “second famine” effect).

During 9 months of 2013, losses of enterprises increased by 31.3% from the same period the previous year, and income thus decreased by 2.3. Government banking system debts amounted to USD 258.3 billion, and debts for government securities stood at USD 250.4 billion, debt thus growing by 30%, and the revenue of the National Bank dropped to a critical level, amounting to only 0.24 billion. The budget deficit for 10 months in 2013 amounted to USD 40.8 billion, and a negative foreign trade balance for the first 9 months amounted to 10.5 billion dollars. For the year, the monetary base increased by 20% and the money supply by 15%. Foreign exchange reserves declined rapidly. Their rate for Ukraine is 30 billion dollars, but after repayment of the debts 17.8 billion remained. In fact, such foolery made Ukraine bankrupt.7

When it comes to “governmental efficiency,” international experts place Ukraine on the same level as Ghana, the Philippines and Peru, below such countries as Mali, Namibia, Lesotho, Papua New Guinea and Mongolia. According to international experts, the Ukrainian government was less efficient than countries such as Honduras, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Zambia and Malawi.8

An important factor influencing the spread of a revolutionary mood is the presence of discrimination among the population. When in their eyes the government does not possess full legitimacy, national or religious counter-elite leaders often speak of revolutionary actions. In this respect it is instructive that the bulk of the protesters are mainly Ukrainian speakers from Western Ukraine and of the Greek Catholic faith. Solidarity with the protesters was expressed by the Crimean Tatar population of Crimea and almost all major religious denominations – except for the ROC. Numerous entrepreneurs’ protests against current tax policy (known as the Tax Maidan) and student demonstrations – against the policy in education and police arbitrariness in Vradiyivka – were merely forerunners of the national civil resistance.

How the Spark Became a Flame

But the main reason why people rose in the act of public opposition is the failure of the new (post-Soviet) political elites to begin the reformation of Ukraine. The country has retained its independent existence as an inefficient hybrid of old (Soviet) and new (oligarchic) methods of management and leadership. The current political crisis in Ukraine is only an external expression of a deep systemic crisis in what has remained an unreformed state since the collapse of the former Soviet Union.

The lack of real political will to reform, the accumulation of errors and mistakes, beginning in the 90s, caused a crisis in the state. Thus, the total sum of Ukraine’s state and guaranteed debt for the last 8 years alone has grown by 4.3 and amounts to 69 billion dollars. This besides the fact that GDP fell by 0.6%, industrial production by 5% and agricultural production by 11.7%.9

Ukraine has the lowest index of economic freedom of all European states (49.3 out of a 100 possible points), and has been listed in the group of countries where economic freedom is inhibited (49.9–0). The world average rate is 60.3 points. If you take the world average index for economic freedom, Ukraine lies 155th out of 178. Last year Ukraine was in 161th place. In last place lies North Korea, in the penultimate place Cuba. Russia ranks 140th and took 41st place out of 43 European countries.10

The difficult social and economic situation is complicated by total corruption. Thus, according to the data of the international organization Transparency International, Ukraine ranked 144th – along with Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Iran, Cameroon and the Central African Republic, gaining three fewer points than the previous year.

According to the Corruption Perception Index, which is determined by a 100-point scale, Russia was in 127th place with 28 points, Kazakhstan ranked 140th with 26 points, while Ukraine came 144th with 25 points. At the foot of the league table for the countries of the former Soviet Union lie Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, sharing 168th place with 17 points each.

9 Ukryina: shans na krayu prirvy: Interview z V.Muntiyanom.
Anything less than 30 points is considered to be, in the terms of the Transparency International organization, a “disgrace to the nation.”

For many Ukrainians, the European integration process outlined not only the geo-strategic vector of its development, but also inspired hope for the reversal of the “rules of the game” and as a result the modernization of economic and political life. The withdrawal from the European integration process – meaning the collapse of hope – was the spark that aroused the flame of Ukrainian revolution.

The logic of events is as follows: an increasing number of revolutionaries, a lowering of the fear threshold to enter the mass arena and the reduction of the number of people not prepared to protest. Clearly, the beating of protesting students by “Berkut” troops ignited (contrary to the government’s expectations) a flash of revolutionary recovery. That was the highest expression of the protesters’ revolutionary energy. The point at which a revolutionary situation developed into a real revolution.

The Waves of Revolution and Democratization

All the current problems facing Ukraine today occurred not in isolation but in the context of the global political process. Ukrainian events undoubtedly affected global political processes, but not least it was the past that influenced the course of the Ukrainian revolution. Most modern social revolutions (except the 1917 revolution in Russia) were attempts to modernize society through westernization. In this regard, one cannot ignore a certain continuity of revolutionary actions in Ukraine with the so-called Velvet Revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s.

It is noticeable that the outbreak of revolutionary activity tends to be repeated at regular intervals, and hence they are called revolutionary waves. They cover the country with close cultural proximity and historical destiny. They are caused – in the first stage – by the prevalence of national factors, while in the second stage they are brought about by the prevalence

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The Revolution of Dignity in the Context of Theory of Social Revolutions

of social and other factors. The modern era has seen the following waves of revolutionary movements:

1968 – a wave of protest movements in Western Europe (mainly in France),
1989 – the Velvet Revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe,
2004 – the Orange Revolution in Ukraine.

Despite their distance, the events of the so-called Arab Spring are also likely to have had some influence on the course of political events in Ukraine. We are talking about the collapse of the imitative democracies, among which Ukraine is included.

So to an extent we can talk about a surge of democratic activity on a global scale. And perhaps it is too early to attribute this movement to Huntington’s concept of the wave of democratization, but neither should we ignore a certain transformation of speech into revolutionary action within a quasi-democracy. Revolutions are the rapprochement factor of conditions and circumstances in different countries; the diffusion of ideas and slogans became the condition for synchronizing the political processes.

“Fueling Material” of the Revolution

This notion refers to people who are ready to enter the arena and take part in revolutionary activities despite the existing risks.

Among 26 European nations, Ukrainians were the least satisfied with their life (4.82 points on a 10-point scale), felt less happy (5.86 points), and were dissatisfied with government activities (2.25 points). Regarding the state of the economy (2.25 points), only the Greeks felt worse than the Ukrainians.

Ukraine’s worst position in the social well-being index was in 1998: 33.7 points, while the best position was reached in the spring of 2009 (before the crisis): 39.4 points. The next index dropped significantly, to 38.6 points in 2010 and 37.4 points in 2012. And in 2012, the decline in social well-being was not primarily due to the deterioration of material parameters, but rather due to such factors as the determination to achieve goals, self-reliance, initiative and independence in solving life’s problems.12

12 Ukraina pase zadnikh za rivnem dovyry do organiv vlady.
And the most deterioration occurred in confidence for the future: in 2012 it was missing for 72% of the population, and in 2010 for 64%. In 2012, 51% of Ukrainian citizens were dissatisfied with their position in society, and only 19% were satisfied. As for the expectations of 2013, only 15% of the population believed that life would more or less get back to normal, and 51% felt that no improvement would come.\textsuperscript{13}

Another interesting fact is that the “fueling material” of the Arab Spring was the youth, especially the students or even young people with higher education. This phenomenon is connected to the devaluation of education in these countries and the inability of graduates to find proper use for their knowledge. Even Europeans in the current economic crisis have become familiar with the acronym NEET, meaning “no education, no job, no studying.” It symbolizes a youth that is deprived the chance of self-realization.\textsuperscript{14}

In Ukraine, according to official reports, on September 1, 2013 the number of people registered unemployed stood at 435,400, including 183,300 young people (aged 14 –35), some 42.1%. In 2012, 887,900 people under the age of 35 were registered unemployed by the State Employment Service, or 48.6% of the total number of people registered. 52,900 of them were college graduates, 33,500 had completed vocational schooling and 6,300 had completed secondary school. Among young people aged 24–29, the unemployment rate increased to 9.5% vs. 9.2% in 2011. Almost one-third of the total number of unemployed young Ukrainians had been at the labor exchange for more than a year since being released from their jobs.\textsuperscript{15}

Some studies hold that the revolutionary material is most active when the third generation comes to the forefront, the generation which has not smelled the gunpowder and did not participate in the revolutionary events of the past. The Ukrainian youth participating in protests, especially students, showed themselves to be the major “fueling material” of the Revolution of Dignity. They \textit{de facto} declared a “new policy” qualitatively different from the previous one, not only in name, but also in terms of form and content.


\textsuperscript{14} Moller H. \textit{Youth as a Force in the Modern World}. Comparative Studies in Society and History. 1968, 10.

The revolutionary speeches of 1968 in Western Europe were directed not so much against the government itself as against the existing system – against a conservative society and its legacy of political and ethical values. It was a struggle between generations, parents and children. And it ended with the formation of modern Western society.

The Success and Completeness of Revolutions

A revolution is successful when it eliminates the current government. A revolution is completed when the new government (at least partially) implements the slogans and demands of the revolutionary masses.

The Orange Revolution of 2004 was successful, but incomplete, because the new political elite has not implemented the revolutionary tasks that were outlined. Thus, The Revolution of Dignity is, in fact, a continuation of the Orange Revolution and another attempt of Ukrainian society not only to change the ruling elite, but also to make it realize its revolutionary program.

Revolution is a shift from a traditional to a rational type of legitimacy. That is why we now have the problem of the complete reloading of society, a movement from a “blank sheet,” requiring both a well-thought-out program and its professional and, what is more, moral implementers.

In the political arena there is a new political force that is dictating a new agenda for Ukrainian politicians. And it is encouraging that the Revolution of Dignity will be not only successful, but also complete!

References


Part II
Ukraine’s Revolutionary Challenges in the European and the Global Contexts
For half a year Ukraine has been at the centre of a storm of events some call a revolution. The causes are rooted primarily in the incomplete post-communist transformations and the formation of the state. But the influence of external factors and the international context to internal developments within Ukraine should not be ignored. It is important to recognise that it is not a question of one-sided external influencing of the Ukrainian Revolution, but of complex interaction with the system of international relations.

The Post-bipolar International System

One of the difficulties of describing the international system is that a universal term has yet to found. The oft-mentioned “post-bipolarity” is more of a contrast with former conditions than a description of the present situation. Nevertheless, in the two decades since the end of the Cold War the system of international relations has undergone certain developments and it is possible to identify tangible outcomes. On the global level there has been a transition from bipolarity to a multipolar stability, mainly due to the dominance of the United States and the consensus of countries with great influence in the international organisations (UN, G8, G20) concerning the foundations of the world order.

This was the result of a certain configuration of hierarchy and power, or in other words a balance of power and its recognition by the international actors. In the early 1990s the world’s leading countries recognised the dominance of the United States and placed on the USA the demanding and expensive responsibility of playing global policeman.

However, due to constant change this new world order proved unstable, and so at the beginning of the twenty-first century there were active
attempts to revise it. Some of the initiative emanated from Russia: after winning his third presidential election Vladimir Putin announced Russia’s return to an active great power policy in order to at least compete with the USA on a regional basis if not on a global one.1 Clearly, the region implied is the territory of the former USSR. Russia’s attempts to reintegrate the post-Soviet space were perceived by the West not only in a geopolitical context, that is, in a context of a return to global competition, but as an attempt to retard or completely block democratic tendencies in Eurasia.

One of the West’s reactions to the role of Russia was the creation of institutional networks along the lines of the “Organisation for Democracy and Economic Development” and support for “colour revolutions” aimed at intensifying post-Soviet transformations.

These revolutions also had an anti-imperial (and hence anti-Russian) impetus however. The “Orange Revolution” of 2004 and the Euromaidan of 2014 can be considered examples of such movements, since their aim was to bring the Ukrainian state and Ukrainian society closer to Europe and to depose the corrupt, criminal regime of Viktor Yanukovych. However, the significance of the events of November 2013 to February 2014 is not limited to Ukraine and its post-Soviet neighbours, but is of great relevance for the general development of the international system itself.

Regional Impact

Let us examine the impact of the events in Ukraine on the international system and on the sub-regional level: first of all, one stage of post-imperial transformation has now definitely been completed. Despite the prevailing view, the Soviet empire did not collapse in 1991 with the dissolution of the USSR, rather this is an ongoing process that continues to this day. First the Baltic countries and then Georgia left the Soviet empire. Now it is the turn of the Republic of Moldova and Azerbaijan. But it can certainly be said that it is Ukraine’s departure that has finally destroyed the foundation of

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an empire in decline, an empire that is now taking on forms qualitatively different to those of the last two decades.

For the development of the international system, the decline of empires means a significant change in the balance of power that must be compensated for on the regional and sub-regional level. A notable feature of the decline of the Russian empire was the rapid transformation of the potential for power of the former metropolises and their immediate impact on regional balances.

In economic and military terms, the Russian Federation lost 50 to 70% of its former Soviet potential. Despite intensive disarmament the West still overwhelmed Russian military capacity by 4:1.²

One of the consequences of the Ukrainian Revolution is the accelerated collapse of the institutional constructions of transition on the territory of the former USSR. Ukraine’s departure from the sphere of Russian influence clearly heralds the end of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which has increasingly become an instrument of Russian neo-imperial policy as a multilateral transition mechanism.

We can assume – and the facts support this – that the interests of the Russian leadership focus on other structures, above all the Eurasian Economic Community and its transformation into the Eurasian Union. Russia has thus ceased to expand its political and economic influence over a large group of countries as in the case of the CIS and has transitioned instead to gradual but continual control over weaker post-Soviet countries such as Armenia, Kirgizstan and Tajikistan. The Customs Union and the “Collective Security Treaty Organisation” are among the most important instruments of this policy.

At first glance Ukraine’s departure from the post-Soviet structures might seem to make it easier for Russia to realise its neo-imperial strategy as the balance of power shifts towards Russia with the disappearance of what was at least nominally a counterweight to Moscow. However, we must also consider the “soft power” effects: the Ukrainian Revolution sets a precedent for leaving the Russian sphere of influence and thus bolsters the political elites set on independence in other post-Soviet countries.

This effect is particularly noticeable in the Republic of Moldova and above all in Georgia, which achieved independence earlier and is thus

exposed to strong external pressure. In this context it is important to mention a third consequence of the Ukrainian Maidan: the decrease in Russia’s ability to use “soft power”: the occupation and annexation of the Crimean peninsula, like that of Abkhazia and South Ossetia before it, have undermined the great efforts of Russian propagandists and security services to create a network of institutional influence in the neighbouring states. Now very few of these states are still inclined to pursue a policy of rapprochement with Russia.

Even Russia’s closest allies, including Alexander Lukashenko in Belarus and Nursultan Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan, openly favour suspending integration and a more detailed drafting of the steps towards the Eurasian Economic Union, strongly rejecting the creation of supranational political structures. Crimea will always serve as a warning to the political elites of the former Soviet Union and curb Russia’s realisation of its neo-imperial reintegration projects.

The Consequences for the Architecture of International Security

A further consequence of the events in Ukraine is the crisis and destruction of the security system that developed after 1991 and was based on the consensus of the influential global actors. The leading states created common resolutions concerning problems of universal significance (or at least tried to), placing control of the situation on the regional level in the hands of the hegemonial state in question. The states took control in their own “spheres of interest” and showed little interest in developments outside these spheres. There were certain restrictions upon the activities of hegemonial states: firstly they were not permitted to independently alter the territorial borders of other states. Secondly, before it could intervene in its sphere of influence through force, a hegemonial state had to gain the consent of other large partners or at least formal agreement on the level of international institutions, especially the UN. Although this state of affairs was not ideal (since it was never subject to a binding treaty under

3 Trenin D. Krisis v Krymu mozhet vvergnut’ mir vo vtoruyu kholodnuyu voynu.
international law), it guaranteed international stability on the basis of an unstable balance of power. The Kyiv Maidan and above all Russian aggression towards Ukraine have accelerated the collapse of a system that was based on power relations in the post-bipolar age. In the view of Dmitri Trenin of the Moscow Carnegie Centre, Moscow’s intervention in Ukraine has brought about a new version of the Cold War and returned Russia to the position of global player it occupied in 1989.4

What has the world gained, then, as a result of the intensification of the situation in Ukraine? First, the inviolability of post-Cold War borders has been called into question, with the effect that the process of revising borders could become more commonplace, and by no means will it always be peaceful.

This is a threat in particular to the countries of the former Soviet Union, not to mention other, less stable regions in Asia and Africa. Second, it gives hope to separatist movements now that the Pandora’s box of simply leaving one state to join another has been opened. It is quite possible that this could also happen in continental Europe. Thirdly, the regime of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has suffered a heavy blow, since no one can guarantee the security of countries who have given up such weapons of mass destruction voluntarily or following international pressure. This particularly applies to Iran. Hence the role of tactical nuclear weapons as an instrument of mutual deterrence will take on increased significance. The danger is that the psychological threshold for the perception of a potential tactical nuclear strike becomes lower than that of a strategic strike.

Fourthly, the development of the existing institutions of regional security bipolarity in Europe and Eurasia has been intensified; NATO has received a “second wind” and the Cold War between the West and Russia has indeed been reborn.

4 Sylina T. Yak zupynyty yadernu bombu, v rukakh yakoi yaderna valizka. Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 2014, 8, 6 March.
The Challenge Facing the USA

As mentioned in the introduction, the USA plays a particularly crucial role in the development of the post-bipolar international system. In this respect its reduced leadership role and its reduced ability to direct global processes is one of the most important effects of the Ukraine crisis. That is extremely dangerous, since virtually the only power preventing the spread of anarchy in the system of international relations is disappearing and cannot be replaced by anyone. This scenario is forcing the American political establishment to revise the strategic interests of the USA as well as its tactical plans for the protection of these interests in order to re-establish the country’s authority and influence. It must be remembered that the USA’s strategic interest is to maintain enduring global dominance. Hence the question must be posed whether Russia’s actions are a threat to America’s long-term strategic interests. At first glance, the occupation and annexation of a part of Ukraine do not impact on or pose a threat to American interests, since the region is one in which the West, following an unspoken agreement, has not increased its activity, to put it mildly. However, the violation of the security guarantees of the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 undermines the authority and the international position of the USA and its allies. It is not so much a case of endangering transatlantic relations as an issue relating to the Middle East and Asia, where signs of a weakening of the American position are apparent. Barack Obama’s political weakness during the Syrian crisis has made it clear to many countries that American guarantees are far from reliable. The declining authority of the USA in strategically important regions will necessarily hamper the realisation of American global interests. For this reason, the territorial integrity of Ukraine is also a litmus test of US capabilities.

Is the American establishment on the look-out for a new instrument with which to realise its global strategy? On the one hand, the traditional school of Realpolitik lives on, as demonstrated by the most recent publication of the doyen of American foreign policy, Henry Kissinger, in the Washington Post. In his article Kissinger calls for the maintenance of the status quo in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, although he acknowledges that the West and the USA have no leverage over the aggressor.5

5 Kissinger H. To settle the Ukraine crisis, start at the end, Washington Post, March 6, 2014.
Such helplessness shows that after more than two decades, the post-bipolar international system has no reliable instruments of security, and that the world finds itself back in 1938. The prestige and the power of the hegemon are not effective. The countries of the West are gradually emerging from this state of uncertainty however and are beginning to change their policies in the field of global and regional security. New concepts and instruments are implied by the remark of the deputy general secretary of NATO, Alexander Vershbow, that Russia is no longer considered a partner, but an adversary.\(^6\) The G7 nations are also developing a strategy to reduce dependence on Russian energy supplies and are prepared to support Ukraine in solving this particular problem.\(^7\)

In this connection we can observe the West’s growing interest in Ukraine and the former Soviet Union as a whole. A new system of regional security and stability based on a combination of “soft” and “hard” power is developing, involving putting oligarchs under pressure and introducing economic sanctions along with traditional methods (arms, advisors, troops).

Moreover, the creation of new institutional sub-regional security structures within the existing Euro-Atlantic security system should not be ruled out, as demonstrated by intensive negotiations between Ukraine, Poland and Lithuania concerning the formation of multilateral military units (brigades) and the potential establishment of a sub-regional security structure. Similar processes can also be observed in the South Caucasus, where discussions are taking place on intensifying military and security collaboration between Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey.\(^8\)

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The revolutionary events in Ukraine have become a serious test of the post-Cold War system of international relations. They have many implications:


for regional and sub-regional processes and have brought about the collapse of the existing mechanisms of stability and security. On the one hand we can observe the lack of a conceptual approach and a suitable apparatus for re-establishing stability. On the other hand the crisis has led to intensive efforts on the part of the western states, foremost the USA, to consider new security concepts in the light of neo-imperial Russian aggression.

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When dealing with the “post-bipolar” period of international relations (IR) during my classes, from time to time I have been faced with the conceptually correct question from my students: “When will this “post-bipolar” period of IR come to an end?” If we take into consideration this widely accepted concept of the current period of international relations as one whose initiation was basically connected to the break-up of the USSR, which, in turn, inevitably led to the collapse of the bipolar model of international relations in 1991, the “post-bipolar era” could come to an end only with another fundamental global structural shift. It could be caused by several possible global scenarios, but what is certain is that such a shift would have to have to be of great magnitude if it were to destroy the current system of IR in favor of a new one, whatever that might be. Before March 2014 I had not seen any appropriate critical factor to compare with the dramatic events of 1991. Even 9/11, with all its pain and global solidarity, was not sufficient to open the door to a new international epoch; it appeared to be only the tragic cost of the post-bipolar period in times of temporal mono-polarity to meet new global risks of international terrorism on the way to multi-polarity. Today, I may state uniquely: the post-bipolar period of IR – 1991–2014 – came to an end in March 2014. What are the reasons for this conclusion and what could be regarded such a “global structural shift” if we are to consider the new “post-post-bipolar” period of IR to have already begun?

Six Arguments to Debate

It is quite logical and thus symbolic that the post-bipolar transformation of IR started from the “Soviet space” and ended in the “post-Soviet” one.
With the “green men” intervention of the Russian Federation in Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea and the anti-terror operation of the Ukrainian forces against pro-Russian separatists from such terrorist organizations as the “Donetsk People’s Republic” and the “Luhansk People’s Republic” with their mercenaries from the Russia militarily supported by the Russian Federation, the red line of the new period of international history was crossed. Generally speaking, we are witnessing a hybrid predatory war waged by Russia on Ukraine in which Russia is a clear aggressor and Ukraine is a victim (albeit in part also the “victim” of its own internal inability over the last 23 years of Ukrainian statehood to prevent such a scenario). Anyway, this is not the Russian-Ukrainian, nor the Ukrainian-Russian war, this is the war of the Russian Federation on Ukraine. Ukraine, in turn, has to fight against Russia on its own territory while resisting the act of state terrorism reproduced by Russia since the early invasion of Crimea. Certainly, the trigger to this “unusual,” even none-traditional war was the Revolution of Dignity, in which the Ukrainian nation proved that Ukraine is a European democracy which was ready to fight and sacrifice lives for a future not even “post-Soviet,” but clearly European in the bloody clinch with the suicidal dictatorship of the “Family” under Viktor Yanukovych. Nevertheless, one may respond that there have been number of interstate conflicts, crises, even wars in the world since 1991 which could have had a global impact and could have destroyed the international system – could have, but didn’t, until it finally happened in March 2014, on the rubble of the Russian empire.

First of all, the war of the Russian Federation against Ukraine became the first interstate war in Europe since 1991 and the first to be ended by occupation. Yes, there was the war in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, but that was the inevitable consequence of the disintegration of one into many. There was the war on the territory of what remained of Socialist Yugoslavia in 1999, but the origin of the crisis was still on the territory of the one country. Slobodan Milosevic did not start a war against another country; it was a war against his own citizens inside the one country. Yes, the USA and NATO intervened for certain reasons, but in the end Kosovo was not annexed by anyone else, it became a separate state, albeit one not recognized by all of the entire international community. Yes, there was the “five-day” war between Russia and Georgia in 2008, but the conflict was ignited of the “frozen” conflicts on the territory of Georgia, which had already passed to the Russian sphere of influence in the early 1990s. Even
in this case, Russia refused to annex the Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia onto the Russian Federation, preferring to grant these territories the undefined status of independent states not recognized by the civilized world. We will come back to the “Russia-Georgia case” later in this article, because the direct act of military aggression towards Georgia and Ukraine with the firm military positions of Russia in unidentified Transnistria, which Russia, incidentally, also refuses to admit as another new subject of its own federation, are the links in the same chain of Russia’s foreign policy in the post-Soviet space since 1991. However, the crisis of the global system did not take place in any of these cases, because the global centers of power did not enter significant confrontation and indeed improved their relations up to a stable level to allow them to cooperate as before.

Secondly, the post-bipolar systems of global and regional security appeared to be ineffective to respond to such a threat of invasion, neither by military nor by diplomatic means and measures. This fact requires a profound resetting of the whole system of global and regional security architecture taking into account a military threat by Russia’s conventional forces and potentially even the threat of nuclear armament, which neither the UN, OSCE, the EU, nor even NATO can handle.

Under such circumstances, the idea of the Pan-European system of the system of security that was at least cooperative faced a powerful knockdown. The EU showed no willingness to fight for the “post-Soviet” part of Europe by any means other than diplomacy. Even diplomatic means are a far cry from a powerful and immediate impact on the Russian Federation, which has appeared more important to Germany and France than the territorial integrity of the European country of Ukraine. Only the tragedy of the Malaysian Airlines Boeing 777 in the airspace over the conflict forced the EU to introduce more or less effective economic sanctions against Russia, though further developments showed that the European strategy was rather defensive and cautious, rather than offensive and powerful. This is neither good nor bad, this is just an observation, clearly acknowledging the current realities of the strong EU-Russian energy and trade links. Additionally, it is hard to blame the EU for its “easy” reaction to the Russia-Ukraine crisis given the ineffectiveness of the CFSP and the absence of any European security system apart from NATO.

Even the NATO system of Euro-Atlantic security appeared to be passive in reacting to the destructive military operations on the borders of its
European members. Of course, Ukraine is not a NATO member, so Article 5 could not be enforced in any circumstances, which is entirely reasonable. At the same time, Ukraine has been a good partner to NATO, and not only in the capacity of a “Partnership for Peace” partner since 1994. Ukraine was even officially pursuing NATO membership and was close to signing the NATO Membership Action Plan in 2008. That meant that Ukraine was included in the NATO strategy of stretching and strengthening the security space eastwards of its actual zone of responsibility. Finally, as it turned out in 2014, the whole NATO strategy on assisting in strengthening the security sector in Europe faced a dramatic attack with no adequate response to the military challenges from another Trans-Atlantic Partner of NATO – Russia. Moreover, it also looks like NATO does not even have the ability to protect by conventional force and guarantee the security of its own members, such as three Baltic States, in the case of direct military threat from Russia; there are fears that Russia, if it is successful with Ukraine, will go further. There is also a suspicion that the USA and NATO simply “over-slept” the Russian invasion of Crimea. Should we take seriously Putin’s thesis to explain away Russia’s invasion of Crimea by the fear that NATO troops would come there? When, after 2042, when the Russian Black Sea Fleet was to move away in line with the Kharkiv Accords of 2010, which Russia successfully cancelled unilaterally after annexation of Crimea? And does all this mean that Russia is already openly opposing NATO not as a hypothetical, but as a real enemy? What is this if not a crisis of trust and a sign of the demise of the post-bipolar way of cooperating on security and estimating security threats by the only collective security structure in the world – the North Atlantic Alliance? Even NATO’s ability to combat them


was called into question last year, when traditional conventional forces were underestimated in favor of new methods of “clever” offensive and defensive systems with a limited number of soldiers. Thus, today the whole Euro-Atlantic space is under threat.

Thirdly, the case of Ukraine in 2014 clearly showed that the fundamental platform of international and humanitarian law was disregarded, as were affordable and accepted schemes of diplomacy on top of the diplomatic Olympus, in the UN Security Council, by the triple standards, manipulations, lies and sheer falsifications the Russian diplomatic Corps employed when discussing the situation in Ukraine. Russia’s inadequate and humiliating policy in the UN not only became quite evident, but also appeared to be the subject of strong criticism from the vast majority of the UN Security Council members when discussing the situation in Ukraine. It appears Russia’s colleagues in the UN Security Council are no longer prepared to tolerate such quasi-diplomatic behavior, as clearly stated by Ambassador Lyall Grant, UK Mission to the UN, at the Security Council Meeting on Ukraine on August 28, 2014: “Violating international law and the UN Charter in such a brazen manner is not compatible with Russia’s responsibilities as a permanent member of the Security Council.” At the same time, the key challenge of today for the UN is that it is simply paralyzed and appears to be in a deadlock, given the right of Russia to veto any resolution against itself. That means that the UN community simply has no adequate diplomatic instruments to influence Russia diplomatically. It also touches upon the inability of the UN to regulate harsh conflicts in other disputes. The system of bilateral agreements was also attacked and wrecked by Russia’s aggressive unilateral decisions, even the so-called “Big” political agreement between Russia and Ukraine “on friendship and cooperation” of 1997 with its principles of mutual respect for territorial integrity and state sovereignty being totally ignored. So, in the post-post bipolar period, a new system of international agreements should take place, which, I suppose, must be developed in the fashion of business contracts, with all obligations in details without “sincere” declarations.

Fourthly, the ignorance of the actual international system of law and the neglecting of the principles of IR also led to the crisis in the functioning of the system of international guarantees. It turns out that the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 was not binding; Ukraine – the only country in the world denied nuclear status – received no guarantee of its security, neither from Russia nor from the other sides of the Memorandum. The implication for the rest of the world is that the whole process of nuclear disarmament could be hampered, and that the traditional “dilemma of security” for each country could be resolved in a less “peaceful” way.

Fifthly, we received a lesson on the use of sanctions against a former superpower that is still a nuclear great power in the new period of IR. Pre-existing sanctions by the US and the EU are more or less effective. At the same time, those sanctions on Russia that were introduced by August 2014 initiated only a long-term effect, with no immediate impact, which made the further escalation of the conflict possible and did not convince Vladimir Putin to refrain from direct military invasion of Ukraine in the late August of 2014. What the post-post-bipolar period is looking for is how sanctions may have an immediate effect, while forthcoming sanctions on Russia in the field of energy would change the global approach to gas and oil extraction, supply and usage in the long run. At the same time, the latter may change the energy market dramatically, beginning with the big oil game in the USA-Saudi Arabia tandem and reformatting the whole system of energy security in favor of new alternative sources in order to decrease Russia’s influence and weaken its economy in a long-term perspective.

And finally, Russia itself, when it crossed the red line with Ukraine in March 2014, became the only actor since 1991 to break up the international system. Russia became the first former superpower, the first nuclear state and the first constant member of the UN Security Council to capture the territory of a neighboring country and integrate it into itself. All this is rather dramatic, given that Russia is still an actor expanding its global capacities and influence, is still a great power, and is potentially one of the global centers of the future multi-polar world whose chances of being constructed became less feasible however after the “Ukrainian” campaign of Kremlin. In fact, Russia never departed from its imperialist ambitions after 1991, and remained a superpower in the post-Soviet space; to Russia, the space of global superiority just narrowed and declined from the top level to the regional, something Moscow cannot accept even today. Such ambitions
dictate a tough policy towards Russia’s “near abroad,” including Georgia and Ukraine, in Putin’s aspiration to restore the global superiority of the times of the USSR and even earlier. The case of Ukraine is highly instructive (with all respect to Georgia) in the light of Brzezinsky’s well-known thesis on the specific role of Ukraine in such a process, also known much earlier as Lev Trotsky’s “There is no Russia without Ukraine.” In any case, without democratization of Russia, the hypothesis debated by democratic peace theories that “democracies do not wage war on each other” will be the subject of debate for years to come.

The case of Ukraine in 2014 also demonstrated that the art of international relations in academia received a powerful impulse for rethinking the whole theoretical framework, ranging for example from the discourse on “soft” security to the older “hard” security issues on the basis of classical theories of IR with the privilege for neo-realism.

Conclusion

The case of Ukraine in 2014 will have a tremendous effect on the global system of IR in a short- and long-term perspective. Not, of course, because of Ukraine itself, but because of the “case of Ukraine,” which has demonstrated the inability of the post-bipolar world order to keep the global system viable without a fundamental change of system. With the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the post-bipolar system of international relations ceased to exist. Even the US showed its inability to act “monopolarily,” which brings an end to the temporal stage of the post-bipolar “monopolary” system, which was quite flexible however in transition from 1991 up to today. The new post-post-bipolar period of IR is taking place: whether it develops into a “neo-Cold War” or not the next developments will show soon; at the moment this is doubtful, given Russia’s inability to become the second USSR and keep opposing the West in the long run. Formally, institutionalization of the brand new period of international relations will take place after Russia’s war on Ukraine comes to an end through Ukraine’s victory.
and its outcomes will be settled during the peace conference in somewhere like … Ukrainian Yalta again? Is the new Yalta world order and the period of international relations on the way? Why not? Provided, of course, the war in Ukraine never spreads beyond its borders over the rest of Europe … The post-post bipolar period will definitely become not a tendency, but the reality after power changes in Moscow, so the post-post bipolar system could be renamed the “post-Putin era” of international relations. It will open the way for the real multipolarity, in which the “new Russia” – the real “NovoRossiya” – becomes the democratic pole in this system in the frame of the “new Euro-Atlantism,” the concept of which was proposed for discussion by the author of this article back in 2009.5

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In this paper I discuss the international aspects of Ukraine’s security, which has been severely compromised during the current political crisis in Ukraine. With Crimea’s accession to the Russian Federation and the Russian invasion of the Donbas, the European and international system of security was broken. In particular, Russia has violated the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, which protects Ukraine’s territorial integrity and security and which was also signed by Russia along with the USA and Great Britain. It is worth noting that the Memorandum was the international response to Ukraine’s decision to abandon the world’s third largest nuclear weapons arsenal after the dissolution of the USSR. And now the question arises whether Ukraine’s current status as a non-aligned country is an effective solution for its security?

Each country determines its own security arrangements, on the local, regional and supra-regional levels. Such arrangements are determined by a number of factors, such as relations with neighbors, existing challenges and ongoing regional conflicts and more general global developments. Ukraine has found itself in a complex geopolitical situation for many years. Yet, in the early twenty-first century it has faced even greater challenges in the volatility of the modern system of international relations.

From the regional perspective, Ukraine’s overall policy and security strategy build upon its internal capabilities, which are inevitably affected by the presence of armed conflicts in its neighbouring countries (e.g. Moldova, Georgia, Russia), as well as poor economic and political stability in the wider region. More globally, Ukraine’s foreign policy and security strategy were shaped by intensified integration processes, which involved countries of Eastern Europe, and by the liberal world order which is currently taking shape. Following the proclamation of its independence, Ukraine has opted for the path of peaceful co-existence. Since then, Kyiv has always expressed its will to resolve conflicts through diplomatic means and announced its intention to seek membership in the European political and economic communities. Being a good neighbor and a “good guy”
for all, Ukraine however was not able to avoid some catastrophic miscalculations in its national defense and security strategy. In reality, Ukraine has failed to produce a self-sustained defense and security capability or to put in place adequate mechanisms to obtain international guarantees that would ensure its national security and the inviolability of its state borders. The Ukrainian leadership has proved to lack consistency while pursuing the country’s European integration policy, which is to blame for Ukraine’s current status of a “buffer zone” between Europe and Russia.

National Security in the Context of Integration Efforts

In the twentieth century, the traditional means of guaranteeing national sovereignty and security in the face of external threats included intergovernmental agreements for political and military cooperation, non-aggression pacts and membership of international security organizations. Even though after the end of the Cold War the likelihood of a large-scale conflict in Central and Eastern Europe as a major threat to peace and security was deemed extremely low, all nations in Eastern Europe applied for NATO membership. They were driven by their traditional perception of Russia as a threat to their freedom, as a nation which had pursued, pursues and is likely to continue pursuing hegemonic policies. As for Ukraine, its lack of internal resources and capabilities (particularly when it comes to European and Euro-Atlantic integration), its confidence in the supremacy of international law and, above all, its conviction that “brother” Russia would never attack were the factors defining Ukraine’s ultimate foreign policy choices, such as deciding to bridge Russia and the West as the liberal world order was being shaped. Meanwhile, political confrontation and rivalry between East and West did not really end with the end of the Cold War.

For over twenty years the United States dominated the global scene, while Russia tenaciously built up resources, preparing to re-emerge as a regional and international center of power. The current crisis in Ukraine and the international context in which the armed conflict in the East of Ukraine is evolving testify to the fact that today’s system of international relations is shapeless, has no “acceptable system of references as to the
actual national capabilities,”¹ and hence the world is becoming increasingly “non-polar.” Today’s system of international relations is changeable and rather unclear. As a result, more nations are getting involved in the dialogue on key issues and working towards potential common solutions. In doing so, they mainly rely on domestic needs and personal evaluations. This situation is particularly reflected in the approaches to the use of military force, e.g. in order to better protect their country’s national interests or guarantee control over key resources. Generally speaking, this provokes an even greater feeling of insecurity and, in the long run, gives way to the emergence of new threats.

Some experts believe that in the “non-polar world” integration processes and the international organizations that are the fruit of these processes may represent a remedy. This may indeed be the way to guarantee stability and impose on all actors a certain set of rules of the game, thus safeguarding the system of international relations from falling into complete chaos. A structural transition to the liberal world order could thus be justified, while nations would give up Cold War-style logic and approaches. As demonstrated by almost 60 years of EU and NATO history, democracies never challenge each other, while general security and development are the best foundation for developing relations of equal partnership in which all have the same rights and obligations. This is what makes the EU and NATO so appealing for the new members: the image of a united Europe is an attractive one. It manages to combine ideas, norms and values which are crucial for the culture and mindset predominant in the European nations, including political dialogue, encouragement, technical and financial assistance, mediation, advice and good reason. The EU’s legitimacy has never been called into question; most non-EU nations view it as an impartial and credible international actor. When it comes to NATO, its continuing transformation to meet new challenges and threats makes it very much appealing to the aspirant nations. Moreover, NATO’s burden-sharing makes security cheaper for the individual allies while the overall level of security is extremely elevated. Yet, if we look at the Russia–West dialogue, it should be noted that integration processes did not acquire a role of deterrent or a factor of constructive cooperation, but have proved to be, on the contrary, rather destructive.

Security and democratic development are the foundation of NATO’s and EU’s foreign policy and represent a key factor in developing relations with partners. While the countries of Central Europe were successfully integrated into the European system of values, Ukraine, Moldova and other newly independent post-Soviet Republics are still a problematic area. These states remain unpredictable and continue to display profound systemic problems, thus representing a major destabilizing factor on the EU’s and NATO’s Eastern borders. The initiatives to include them in cooperative activities with the EU and NATO were intended to make them part of Europe’s “post-modern” security space, creating a network of partners capable of acting in line with democratic norms and values and guided by the rule of law and free market economy.

Ukraine’s strategic choice in favor of European integration, as well as its involvement in various European projects, were due to the fact that Ukraine’s course was destined to shape the geopolitical situation in the region: closer ties between Ukraine and the EU were to increase the organization’s “critical mass,” change strategic priorities affecting developments in the post-Soviet space and contribute to stability and effective cooperation in the region. Ukraine’s destabilization and the growing Russian influence could be harmful, as political institutions could grow increasingly weaker as a result, while corruption would flourish and the social and economic environment would become increasingly adverse against the background of poor border management, active migration and reliance on external sources for energy supply etc. According to the Razumkov Centre, should Ukraine opt for a “Eurasian” choice, this would mean a higher risk of creating states of “guided democracy” on Europe’s borders based on values different from those of Europe. Hence, the area of democracy, freedom and security would no longer be extended to the East, which Russia increasingly views as being contradictory to its national interests.

Moscow is not willing to abandon its inherently imperial approaches and continues to regard integration projects above all as an instrument of competition for exercising control over “key interests,” primarily in the newly independent states to its west. As there is an ever-growing trend towards integration, Russia is seeking to pull all post-Soviet countries into

its integration projects, such as the CIS, the Customs Union, the Single Economic Space and the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Unlike the EU, Moscow offers “integration without inclusion,” tempting its participants with promises of quick dividends. Yet, these projects often fail to achieve their objectives, as the nations in question are quite cautious with regard to Russia’s “free cheese in the mousetrap,” which is inevitably associated with the stronger political, economic and information primacy sought by Moscow. Russian-sponsored integration projects are lacking adequate regulatory mechanisms, which would permit resolving, in a mutually beneficial manner, such challenges as economic inequality, conflicting interests of the participating nations, lack of trust among those involved and excessive protectionism, which, in the long run, leads to the revival of old-style “friend-or-foe” dividing lines in the economic space and the inaccessibility of each other’s markets.

Nevertheless, Moscow is clearly seeking to dominate the entire post-Soviet area and positions itself as a new global center of power, geopolitically speaking. Russia’s ambition is also to influence technological development through investment projects and enhance its “civilizational” and cultural domination. Considered from this perspective, the former Soviet Republics should not only become satellites of this Moscow-dominated center of power, but also a “buffer zone,” which would guarantee protection from potential invasion by “greater powers.” As for Ukraine, Moscow attaches such a great importance to it since it represents for Russia that borderline of the so-called “Rus’ family of nations.” This has nothing to do with the geographic borders of the former Soviet Union or the Russian Empire, but what Russia views as something “rightfully hers.”4 Hence, Russia assumes the role of “protector” in Eastern Europe, which it simplistically justifies by historic, geographic and cultural (or civilizational) circumstances.

A number of researchers argue, however, that this competition should not be viewed as just a normal rivalry for “areas of interest,” but as a model of strategic struggle, in which Russia positions itself as a regulator and an alternative to the European Union. Yet, it could be said without a shadow of doubt that the Kremlin’s current foreign policy is aimed at gaining the

role of a “great country” through formalizing this new community of the post-Soviet states, which should all serve Russia’s foreign policy, foreign trade and security interests. Thus, Russia is seeking to surround itself with satellite states, in order to be recognized as a center of power and to be treated as such by other major international actors. Despite this, no matter how hard it tries, Moscow is unable to offer a worthy political and economic model that would garner support of the neighboring countries and transform the post-Soviet space into a “club aspired [to] by all neighboring countries who queue to join it.”

Henry Kissinger wrote “[…] to Russia, Ukraine can never be just a foreign country.” Ukraine is the most important post-Soviet state Russia strives to dominate politically, economically and mentally. Even domestic experts happen to admit that Russia’s policy towards Ukraine is based on the “unbreakable conviction of the Russian political elite and wider public” that Ukraine is part of Russia and should never leave Russia’s “geopolitical orbit.” The Kremlin policy-makers are not hiding their ambitions: the national Foreign Policy Concept of February 12, 2013 sets forth the following Russian foreign policy priorities on the regional level, while indicating Ukraine as a fundamental benchmark for their success:

– developing bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the CIS Member States, further strengthening of the CIS as a basis for enhancing regional interaction among its participants, who not only share common historical background but also have enormous potential for integration in various spheres;

– establishing the Eurasian Economic Union, aiming not only at making best use of mutually beneficial economic ties in the CIS space, but also becoming an integration model open to other states, a model that would determine the future of the Commonwealth.

In reality, this means that, as the EU–Russia rivalry becomes institutionalized, Ukraine is becoming a “battleground.” Ukraine’s rapprochement with the EU is viewed as a threat to Russia’s fundamental interests and a factor capable of preventing the Russian-sponsored Customs and Eurasian Unions from becoming truly dynamic and sustainable projects promoting Russia’s status as a “global power.”

At the same time, Kyiv has repeatedly assured Moscow of its desire to bring forward a mutually beneficial partnership and to promote dialogue between Russia and Europe. Yet Moscow remains deaf to these assurances despite the fact that Kyiv has taken practical steps, steps that at times were not in line with Ukraine’s proper national interests, but which clearly demonstrated its respect for the security and national interests of Russia. Those included, inter alia, transfer of Ukraine’s tactical nuclear weapons to Russia, the agreement to station a Russian Black Sea Fleet base on its national territory (in order to satisfy Moscow’s insistent requests, Ukraine had to introduce a special amendment to its Constitution in 19969), forego the opportunity to join NATO’s Membership Action Plan in 2006 or to place European missile defense components on its soil. Ukraine has also supported Russia in European security matters, has extended the contract for the stationing of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea, and proclaimed neutrality in 2010. At this point, the argument that in order to overcome the crisis Kyiv should follow the Finnish security model appears far too idealistic.

Above all, today’s international system is much different from the post-WWII era, when nations feared a new armed conflict and thus managed to achieve a certain acceptable balance. Today, such a balance has been broken, but what we are witnessing is the ongoing rivalry for influence in international relations, including Russia’s superpower ambitions. Secondly, Finland has indeed agreed to a number of constraints in terms of its foreign policy, while maintaining sovereignty as far as internal development goes. Moscow’s policy towards Ukraine demonstrates its desire to establish direct control over the country’s foreign and security policy. It goes without saying that this excludes the possibility for Ukraine to pursue

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9 Article 17 of the Constitution of Ukraine of 28 June 1996 bans any stationing of foreign troops on the national territory. The stationing of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine was regulated by Article 14 Chapter XV, which states: “allow temporary presence of the foreign troops in Ukraine and only on conditions of renting facilities, as authorized by Ukraine’s relevant international treaties ratified by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (the Parliament).”
democratic development following European standards. In this vision, the Ukrainian Government would not only lose the chance to freely exercise its foreign policy, but would also have to renounce to its right to define the country’s internal development model. Russia's continuing pressure on the Ukrainian leadership when it comes to Ukraine's European integration ambitions is an excellent demonstration of this.

Moscow's continued efforts to camouflage its geopolitical tricks with the slogan that it is protecting Russian-speaking citizens, as happened during the Euro-revolution, its encouraging of separatist and terrorist groups in some of Ukraine's regions, its unconcealed mockery of our country and the entire international community when it repeatedly denied its actual military presence in Crimea and in the East, making impractical demands of the Ukrainian authorities during high-level international negotiations – such behavior on the part of Russia forces Kyiv to search for adequate ways of ensuring its national security, given that neither the United States nor Western Europe is ready to provide Ukraine with security guarantees under the NATO umbrella, as this would potentially provoke a new wave of Russian military aggression.

Prime Minister Dmitriy Medvedev recently made a declaration with regard to the Budapest Memorandum expressing the opinion that Russia never really violated it,\(^\text{10}\) which leaves little hope that Moscow will respect the “Finnish model” when it comes to Ukraine's or Kyiv’s neutrality.

Does Moscow show any respect for the neutrality and non-alignment status of Georgia and Moldova? No, instead it carries out trade and information wars, not to mention the real fighting. Georgia suffered Russian aggression in 2008, while for decades Moldova has found itself unable to resolve the dormant conflict over the breakaway region of Transnistria, which was instigated by Moscow. Presently, groups of so-called “defenders of Moldovan statehood” are being formed in the country. They are campaigning to protect Moldovan statehood, but at the same time are speaking about the potential division of Moldova into four independent territories. Federalization and non-alignment slogans are also being heard. It should be remembered however that such a provision is already contained in the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova. On the other hand, the idea of

federalization runs counter to the concept of “Moldova Mare” (“Great Moldova”).

In conclusion, it should be noted that over a long period of time Ukraine has avoided guaranteeing its security in any form that might irritate Russia or threaten Russia’s security and good neighborly relations between the two states. But the leaders in the Kremlin have consistently pursued a strategy of destabilizing and splitting Ukraine and its neighborhood, thinking solely of Russia’s own geopolitical interests, which include new relations with other centers of power (testing how far they are willing to go in response to the tactics of “fluid” or “hybrid” warfare adopted by Russia, which consists of fast but veiled actions, aimed at creating chaos and maintaining the *status quo* under which Russia controls Ukraine\(^{11}\), retaining its supremacy in the post-Soviet space and putting into practice new strategies to achieve its foreign policy goals. Russia has applied this approach on previous occasions, namely towards Moldova and Transnistria, Georgia and Abkhazia. This leaves Ukraine little hope that it will be able to preserve its sovereignty, if it acts on its own anyway. Russia is seeking to consolidate the current *status quo* as far as configuration of Ukraine’s foreign policy is concerned. Yet, this runs counter to our country’s national interests and is harmful for European security as a whole. Therefore, it is quite unlikely that Ukraine will follow the model of neutrality adopted by Finland or Switzerland. We should rather conclude from the present disastrous situation that new powerful mechanisms must be developed on the international scale in order to guarantee the sovereignty and security of nations like Ukraine which are at war with a neighboring neo-imperialist state.

References


Part III
Social Economic, Legislative and Humanitarian Issues of the Reforms
Olexander Baranovskyi

Ukraine’s Economy: Current Challenges

My purpose in this paper is to characterize the state of Ukraine’s economy, which is currently in very unfavorable situation due to a variety of reasons, including the irresponsible policy of the previous government, foreign intervention, the unforeseen cost of the military conflict, a trade war with Russia and other negative factors. However, describing the country’s economic hardship is not particularly difficult. The main problem is how to overcome these negative trends. And here there is no formula other than the imperative of undertaking through tough and unpopular reforms and hard work. Although in order to make responsible decisions, we should realistically know where we stand in terms of the main economic indicators.

Indeed, Ukraine’s economy is going through difficult times. Already beset by chronic problems (lack of fundamental reforms and optimal structuring of industries, overregulation of the economy, an unfavourable investment climate, excessive energy consumption in production and the public sector as well as widespread corruption in economic relations), it is now facing additional challenges such as the loss of traditional markets for domestic products, the steep increase of Russian gas prices and complete cessation of its delivery in June 2014, lower demand and prices for primary export goods, the breakup of logistics chains, cutbacks to the means of financing the economy, a reduction in foreign investments (which were by no means significant in the first place), rapid devaluation of the hryvnia, the Russian annexation of Crimea and the undeclared hybrid war in the east, and terrorism. These factors are all causing huge losses for the Ukrainian economy.

According to the State Statistical Office (Derzhstatsluzhba), in January–July 2014 industrial production in Ukraine (which is closely connected to all the key sectors) declined by 5.8% (14.7% in the Donetsk region, 13%
in the Luhansk region).\textsuperscript{1} The construction index in January–July 2014 in comparison to the corresponding period of 2013 was only 87.6\% (72.5\% in the Donetsk region and 70.7\% in the Luhansk region).

Wholesale trade turnover in January–July 2014 in comparison to January–July 2013 was 86.9\%\textsuperscript{2} and retail 99\% (in the Donetsk region 87.8\%, and in the Luhansk region 80.4\%).\textsuperscript{3}

The January–July 2013 figures for freight turnover stood at 99.2\%. Freight transportation by roads increased by 1.8\%, by water 20.5\%, and fell by 0.1\% rail, 4.1\% by pipelines and 29.5\% by air.\textsuperscript{4}

The amount of foreign direct investment (joint-stock capital) brought to the Ukrainian economy up to 07.01.2014 amounted to 50 billion dollars (1,164 dollars per capita). In January–July there were investments of 1.3 billion dollars. Reduction of capital during this period was 8.1 billion dollars (including reduction caused by exchange rate differences: 7.3 billion dollars). Since the beginning of the investment, 39 billion dollars (77.6\% of total joint-stock capital) came from EU countries and 11 billion dollars (22.4\%) came from other countries.\textsuperscript{5}

During the first half of 2014 exports of goods compared to the first half of 2013 decreased by 5.2\% (in the Donetsk region 14.4\%, in the Luhans region 19\%), imports by 17.9\% (in the Donetsk region 34.4\%, in the Luhansk region 25.1\%). The volume of export to the EU was 33.1\% of the total, to other countries 66.9\% (in the first half of 2013 27.3\% and 72.7\% respectively). The share of imports of goods compared to the first

\textsuperscript{2} Pro sotsialno-ekonomichne stanovyszcze Ukrainy za sichen’-lypen’ 2014 roku. Derszhstatsluzhba. 2014.
half of 2013 accounted for 35.4% of the total, with imports from other countries accounting for 64.6%.6

As of 01.08.2014 there were 172 licensed banks (of which 50 were foreign-owned). Their assets totaled 1.3 trillion hryvnias, their capital stood at 174 billion hryvnias,7 and resident deposits amounted to 658 billion hryvnias. The reduction of household deposits was due to the emotionally tense situation, internal migration and closure of banks in regions with a significant decline in social security (the Donetsk and Luhansk regions), as well as in Crimea as it became a temporarily occupied territory. The balance of residents' loans on 01.07.2014 amounted to 1 trillion hryvnias and their annual growth rate was 17.2%. The decrease of credit debts was due to the forced closure of banks in Crimea, their partial inventory in other regions of Ukraine and sale or amortization.8 Armed aggression and temporary interruptions to work on the territory of ATO in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions also affected banks.

According to the forecast of the World Bank the country’s GDP in 2014 will decrease by 5% of the IMF to 6.5%. Concorde Capital predicts that industrial production this year may be reduced by 5.1%. And we should also keep in mind that the fighting in the east is a factor that hasn't fully showed itself yet, especially given the concentration of industry in the region.9 According to the forecast of Ukrpromzovnishexpertyza, GDP in 2014 will drop by 4.5–4.7%. There is a high probability of recession in the extractive industries (-2.5%), the manufacturing (-7%) and the electricity sector (-3.5%), while the construction (-20%) rate will go down due to lower investments in the trade sector (-6%) – consumer spending, transportation and communication (-6%) and the cargo base in the real economy sector will also decrease.10

The annexation of Crimea led to the rupture of interregional relations and the partial loss of coastal boundaries, which affected marine industry and shipbuilding. The absence of the domestic market and increased competition in the global market has led to the reduction of contracts in shipbuilding. The unstable political situation and war in the east of Ukraine led to the cancellation of dozens of contracts. Smart Maritime Group has lost contracts in the CIS market worth approximately 200 million dollars. Ships that were due to be repaired in Ukrainian shipyards are being repaired by Turkey and Romania.\textsuperscript{11}

During the hybrid war in the east (the principal aim of which is not to capture territory but to destroy the infrastructure) terrorists have destroyed power stations, plants and factories, mines, railways and highways, bridges, water stations, homes, schools, hospitals, museums, sports facilities and urban infrastructure (as a result of which the population has remained without electricity, water and communications). Due these activities the harvest partly withered, livestock and poultry have died, food supplies have vanished, coal mining has been interrupted, wages and pensions have not been paid, their actual size has decreased, workers have been sent on unpaid leave, state-of-the-art Ukrainian equipment has been taken from occupied industrial facilities, airports, railways, highways and roadside strips have been mined and closed, traffic has frequently been blocked (air, railways and highways), NBU territorial departments and the Treasury had to stop their work, banks have been robbed, public transport has been damaged, and there has been an increase in forced migration. The threat of closure loomed over the main companies of the national economy, including the largest metallurgical, metal rolling, coking and chemical plants. As a result of military operations the financing of budget expenditures stopped and the expansion of existing Ukrainian assets and foreign investments became scarce. The number of foreign tourists in Ukraine and Ukrainian labour migrants in Russia has decreased significantly. There has been unmasked robbery of enterprises and the population in the territories occupied by terrorists. Warfare in the Donbas led to deterioration of all the main economic indexes. And we have to be aware that the Donbas is an integral and very important part of the national economy, so sooner or later its problems will impact on other regions.

There are various estimates of the losses to the Ukrainian economy brought about by these challenges. In May the National Bank underlined\(^\text{12}\) that the rupture of interregional relations caused a significant decline in wholesale trade (20% per year), which contributed to the drop in production levels in the main industries (7.9%); with the loss of Crimea, Ukraine also lost control of over a number of leading enterprises in the chemical industry (Titan and Crimean Soda Plant), and as a result of war in the east the largest plants in the Donbas ceased manufacturing mineral fertilizers, which along with the decrease in world prices caused a reduction of chemical production by 20.8% (per year).

In July public evaluations were made of “Ukrpromzovnishexpertyza” (Ukrainian Industrial External Examination), according to which the potential loss of Ukrainian export of major industrial products to the Russian Federation in 2014 is estimated to be worth 4.3 billion dollars. The Examination further forecast a decline of export to Russia in comparison with 2013 of 31%. If there are further complications in Ukraine’s foreign trade with the RF, the biggest risks are the reduction of ferrous metals export (a loss of 1.1 billion dollars annually), railway cars and locomotives (0.9 billion dollars) and food industry goods (0.6 billion dollars).\(^\text{13}\)

The Prime Minister of Ukraine Arseniy Yatsenyuk announced during his working visit to the Cherkasy region in August that because of the Russian annexation of Crimea and the fighting in the east, which Russia supports and finances, the Ukrainian crop losses in 2014 will reach 15%.\(^\text{14}\)

As of July 10, the Donbas road system had suffered damage worth at least 1.5–2 billion hryvnias, the greatest share of which is due to the blasting of bridges by terrorists. Considerable damage was caused to roads

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due to the movement of heavy military machinery. 705 km of roads in the Luhansk region and 298 in the Donetsk region need to be repaired.\textsuperscript{15}

The share of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in the interior railway system used to be almost 45%. During the fighting in the east of Ukraine in May–July Donetsk Railway transported 13.1% less cargo compared to the corresponding period of the previous year. Due to the reduction of traffic on the Ukrainian railways in the past six months, the budget has decreased by approximately 1 billion hryvnias.\textsuperscript{16} According to the State Administration of Railway Transport, significant damage was caused to the railway infrastructure facilities in eastern Ukraine, in particular there was destruction or significant damage to stations, station buildings, tracks and turnouts, thermal control devices for trains, aerial contact wires and electrical equipment of Donetsk Railway, and the work of major freight railway junctions was paralysed. Ukrainian Railway losses due to terrorists in the east reached 600 million hryvnias and the department anticipates that should there be further destabilisation of the situation in eastern Ukraine, the railway industry could lose up to 3 billion hryvnias in 2014.\textsuperscript{17}

According to the Ministry of Finance, because of the war in the Donbas the budget will not receive 18 billion hryvnias in tax payments and its deficit could rise to 87 billion hryvnias.\textsuperscript{18} In mid-July the IMF estimated that the total fiscal and quasi-fiscal deficit of Ukraine will reach 10.1\% by the end of the year.\textsuperscript{19}

There are also economic losses due to the forced resettlement of


migrants, the sharp increase of ATO costs, which exceed 1.5 billion hryvnias per month, and new Ukrainian sanctions against Russia.

Of course these losses will require huge funds for the restoration of destroyed and damaged property and infrastructure. In July (later the scale of losses increased significantly), Prime Minister Yatsenyuk named for the first time the approximate amount needed for the normalisation of life in the Donbas after the end of hostilities – 8.1 billion hryvnias. However, a realistic assessment of funds needed for the recovery of the Donbas will only be possible after a complete inventory of buildings and infrastructure requiring restoration. In Ukraine the creation of a Donbas restoration fund was announced, to which the EU and the USA are ready to make contributions. Officials think that the energy sector and agriculture can provide future economic growth, and promise support for industrial enterprises on an individual basis and market differentiation for domestic products.

And again, to my mind, the main challenge, despite Ukraine’s current economic hardship, is the reforms that have no alternatives or excuses (even such as the war). These reforms are needed, above all, in the following areas and with the following aims: improving the climate for investment; effective governmental activities against corruption; and in establishing a taxation policy attractive for small and medium-sized businesses. And there should be concrete economic assessment of the reforms’ effectiveness. Every politician and economist should be able to see behind the macro-indexes and statistics the human dimension in their application.

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*Ukrzlivnytsia: tterorysty prodovzhuyut ruinuvaty stantsii Donetskoyi zaliznytsi.*
Ukraine’s Economy: Current Challenges


Our purpose in this paper is to explore the issue of decentralisation of power in Ukraine, which was mostly inherited from the country’s Soviet past. However, under the current geopolitical circumstances reform through decentralisation has an especially sensitive character, since there is a real danger of the country’s disintegration and a threat to its territorial integrity.

Indeed, the political crisis in Ukraine has made a key governmental issue more pressing than ever: the improvement of mechanisms for the implementation of state policy and the reapportionment of power and authority in the system of state and local self-government. In particular, the crisis has revealed severe defects in the existing system of separation of powers, the rectification of which requires comprehensive reforms. The decentralisation of power, as one of the most welcome directions in the new development of Ukrainian legislation, has become the question of the day. However, the only possible way to achieve effective decentralisation of power is constitutional reform.

Article 132 of the current Constitution of Ukraine directly emphasizes the use of the principle of decentralisation within the context of the basic principles of the territorial structure of Ukraine. This article states: “The territorial structure of Ukraine is based on the principles of unity and territorial integrity, the combination of centralisation and decentralisation in the exercise of state power, balanced socio-economic development of regions, considering the historical, economic, environmental, geographic and demographic characteristics and the ethnic and cultural traditions thereof.”¹ It is worth stressing that this article draws special attention to the combination of centralisation and decentralisation, which can be easily explained by the unitary form of the Ukrainian state. The exception of

centralisation from the basic principles of the territorial system would be more typical of a federal state. It must be emphasised that this article of the Constitution corresponds only to the territorial structure of Ukraine, but decentralisation is a complex concept which affects much more than the territorial system alone, although it is indeed inextricably connected to it.

Decentralisation is a general concept that is used primarily within the context of the methods of separating state powers. The term originated in the first half of the nineteenth century in France and its early meaning is quite consistent with the modern understanding of the decentralisation of state power. In those days, the concept of decentralisation was used referring to the distribution of the state functions only and the main advantage of decentralisation was considered to be a certain diversification of risks of incorrect or incompetent policies of the central government in the state. Over almost two centuries, the concept of decentralisation has evolved significantly and the main challenges and benefits of decentralisation have been repeatedly confirmed in practice in many countries of the world.

In modern legal studies decentralisation is defined as a way of determining and distributing tasks and functions of the state, according to which most of them are transferred from the level of central government to lower (local) levels and become part of the lower level’s own tasks and powers. The principle that state powers shall be divided into three separate branches (legislative, executive and judicial) is well known among legal scholars. Decentralisation as a concept affects all of these branches, but in Ukraine there are several peculiarities of the local legal system that should be taken into consideration. Decentralisation of power in lawmaking is a characteristic only of federal states, since a unitary state as a form of government does not empower administrative-territorial units with the state powers of conducting legislative activities. In Ukraine, the possibility of decentralisation of powers within the judicial system is limited, because this system should include courts of different instances to allow the appeal of decisions. Thus, the decentralisation of executive authorities gains significant importance for Ukraine.

The legal basis for the allocation of functions and tasks of the Ukrainian state is the Constitution of Ukraine. Thus, decentralisation of powers and authorities without amending the Constitution is impossible, and

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therefore limiting the executive and administrative functions of the central state bodies and in turn expanding the range of similar functions of local authorities and local self-government bodies will result in significant changes to the current version of the Constitution. (It can even necessitate the adoption of a new text).

Constitutional reform aimed at decentralisation of powers may *inter alia* result in some negative consequences. Some Ukrainian legal scholars even distinguish some categories of risks which can be caused by the decentralisation processes. For example, O. Skrypniuk specifies the following groups of risks:

- the possible deepening of negative trends aimed at strengthening regional identities among the population, the appearance of separatist challenges in some regions within the state;
- an increase in corruption on the part of local authorities’ officials;
- an increase in public dissatisfaction with the government, including the central state authorities, which are not able to protect the interests and rights of regional communities;
- strengthening the trend for regionalization because of the extremely low level of state responsibility for the administrative-territorial entities.\(^3\)

Researchers at the National Institute for Strategic Studies of Ukraine identify five groups of risks that may arise in the process of decentralisation of power in Ukraine. These groups are the following:

- risks related to the need to re-determine the administrative units’ boundaries;
- the weakening of state control over the local authorities at the regional and subregional levels with regard to the implementation of the powers transferred to the executive bodies of local councils;
- the danger of imbalance in the budget-forming processes and other risks associated with the budget system;
- reducing the quality of local governance and the legitimacy of its decisions;

legitimization in the public consciousness of the legal claims of regional authorities in the pursuit of policies that conflict with national interests.4

Thus, the existence of such risks makes it clear that the decentralisation of power in Ukraine should be precisely planned to prevent the occurrence of such adverse effects or minimise their potential negative impact. Any reforms carried out in extremely difficult times of deep political crisis and adverse economic conditions should be carefully analyzed using effective methods such as impact assessment.

In March 2014, Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine Volodymyr Groisman presented his proposals for amending the Constitution of Ukraine, which are related to the problem of decentralisation. As part of the changes he proposed new wordings for Articles 85, 118, 119, 133, 140, 141, 142, and 143 of the Constitution of Ukraine.5 Subsequently, based on the amendments proposed by Mr. Groisman, a draft project of the Constitution of Ukraine appeared. With Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko as a subject of legislative initiative the draft law “On Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine (regarding the powers of the state and local governments)” is even included in the agenda of Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada (VII convocation acting by the new pre-term parliamentary election on October 26, 2014).

The main innovations of the project are fundamental changes in the territorial structure of Ukraine and significant redistribution of powers between the state authorities and local self-government bodies. The explanatory note to the bill, in particular, states: “The Draft Law of Ukraine ‘On Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine’ clearly, fully, systematically and uniquely proposed improving the functioning of the constitutional principles of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine as the sole legal representative body, clarifying certain aspects of the constitutional and legal status of the President of Ukraine, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and public prosecution authorities as well reforming the system of local self-government and the basic principles of the exercise of state

power in the regions and districts.” The project contains amendments to more than 20 articles of the Constitution of Ukraine. Much attention is paid to the issue of decentralisation. The main features are a three-tier administrative-territorial structure (comprising regions (oblasti), districts (rayony), communities (hromady)), expanding the powers of local government, and the introduction of the executive position of official representatives of the President of Ukraine in the regions and districts.

However, despite the positive will of the authors and the initiators of this draft law to enhance the decentralisation of state power in Ukraine, this project is not perfect and includes several disputable wordings. Some reasonable doubts may be caused by the wording proposed for Article 132 of the Constitution: “Article 132. Administrative division of Ukraine is based on the principles of unity and territorial integrity, decentralisation in the exercise of state power, the ubiquity and capacity of local government, sustainable development of administrative units, taking into account their historical, economic, environmental, geographic and demographic characteristics, ethnic and cultural traditions.”

First, despite the exclusion from this article of the word “centralisation,” which corresponds to the general trend of modern Ukrainian constitutionalism, it does not comply with the real mechanism of the formation of the state government in Ukraine. In any case, state power is to be built on the basis of the combination of centralisation and decentralisation, and the balance between these concepts is variable. The goodwill of the Ukrainian political elite to activate constitutional reform processes is aimed only at strengthening decentralisation. But this shouldn’t lead to complete rejection of centralisation, considering the basic principles of the territorial structure of Ukraine. Availability and wide-ranging powers of central government, characteristic of unitary states (including Ukraine), are the main hallmarks of the centralisation of state power.

Secondly, it is not clear what the authors of this draft law meant by the terms “ubiquity” and “capacity” of local self-government. What legal meaning are these terms to be given in the context of the administrative-territorial


structure? How do these terms relate to the basic principles of formation of the administrative-territorial structure (not local self-government bodies)?

Thirdly, the concept of sustainable development is one of the ideological concepts of effective development of modern society. How does sustainable development correspond to administrative-territorial structure? Is there a practical necessity to include non-legal concepts in the text of the main Law of Ukraine?

The proposed wording of Article 140 of the Ukrainian Constitution also raises many questionable issues: “Local self-government is the right and the ability of communities’ residents to decide local issues taking into consideration the interests of local people both directly and through local self-government bodies within the limits provided by the Constitution and other laws of Ukraine.”

First, according to the proposed text it seems to be that the community is not an assembly or communion of people, but rather is constituted by “residents” living in a certain territory. This wording may cause serious disputes considering legal terminology.

Secondly, it is stated that “Local self-government is the right and the ability[...]” The term “right” in this article may be determined to be a right of a person, but the term “ability” is not used as a legal concept in the Ukrainian language.

Thirdly, what is the correlation between the concepts of “locals” and “community”?

Fourthly, what is the mechanism that directly empowers the community to solve local problems and how should this mechanism be established?

It should be emphasized that despite the presence of some shortcomings, this draft law is an important step forward towards a real decentralisation of power and towards building truly effective mechanisms for local self-government. Since the changes do not apply to Constitutional sections I, III and XIII (which require approval by national referendum), this draft of constitutional changes can be adopted by the usual procedure of amending the Constitution of Ukraine. And this is one of the most significant positive features of the project. Moreover, because of the difficult financial situation in which Ukraine currently finds itself, the temporary occupation of Crimea and the counter-terrorist operation currently being conducted in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions, the holding of a national referendum would be hardly visible.
Be that as it may, the constitutional reform aimed at decentralisation of power in Ukraine has just started. The first draft law with specific proposals to amend the Constitution is currently being discussed by politicians and the active public and is also being analyzed carefully by experts in constitutional law. In this context it should be noted that one of the main current challenges to the effective decentralisation of power in Ukraine is the absence of alternative draft laws for the proposed reforms. At the moment we have only consolidated the position of central government, which should satisfy the interests of lower-level governmental structures, local self-government bodies and civil society. The effective implementation of constitutional reforms demands immediate intensification of the activity of lawyers specialising in constitutional issues and the establishment of a constructive dialogue with civil society.

The decentralisation of the power initiative must not reflect the interests of the central government alone, but should also correspond to the real possibilities of lower-level governmental structures and local government bodies. Transfer of powers must be gradual, because the institutions that adopt these powers should be prepared to implement the relevant functions. Such preparation should include two main stages: forming a legal environment for power (drafting laws and regulations that apply to the corresponding relations) and developing organisational and administrative support for these reforms.

It seems, however, that the conditions for the implementation of the constitutional reforms, aimed at the country’s move to decentralisation, are in formation. Many institutional actors, particularly the lower-level governmental structures, local self-government bodies and the institutions of civil society, have expressed their interest in the reformation of the state through the separation of powers and have begun active work on planning and designing changes to the legislation of Ukraine. The next step should be the formulation of a unified concept of the reforms aimed at decentralisation, the coordination of this concept with all stakeholders and its subsequent implementation. Moreover, during the coordination stage the impact assessment method should be used. This will significantly reduce the likelihood of adverse effects in the implementation of the reforms.

The issue of decentralisation of powers in Ukraine is also a serious challenge for Ukrainian lawmakers and legal experts. Even though decentralisation itself is the main direction and final destination for future constitutional reform, it shouldn’t be considered the only political “magic
key.” This could be rather the beginning of reforms in many problematic areas of current Ukrainian legislation and judicial practice, which currently doesn’t correspond to society’s demands for the rule of law, for a truly fair and independent court system and equal access to justice for all citizens, and for the state’s effective activities against corruption.

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Developing local self-government is the key to Ukraine’s democratic transformation. Many world democracies have undertaken this journey in the past, in particular those European nations which have successfully implemented the respective administrative and territorial reforms. As a result, the role of local self-government bodies has been strengthened, thus achieving a better balance as far as social, economic and cultural development of their national territories and developing a viable civil society are concerned. Regrettably, in contrast to other former socialist countries which subsequently became EU members, Ukraine has not yet managed to drive this process forward. Moreover, over twenty-three years since gaining independence, Ukraine has failed to reform its Soviet-inherited centralized system of government, which today still represents a huge obstacle to the adequate social development of our country. Will the new revolutionary challenges and the threat of the country’s disintegration in the war be sufficient stimulus to push through local self-government reform? This paper attempts to answer that question. In order to understand the reasons and factors behind what might seem to be an “endless story” of local self-government reform in Ukraine it is helpful to begin with exploration of the historical conditions, current legislative arrangements and the issues connected to them.

With the adoption of the Ukrainian Constitution in 1996, local self-government was granted official constitutional status, becoming one of the pillars of our country’s constitutional system. The Constitution defines local self-government (LSG) as a “form of government independent from the state and responsible for managing local issues through the elected (or created) representative bodies of government.” When it comes to self-government, its main actor is in fact the local community, which represents an independent source of public authority, not subordinate to the state. Under the Constitution, the right for self-government may be
exercised by the local communities either *directly* – through various forms of *direct democracy* (local elections, local referenda, local initiatives, public hearings, town hall meetings etc.) or through *elected and other local self-government bodies*, i.e. by means of *representative democracy*. Thus, the municipal authorities combine features of direct and representative democracy.

While the national-level state authorities represent a single network of government bodies on the national scale which follow a strict hierarchical subordination, LSG operates on the basis of organizational autonomy and lacks vertical hierarchical subordination. However, given the fact that Ukraine is a unitary state, the national legislation envisages the following LSG uniform organization and legal structure, including:

1) local community;
2) village, town or city council;
3) village, town or city mayor;
4) village, town or city council executive bodies;
5) district and regional councils representing common interests of territorial communities including villages, towns and cities;
6) self-organized bodies.

In real practice, however, the local self-government system still fails to become a valid instrument of public administration and often it does not meet the needs of modern Ukrainian society. In most municipalities the present local government bodies prove unable to guarantee the population favorable living conditions that would create prerequisites for comprehensive development and growth of personality, respect for individual rights and ensuring accessible and high-quality public services. At the same time, the most severe social and economic difficulties are concentrated on the basic level: villages, small towns and towns. Most communities suffer because of their excessive fragmentation and chronic under-funding, which prevents them from exercising adequate governance, not to mention guaranteeing the quality and accessibility of primary services such as education, healthcare and culture. Many village and town councils lack executive bodies, while the most essential infrastructure (pharmacies, post offices, shops and roads) is often lacking. In rural areas, utility services such as facility maintenance, garbage collection and road repair are virtually non-existent. As a result, living standards in the country are much lower
than in the city, which leads to the ongoing rapid depopulation of small villages. Thus, for example, over the period of 2003 – 2009 the population in villages with less than 1500 inhabitants decreased by over 10%.\(^1\)

Overall, since 1991 the country’s rural population has declined by 2.5 million people, while the number of smaller towns and villages has decreased by 641 entities (40 small towns and 601 villages).\(^2\) While the Ukrainian urban population is annually declining by about 0.3 per cent, the decline of the country’s rural population is three times faster and is currently at the level of 1 per cent per year. Even though the government has approved the State Program for the Development of Small Towns, spontaneous economic migration remains a prevailing trend in the modern urbanization, with rural residents mainly migrating towards the capital and major cities rather than smaller cities and towns. Should this trend persist, Ukraine risks following the Latin American model, in which rich metropolitan areas are suffocating from the influx of migrants, while only 5% of the population resides in depressed and deserted rural areas. Such a situation represents one of the most alarming signals for Ukraine’s further internal development. The future of Ukraine’s villages and smaller towns, which are part of its national identity and traditional landscape, depends on how this situation is tackled.

The main failures of the current Ukrainian local self-government model are due to its constitutional basis, particularly regarding its legal, financial and resource dimensions, while the archaic territorial organization model is another negative aspect. Thus, in particular, while the national Constitution enables local communities to exercise local self-government through the respective village, town and city councils supported by their executive bodies, at the same time it deprives district and regional councils of the opportunity to have their own executive bodies. Consequently, district and regional level local self-government institutions have to delegate executive authority to the local administrations, which as a result assume primary responsibility for managing the territories in question. Such a model is not only contrary to established international political and legal practice and the European Charter on Local Self-Government, but also calls into question the very existence of local government at sub-regional (district)
and regional ("oblast") levels. Indeed, such undue extension of authority to the local state administrations takes away the most inherent self-governing functions from the local self-government bodies. The legalized practice of delegating authority enables the central government to have full control of the local self-government institutions, as in this situation distribution of local resources and existing regional infrastructure is ultimately up to the central government. Over-centralization of public authority at the regional level is also accompanied by the lack of effective “checks and balances” between the local self-government institutions and state administrations, creating never-ending tensions between the two.

Another reason for the current weakness of local self-government in Ukraine is its lack of financial and resource autonomy due to the fact the national state budget is basically centralized, while the local taxation base is quite limited and regulation of land property rights is complicated. Even though the new Budget Code adopted in 2001 (including its revised version of 08 July 2010) was an important step towards fiscal decentralization, it did not completely resolve the pending fiscal decentralization issue, as it gave more autonomy to the regional, but not to the local centers, while patterns of funding the rest of Ukraine’s local self-government bodies remained unchanged. Moreover, budget adjustments, which occur now and then, are never in favor of the local budgets, which remain so scarce also due to unfair redistribution of intergovernmental transfers between the national and local government bodies, as well as between the local budget levels. Another problem is the lack of transparency and poor judgment in providing funds from the central budget, the lack of incentives to stimulate new sources of revenue and the inability to make rational use of the available economic resources. Generally speaking, the main indicator of the Ukrainian local government’s capacity is just $ 25 per capita, while in Lithuania this figure stands at $ 565, in Poland $ 700 and in Sweden $ 2200.3

Local taxes and duties are a source of revenue for the local governments. Yet, in recent years the taxation base of the local governments has not widened, but has become, on the contrary, increasingly smaller (thus, the number of local taxes has recently dropped from 14 to 4). This existing system of local taxes and duties is not able to ensure the financial

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independence of the local authorities. Firstly, because the local taxes and duties are not sufficient to provide for the effective functioning of the local governments, which renders local bodies of power reluctant to practically implement tax collection. Secondly, quite often the expenses needed to collect such taxes exceed the actual revenue they provide. As a result, over a half of village and smaller town councils are not able to sustain themselves even with all the taxes and duties they may collect. Overall, local governments’ own revenues constitute just a share of local budgets, less than 10 per cent of total revenues. Therefore 5,419 local communities are subsidized by over 70 per cent and 483 local communities are subsidized by 90 per cent from the state budget.¹ There is also a peculiarity to note: the smaller the village council, the higher the costs per capita for maintaining its employees, which means less money available for public services.

Since collectivist approaches were predominant in the Soviet period, today Ukraine faces the situation in which the exact boundaries of populated areas are hard to establish with precision. The absence, in many cases, of clearly defined village boundaries, or their establishment without taking into account the local natural, historical and other factors and without thinking about their development prospects leads to competition between the local self-government bodies and local authorities, particularly when it comes to land ownership rights, taxes, etc. Ukraine is one of the few European nations which fails to guarantee one of the key local self-government principles, i.e. its omnipresence. As a result, local communities have no boundaries with each other. Territories outside of populated areas are placed under the exclusive jurisdiction of district administrations, which, in fact, prevents the local communities from exercising their rightful taxation and fiscal sovereignty guaranteed by the Constitution and instigates corruption among local officials.

Inadequate spatial organization of the bodies of power is yet another challenge. Ukraine’s current territorial organization was created based on the traditional Soviet parameters – and we are referring to a period when Ukraine (then the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) was part of the world’s largest authoritarian state and thus had a specific territorial organization and functional responsibilities. This old-fashioned territorial organization is still in force today. Obviously, this is contradictory to the

¹ Kontseptsiya reformuvannia mistsevogo samovriaduvannia ta terytorial’noyi organizatsii vlad. The Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine of 1 April 2014. Kyiv: Uryadovyi Kur’er. 11 April, 2014.
current situation of an independent Ukraine, which has a new mission, as well as social, political and economic relations different from those under the Soviet Union. This obsolete territorial organization also represents an obstacle to the effective functioning of the public administration system. Moreover, it is also damaging for the rest of the country's subsystems, be they economic, social, demographic etc. Uncertainty as far as grouping villages, towns and cities into a single administrative and territorial entity led to the emergence of populated areas within the boundaries of an administrative unit which in turn are creating their own self-government bodies (the self-government “matryoshka” effect).

Drawbacks in the public administration’s territorial organization represent an obstacle to other structural reforms, including those related to healthcare, education and budgeting. Following the formation of medical care districts as part of the healthcare reform, districts will need to be merged; the same holds for education reform: it dictates the need to merge more local communities. The only way to “link” specific social and economic reforms to an individual citizen and to a particular local community is to create efficient baseline administrative and territorial entities. This will enable the putting into practice of a fundamental principle of decentralization that plays a key role in a democratic state: subsidiarity.

It should be noted that Ukraine has made repeated attempts to put in place administrative and territorial reforms. Such reforms were launched 16 years ago, namely in 1998, following the Decree of the then Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma approving the Concept of Administrative Reform in Ukraine. The process of administrative and territorial reform has taken place in four phases: the first one from 1998 to 2004; the second from 2005 to 2009; the third since 2010 and the fourth starting in 2014.

The first phase began with the establishment of the National Commission for Administrative Reform led by Leonid Kravchuk. However, due to the lack of scientists, members of the public and MPs as part of this Commission and its working groups, its activity was not particularly fruitful. In fact, reform projects were immediately “privatized” by the Government officials, which narrowed both the social base and the significance of the forthcoming reforms.

The reform concept envisaged steps aimed at legislative, resource (financial and economic) and scientific support to ensure transformation of the existing territorial organization of public administrations. Yet, regrettably, these reforms were not inclusive and lacked consistency.
In particular, the basic national Law of Ukraine “On Administrative and Territorial Organization” was never adopted, which clearly made further implementation of reforms rather problematic. Neither the transformation of the system of territorial organization’s lower levels by means of spontaneous merger of administrative entities, nor the formation of local community associations were begun. Therefore, the reform stalled: there was no way of creating viable self-government structures which would have the necessary financial and material means to provide a full range of services to the population.

In early 2005, when the second phase of the reform process was scheduled to begin, drastic changes in the administrative and territorial reform were expected, with the Orange Revolution giving new impetus to this process. As a result of the constitutional reform of 2004, under which local self-government bodies were now to be formed on the basis of political affiliation, the whole public administration system, both at the national and local levels, was disoriented. It did not only bring to light the existing contradictions in the President–Parliament–Cabinet of Ministers triangle, but also worsened relations and rendered more difficult contacts between local authorities of all levels. The gap between the real needs of the population (employment, social security, health care etc.) and the policies carried out by the local government became more evident than ever before. The local self-government bodies were slowly losing their inherent role, which primarily entails dealing with local issues. Instead, the principle of party affiliation in forming local councils resulted in over-politicization of the local self-government. As a result, decisions were often taken based on political considerations rather than the actual local priorities of regional development.\(^5\)

For various reasons, once again the government has failed to bring to a conclusion the scheduled reform. Thus, for instance, it did not manage to adopt the Law “On Territorial Organization,” even though the project had previously been widely debated by the public. In spite of the most favorable political and historic environment of that time, which created real opportunities to finally bring about the required systemic transformations, the chance to do so has been so unwisely wasted.

The third phase was marked by the Decree of the President of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych, “On Streamlining of the System of Central Executive Power” of 9 December 2010. Under this Decree, a new system of central executive power bodies was introduced. This was a major step towards transition to the new executive power system, the organization of which has been based on the functional principle ever since. As for the upcoming local self-government reform, the following priorities have been identified: greater authority to the local communities, fiscal decentralization and public services reform. Yet, further steps undertaken by the ruling coalition were not in line with the proclaimed priorities, in particular the adoption of some two dozen laws which limited, instead of broadening, the authority of LSG bodies within the national public administration system. They included, for instance, the right of central government to establish utility tariffs, the abolishment of local self-government in the Ukrainian capital city of Kyiv, failure to hold pre-term elections in Kyiv and a number of regional centers, the elimination or curtailing of district councils in a number of cities, approving the new Taxation Code, cancellation of some local taxes and duties etc. Thus, it has become clear that, despite its declared intention to pursue decentralization, the then ruling coalition actually did everything to enhance the central government’s authority. Its decentralization declarations were nothing but a disguise. As a result of such populist policies of Yanukovych, unresolved issues in Ukrainian self-government accumulated to reach “critical mass,” which inevitably exploded together with other manifestations of popular discontent during the 2014 Euro-Maidan.

Summing up this experience of attempted administrative and territorial reforms, we should note the lack of consistency and scientific background. Generally speaking, when building the state mechanism throughout these recent years of Ukraine’s independence, the national policy-makers started from the “roof” instead of the “foundation,” with territorial organization of public administration. This is to say that the entire state-building process was going in the wrong direction: constructing the central-level government while making empty promises as to its basic-level foundation. This approach was the result of poor awareness on the part of the ruling political elite with regard to the fundamental political institutions, above all local self-government. Reform decisions were taken without previously conducting proper scientific analysis or holding the necessary public debate, while reforms themselves were largely the product of compromise between the political and corporate interests of those
forces which were seeking to establish or retain control over major public administration institutions or extend their powers.

As has been witnessed before, those in power introduce real reforms only if under external pressure. This is especially true when it comes to reforming territorial organization and local self-government bodies. However, as Ukrainian civil society has yet to mature, while the national political parties lack real reformist attitudes, the national-level Government has never really been under pressure to pursue the required transformations. The low level of public trust in the government resulted in an attitude to reforms as “someone else’s business” and the involvement of the general public in this process remained extremely limited. It should also be noted that even though the existing legislation is not perfect, it guarantees the right of the local community to have a say in decision-making and managing local issues. This right can be put into practice through the appropriate LSG legal mechanisms, such as local referenda, advisory public opinion surveys; city hall meetings, local initiatives and public hearings. Yet most communities fail to make full use of these legal mechanisms to exercise direct democracy. This may be due to the fact that basically local communities are underdeveloped and may not be considered real actors in the country’s public life, while civil society activity remains low, particularly at the local level, and citizens lack knowledge and self-organization skills and continue to mistrust any government, including the local one.

At any rate, it may be concluded that the current local self-government reform stalemate is mainly caused by the lack of political will and an inability to reach consensus among the country’s political elite and its top political leadership regarding the basic parameters of the potential political and territorial reform. In reality, despite repeated declarations of the urgency of such a reform, the central government did everything to limit the role and authority of municipal institutes. As a result, each subsequent attempt at reform was nothing but redistribution of power, just another personnel and structural rearrangement not leading to any systemic change towards an optimal public administration model able to meet modern threats and challenges.

The fourth period of the local self-government reform was proclaimed following the victory of the Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity, which created favorable conditions for putting into practice the required transformations. These should become a response to the present challenges threatening our country’s unitary organization and territorial integrity.
The Ukrainian Local Self-Government Reform and the Territorial Organization of Public Administration Concept of April 1, 2014 initiated this process. This document provides for decentralization of power and aims at enhancing the role of LSG. On 3 July, 2014 the Ukrainian Parliament approved President Poroshenko’s proposal to consider constitutional amendment of the decentralization of power. This bill provides for the strengthening of constitutional and legal status of the local self-government bodies and its improved funding. The new Ukrainian President appears to be quite serious in his intentions to bring the reform forward. Proof of this is his Decree “On the Implementation of the Nation-wide Reform Policy in Ukraine.” Moreover, a special Council under the President of Ukraine has been established to monitor advancement of reforms.6

At the same time, it should also be noted that, in contrast to the previous reform attempts, this current phase will most likely prove to be the most unpredictable, as it coincides with the most challenging period in Ukraine’s modern history, given the ongoing hostilities in the Donbas. As a result, the Government approaches will have to be adjusted quite significantly to reflect challenges Ukraine has never faced before. It is high time we finally reformed the current system of central government, which is largely to blame for the present separatist tendencies in the east and south of Ukraine. If Ukraine is to maintain its territorial integrity, it should work at decentralizing state power as soon as possible.

The center–regions relationship is an important factor for the political stability and integrity of a nation. There should be an adequate balance between centralized and decentralized modes of administration. In order to achieve the ideal balance between the central and local bodies of power it is crucial to create such a model of publically administered territorial organization which would guarantee the utmost delegation of power and responsibilities from the center to the regions while being a) compliant with democratic standards and b) able to deter separatist tendencies.

Based on the experience of European democracies, as far as decentralization is concerned Ukraine could follow two possible models: regionalization and federalization. Thus, for example, in 1993 Belgium opted for a federal model. On the other hand, Russia’s record demonstrates that federalization is not really a remedy against separatism, one of today’s challenges.

Instead, more and more nations in Europe are opting for regionalization, a model in which regions are granted a greater political role while maintaining unitary state organization. Examples are Spain, Italy, the UK and France. Regionalization enables harmonization of the unitary state organization and regional initiatives if the center is responsive to the needs of all components of the country, making regions the main target of political innovation and real national policy actors. This may be rendered possible through the appropriate political mechanisms (the Upper House of Parliament, regional legislative initiatives, contributions to forming the national government, expressing their assessment when making plans for the development of territories, requesting referenda on constitutional provisions etc.).

Given that Ukraine is a new democracy and its civil society has yet to mature, our country is not prepared for the eventual introduction of a federal form of government. Moreover, there is no reason for it, as federalism does not necessarily mean decentralization: it may be both centralized and decentralized. As for the internal political aspect, the principle of territorial integrity implies guarantees of a unitary political and territorial organization along with balanced social and economic development conditions for all of its regions, taking into account their historical, economic, social, environmental, geographic and demographic landscape, as well as ethnic and cultural traditions.

Thus, when developing a model structure of the national public administration at the local and regional levels we should keep in mind two fundamental aspects. Above all, it should follow these basic parameters: the unitary form of government and the parliamentary-presidential republic, given that the constitutional and legal status of regional public administration entities directly depends, both politically and legally, on the current form of government and the national polity. Secondly, the main task when transforming the country’s territorial organization of public administration is to convert the administrative region into a self-governed region where self-government becomes a major tool of regional administration.

The reform has to be performed in the following areas:

- political, related to creating institutional conditions for democratization of this sphere (new electoral legislation, a new model for citizens’ participation, local advisory councils, public hearings), also with the
introduction of regional self-government as a cornerstone of decentralization;
– *institutional*, aimed at rebuilding structural elements, namely organizational relations between different levels of local government, which is linked to the national territorial organization reform;
– *functional*, aimed at rebalancing functional relationships between local, regional and national authorities based on the principle of decentralization and subsidiarity.

It is recommended that the reform is started from the basic level of local government, from its primary element, the community, creating at this level the appropriate institutional, legal, material and financial basis. Each community should receive, first and foremost, tangible resources, full jurisdiction over the adjacent land and ownership of revenues deriving from local taxes and duties, which should be used to fill the respective local budgets. It is the community that should become a cornerstone of the local administration and the main provider of accessible and high-quality public services, otherwise the country will be unable to overcome the deep internal crisis it is currently facing, maintain its centuries-old traditional rural lifestyle, which is being threatened, or preserve its famous spiritual and cultural rural heritage. The communities are to be formed based on a social and economic model which takes account of political, administrative, economic and demographic principles.

For these crucial reforms to succeed it is imperative that the government puts in place comprehensive systemic transformations, as the lack of consistency, selectivity of measures, poor political will and make-believe are going to lead, once again, to the failure of these reform attempts and will ultimately discredit the role of local self-government as the guarantor of democracy at home.

References

The demographic situation of a country represents, on the one hand, an important factor in its social and economic development, as the size and structure of the population have a direct impact on the capacity to provide labor power for the development of the national economy, while also determining the burden placed on the social security system. In terms of national security, it is crucial to maintain the minimum prerequisite population density throughout the country’s territory. If we look at those nations which that have vast under-populated territories (particularly if those areas have a mild climate favorable for living), their governments are encouraging people to settle in those areas. On the other hand, demographic processes, in their turn, depend on current trends in economic and geopolitical development. External conditions are changing so rapidly that they also impact on migration patterns, while it takes time for the natural movements of the population to adapt to the new circumstances.

This article aims to determine demographic transformations, including Ukraine’s migration situation in the context of the Russian annexation of Crimea and developments in the East, as well as to foresee their potential demographic implications for Ukraine. The article uses statistics released by the National Statistics Service of Ukraine\(^1\) (henceforth NSS), including the official NSS website, the Interagency Coordination Committee for social security of Ukrainian citizens transferring from the zone affected by counter-terrorist operations and temporarily occupied territories and a modular sample survey. The main difficulties encountered in conducting this research are due to the fact that the data on the exact number of migrants and\textit{ internally displaced people} is incomplete.

\(^1\) NSS Official Website <http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/>.
Since Ukraine's independence, the demographic situation in the country has been characterized by the following features:

- Until 2001 the fertility rate decreased, while in 2001 it started to rise slightly;
- Growing mortality, which stabilized and has started to decrease slightly in the past few years;
- Intense emigration, which led to a significant decline in the Ukrainian population during the period 1994–2004; since 2005 there has been a slight positive balance of the net registered migration (and net migration);
- Active labor migration to foreign countries, where seasonal migration has often tended to become permanent; external labor migration, which was not reflected in the official statistics, its real size being determined through a modular sample survey; a negative migration balance with seasonal migration becoming “migration de facto,” which may be determined solely through the national population census.

Since 1993, Ukraine's population has been in decline. Thus, in particular, from early 2001 to early 2014 the size of the de facto population decreased by 3.4 million to 45.2 million.\(^2\) During the period 2001–2012, the rate of population decline was diminishing: while in 2001 the overall population declined by 478,300, during 2012 the relevant decline was 80,600 people (Fig. 1). Yet, in 2013 the rate of population decline once again increased by over 150 & – up to 126,800. During the first six months of 2014 the overall decline in the population of Ukraine, without taking into account the temporarily occupied territory of the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, was virtually equal to that of the first six months of 2013. Overall, compared to the early twenty-first century, the size of the Ukrainian population has declined in 25 out of 27 regions (Kyiv and Sevastopol excluded).

\(^2\) Hereinafter all national data also refers to Crimea unless otherwise indicated.
It should be noted that the official data with regard to the actual size of the population cannot be considered completely accurate given the fact that the national population census was last conducted at the end of 2001. The new census was initially scheduled for 2011, yet it was eventually postponed until 2012 and, later again, until 2013. At the moment, the next census is due to take place in 2016. The more time passes since the latest census, the less accurate the annual statistics on the size of the de facto population released by the NSS are likely to be. This is mainly due to the improper accounting for migrants. NSS’s current track of migrants reflects only those who are officially changing residence, while the population is reluctant to register officially, and apartment owners often refuse to register contracts with the occupants, thus leading to inconsistencies in accounting for the actual change of residence by citizens. Moreover, the statistics do not take into account external economic migration, which is quite widespread among Ukrainians. It should be remarked that, as of the end of 2001, the figures for the size of the population according to the census and according to the NSS data diverged by over 460,000 people.

In the early twenty-first century, Ukraine’s fertility rate has been among the lowest in the world. Following the years of decline, in 2001 Ukraine’s total fertility rate stood at 1.1. By 2013 this figure eventually reached an average of 1.5 children per woman. This was due to the government’s active birth stimulation policy (such as providing subsidies to new mothers), as well as general improvement in the internal economic
situation. The fertility rate has also increased due to the fact that women who previously had preferred to wait have had babies in this period – a “fertility postponement” phenomenon of the 90’s. Indeed, we are witnessing fertility postponement in Ukraine today: the average age for a woman to have her first baby has increased by 1.5 times over the last 13 years. It should be noted that the Donbas region is one of the last in Ukraine as far as fertility rates are concerned: the total fertility rate here is just a little over 1.3, whereas the fertility rate in Crimea and Sevastopol is slightly higher than the Ukrainian average.

Despite the global trend, which demonstrates a steady decrease in mortality, as well as growing life expectancy, Ukraine is one of the few nations (along with some Eastern European and African countries) where in the early twenty-first century mortality rates were not going down. Thus, in the period between 2000 and 2008, the average life expectancy at birth remained virtually unchanged and did not increase before 2009. By 2013 the average life expectancy at birth was 66.3 and 76.2 years for men and women respectively. Ukrainian mortality rates are generally higher than those of the EU nations and much higher than the corresponding European figures when it comes to working-age Ukrainian men: one third of the working-age male population die before reaching retirement age. In recent years, the Donetsk and Luhansk regions were among the worst in Ukraine regarding the life expectancy of both men and women: of the 27 Ukrainian regions, these two registered 19th and 25th respectively. The relevant figure for Crimea is within the national average.

In the early twenty-first century Ukrainian migration losses (registered migration) have decreased sharply: in 2001 the negative migration balance amounted to 43,100 people versus 100,000 annually in the second half of the 90’s; in 2004 it stood at 7,600, while in 2005 there was a positive migration balance, which amounted to +4,600 people. This trend strengthened over the period 2006–2011, when the migration balance ranged from +13,500 to +17,100 people. The situation improved as fewer people were leaving Ukraine, while the number of those arriving in the country remained steady (in the period between 2001 and 2011 the number of those leaving Ukraine decreased sixfold, while the number of those arriving in the country over the same period has decreased only by 140%). In 2012 the number of registered arrivals increased considerably, which led to an almost fourfold increase in the positive migration balance – up to +61,800 people. Yet, this was not due to an actual increase in immigrants,
but to simplified registration procedures for foreigners entering Ukrainian territory following the adoption of the Law of Ukraine “On Legal Status of Foreigners and Persons without Citizenship.” Generally speaking, the available statistics reflect the official registration date rather than the actual entry date. In 2013 positive migration balance has virtually halved compared to 2012, yet remained much higher than in 2006–2011. Over the first six months of 2014 the migration balance of the Ukrainian population, excluding the temporarily occupied territory of Crimea and Sevastopol, decreased 1.5 times the figure for the same period of 2013.

During the first 13 years of this century the only locations in Ukraine with a steady migration surplus were Kyiv and the Kyiv region, Crimea, Sevastopol, Kharkiv and its region, and Odessa and its region, while the Donbas area has suffered tangible migration losses over the period indicated.

Ukraine continues to be one of the most important donors of labor power to Europe. As revealed by the second nation-wide Labor Migration Survey conducted by NSS in collaboration with the Ptukha Institute for Demography and Social Studies (henceforth IDSS) under the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine at the request of the Ukrainian Labor Ministry during April–June 2012, in the period between 1 January 2010 and 17 June 2012 1.2 million Ukrainian citizens aged between 15 and 70 were seeking jobs or actually working abroad, which constitutes 3.4% of the country’s working-age population. This survey excludes those households where all family members have left Ukraine and permanently settled in a foreign country. Hence, the actual scope of Ukrainian economic migration is even greater than revealed by the survey. Leading countries in terms of the number of Ukrainian seasonal workers include the Russian Federation (43.2%), Poland (14.3%), Italy (13.2%) and the Czech Republic (12.9%). The smallest numbers of Ukrainian seasonal workers are registered for Spain (4.5%), Germany (2.4%), Hungary (1.9%), Portugal and Belarus (by 1.8%). With respect to 2008, when the

first national survey on labor migration was conducted, Russia’s share declined by almost 5 percentage points, while that of the EU countries has, by contrast, increased.

A new form of migration came into being as a result of the Russian annexation of Crimea and the recent developments in the Donbas. We are dealing with something Ukraine has never faced before: internally displaced persons, i.e. migration of the population within the borders of the national territory. The National Emergency Service released information that the overall number of Ukrainian citizens who moved to other regions of Ukraine from Crimea, Sevastopol and the counter-terrorism operation zone has reached 225,900 people, as of 31 August 2014. This number is constantly growing despite the fact that some of the IDPs have chosen to return to their previous places of residence. In just one day before the data was released, some 500 people left their homes. In fact, the actual number of internally displaced persons is much higher – the official statistics keeps track of those who have turned to the government institutions for help, whereas many of the IDPs are staying with their relatives and friends, thus remaining unaccounted for. Regrettably, we have no scientific tools to be able to evaluate with precision the actual number of internally displaced persons.

Among the officially registered IDPs as of 31 August 2014, 17,200 citizens (7.6%) are from Crimea, while the vast majority are from the zone of the counter-terrorism operation. Moreover, if the number of internally displaced persons originating from Crimea in the months following its annexation by Russia has remained quite stable, the number of those seeking to flee the counter-terrorism operation zone keeps growing day by day. Most IDPs have found shelter in the government-controlled central part of the Donetsk region (57,300 people), Kyiv region (25,200 people), Zaporizhzhia (21,300 people), Dnipropetrovsk (18,700), and Kharkiv region (16,100 people), as well as government-controlled sectors of the Luhansk region (15,100 people). The lowest number of IDPs are in the Ternopil, Volyn, Rivne and Transcarpathian regions (slightly more than 1 thousand persons per region). This means that IDPs tend to be hosted close to their original residence and in the regions with a similar mindset among the population, as well as in the capital.

It is believed that at least some of today’s IDPs will seek to gain a foothold in their new places of residence and will not be willing to return home once the counter-terrorism operation is over. They will be assimilated easily in the neighboring Donbas region, while their integration in Western and Central Ukraine might prove to be more painful. The national media happen to report on occasional conflicts between IDPs and the local population. Yet, we have no reason to consider them a regular occurrence; most probably these are just isolated cases which have gained visibility in the media. This theory might receive indirect confirmation based on sociological survey findings which addressed another widespread idea that IDPs are “reluctant to find to work and expect to be fully maintained by the state.” Thus, as revealed by the Ukrainian O. Yaremenko Social Research Institute’s opinion poll, which involved three focus groups and was conducted in the areas with a high concentration of IDPs, as of 5–7 July 2014 the idea of relying completely upon the Government is almost inexistnet among IDPs.6

In part, residents of the regions affected by the ongoing counter-terrorism operation are likely to request asylum in foreign countries, thus leading to irreversible migration losses. According to the Russian Federal Migration Service, during the period between 01 April 2014 and 30 August 2014 some 820,000 Ukrainian citizens entered and presently remain in Russia. This figure refers to the overall number of Ukrainians who crossed the border with Russia. As for the number of Ukrainian citizens who applied for temporary asylum or refugee status in Russia during this period, they numbered some 130,000.7 On the Russian territory refugees are likely to be settled in the under-populated areas, thus helping improve Russia’s demographic situation.

Consequently, the share of Donbas residents in the overall Ukrainian population will decline (as of early 2014 the respective figure stood at 14.5%). In the long run this is likely to have a positive impact on fertility trends – migrants are likely to eventually follow reproductive behavior patterns of the local population. However, in the short term, the fertility rate may be expected to decrease due to fertility postponement until “better times,” as well as the direct loss of population due to mortality given the

ongoing hostilities and continuing mass departures.

At the same time, the Crimean population is unlikely to change drastically. No matter who comes to power, it is hard to imagine that there will be mass emigration from this favorable area. On the other hand, there are limited possibilities to accommodate new residents from outside Crimea.

The negative political climate in Ukraine is likely to force the current Ukrainian economic migrants to settle abroad permanently rather than offer just a seasonal solution. Most probably, fewer Ukrainian seasonal workers will look towards Russia and more towards Europe. In contrast, we should not expect any significant increase in labor migration towards foreign nations. In 2012 the Ebert Foundation conducted a survey which looked into the implications of signing the EU Association and the Free Trade Zone Agreements. According to the survey, Ukraine’s labor migration potential is coming to an end. Moreover, Ukraine’s regions affected by the counter-terrorism operation are not among areas with the most intense labor migration. Thus, as demonstrated by the second nation-wide labor migration survey conducted in 2012, the rate of labor migration in the Donbas area among the population aged between 15 and 70 years is low, while in Crimea it is very low.

The Ptukha IDSS under the National Academy of Sciences is working on demographic projection to calculate the future size and composition of the Ukrainian population, the projection’s migration component currently being developed by the author of this article. Demographic projection is to be reviewed annually to reflect the new data with regard to fertility, mortality and population movement trends. This demographic projection is based on registered migration to enable estimation of the future size and structure of the population. For this purpose we make reference to the annual reports of the National Statistics Service, which contain information on change of residence by the Ukrainian citizens.

In any event, the size of the Ukrainian population is likely to decline, as the country’s demographic growth potential appears to be drying up. According to demographic projection undertaken in 2013 (when demographers were not able to predict the developments of 2014) in the

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8 Pozniak O. *Sotsial'ni naslidky evrointegratsii Ukrainy. Mizhnarodna mihratsiya*, 2012.
average case scenario (which the authors consider to be the most probable), by 2061 Ukraine’s population will constitute 36,878,000 people, which is 8,494,700 fewer than at the beginning of 2013.\(^\text{10}\) While preparing 2014’s demographic projection we also included demographic implications of the current intervention in Ukraine. Thus, 2015’s fertility projection has been adjusted, as it is likely to decline. We also took into consideration the fact that the population who moved from the area of the counter-terrorism operation might not return to their original places of residence, while the number of immigrants will decline in the next few years. Consequently, in 2014 we reviewed the average case scenario and concluded that by 2061 the population of Ukraine is expected to reach 36,372,600 people, i.e. 505,400 people fewer than expected in the 2013 projection, even though the actual size of the Ukrainian population by 2014 was only 27,400 lower than the developers of the model expected.

In conclusion, 2014’s foreign intervention in Ukraine will have direct demographic implications due to increased mortality and emigration, as well as the movement of the population inside Ukraine. Ukraine’s immigration attractiveness is likely to decrease in the short term. According to average case projection developed by the Ptukha IDSS under the National Academy of Sciences, during the period 2014–2060 Ukraine’s population will decrease by 8,873,300, and 5.4% of these demographic losses will be due to the current intervention in Ukraine.

At any rate, long-term demographic implications of the current intervention in Ukraine will not be so significant to alter internal development trends and global factors, such as population aging or the expected “replacement migration.”

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\[^{10}\text{Pozniak O.V., Shevchuk P. E.} Demohrafichni perspektyvy Ukrainy do 2060 roku. Domohrafiya ta sotsial’na ekonomika 1, 2014.\]*
Team and Country Office for Central and Eastern Europe (DWT/CO-Budapest) Budapest: ILO.


Part IV
Regional and Ethno-Cultural Dimensions of the Ukraine’s Transformation
In this paper I focus on the issues of Ukraine’s regional differences reflected in particular in the regional variety of political values and attitudes. As a sociologist I see these regional variations to be much more complex than the stereotypical and simplistic view of Ukraine as a “divided country” or the cliché of “two Ukraines.” In my view the latter is rather the product of politically manipulative technologies which were artificially brewed and imposed at least by the complex presidential campaign of 2004 known as the country’s “Orange revolution.”

The Euromaidan and the Revolution of Dignity, as the Ukrainian mass protests in 2013–2014 were named, was perceived differently not only in different countries but also in Ukraine itself. While there is no reason to talk of the confrontation of “two Ukraines,” these protests against the Yanukovych regime and their perception by the public varied in different parts of the country. The protests on the Maidan were supported, according to the nationwide survey of the Institute of Sociology, by 83% of Western Ukraine inhabitants, 79% in Kyiv and by almost two thirds of Central and Southeastern Ukrainian citizens (65%).

The Maidan was perceived differently in the southern and southeastern regions of Ukraine. Only in the Donbas, the native region of President Yanukovych and his stronghold, was the Maidan not supported by the majority of citizens (68%), its supporters clearly constituting a minority there (10%). In the South Ukrainian areas (Odessa, Nikolaev, Kherson regions) a relative majority (52%) did not support the protests in winter 2013–2014 but the supporters made up nearly a third (33%) of

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1 Here and further, if not indicated otherwise, all data from the nationwide representative survey (excluding Crimea) conducted by the Institute of Sociology, the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine in July–August 2014. 1800 respondents were interviewed; the survey covered all regions of Ukraine (excluding Crimea); the sample was random and representative of the population of Ukraine aged 18 years and older.
the population. The situation was similar in the Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia and Kharkiv regions (49% did not support the Maidan and 27% did). Therefore, there are no reasons to declare the complete rejection of the Maidan protests even in the Southeast (except the Donbas), although the situation in these regions was significantly different than the one in Western and Central Ukraine. Moreover, it is not completely true that the rest of Ukraine (which did not support the Maidan) was mostly in favour of the Yanukovych regime. Demonstrations of the so-called Anti-Maidan (mass actions organised in Kyiv and in the Southeast to support President Yanukovych) were approved of by only 6.5% of the population and more than 70% disapproved of them. Even in the Donetsk region, only 18% support the Anti-Maidan, in Kharkiv 19%, in Odessa-Nikolaev 11%. In other areas there were even fewer supporters. But events on the Maidan were certainly perceived very differently in the Ukrainian regions.

The Historical Background to Political and Socio-cultural Differentiation in Ukraine

And this political differentiation between Ukrainian regions is not the result of some situational factors, it is due to the deeper social and cultural processes rooted in the specific historical development of the Ukrainian nation as a part of various empires and states over the last four centuries. During twenty years of Ukrainian independence, before the Revolution of Dignity in 2013–2014, these differences even deepened slightly and the political composition of the regions remained practically unchanged. And the cultural boundary lines were not between Western and Eastern Ukraine (Chernihiv and Sumy are not Western Ukraine and Odessa and Mykolaiv are not Eastern) but between the North (from Uzhgorod to Sumy) and South (from Izmail to Luhansk). This distinction was not formed in the time of the Cossacks and the wars between Russia and Poland in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, it all began much earlier. There is the clear distinction on the border of Rus’ and the Steppe, the Ukrainian lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Crimean Khanate, i.e. between autonomous Ukrainian lands where Ukrainians have been living for over a thousand years and lands colonised by Ukrainians in the Russian and
Soviet empires during the last three centuries. Since Ukraine gained its independence, the political-electoral and socio-cultural differentiation of county’s regions has not only not decreased, but has even increased. There are four significantly different types of Ukrainian regions:

- Western Ukraine (Volyn, Zakarpattia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil and Chernivtsi regions);
- Central and Northeastern Ukraine (Kyiv city, Vinnitsa, Zhitomir, Kyiv, Kirovograd, Poltava, Sumy, Khmelnitsky, Cherkasy and Chernihiv regions);
- Donbas and Crimea (the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol, Donetsk and Luhansk regions);
- other areas of the Southeast (Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Mykolaiv, Odessa, Kharkiv and Kherson).

It is important to note that all the socio-economic indicators, the level and quality of life, social standing and political views do not vary significantly among the Ukrainian regions. The main factors that differentiate the regions are:

1) special features of linguistic practices (in Western Ukraine, according to national opinion research, in families 89% of people speak exclusively or predominantly in Ukrainian, whereas in the Donbas and in Crimea 3% speak Ukrainian, and Russian is spoken by 4% and 91% respectively) and attitudes to the possibility that Russian will be the second state language (in Western Ukraine 78% did not support this idea, while in the Donbas and in Crimea 90% did);

2) a number of questions concerning the public perception of integration with Russia and Ukraine’s geopolitical choice (in Western Ukraine 55% of citizens were against Ukraine’s integration into the Russian and Belarusian Union while in the Donbas and in Crimea 83% said “yes”);

3) electoral preferences in Ukrainian regions (in Western and Central Ukraine certain parties and presidential candidates dominated but in Crimea, the Donbas and other areas of Southeastern Ukraine different ones were preferred).

How to change the situation in the regions of Ukraine after the Revolution of Dignity in 2013–2014?

Post-Maidan Changes in the Ukrainian Regions

It could be expected that different perceptions of events of the 2013–2014 Maidan in the regions of Ukraine, acute confrontation between the Yanukovych regime and the opposition, and Russian aggression in Crimea and the Donbas would only strengthen tensions between the regions (the “four Ukraines”). But this did not happen. Although sociocultural differentiation between regions remained (language practices and attitudes of citizens toward the status of the Russian language cannot change during a few months), the political and electoral views of the population in the southeastern region changed significantly, and previously existing types split into several different ones.

Annexation of the Crimea: Public Perception in Different Regions of Ukraine

Annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea by the Russian Federation in March 2014 was the first event that united virtually all the regions of Ukraine. As the 2014 survey by the Institute of Sociology (conducted after the Russian occupation and thus excluding Crimea) has shown, 78% of Ukrainian citizens were against and 7.5% were for Crimea joining Russia. And the Russian annexation of Crimea was condemned not only by 93% of the population in Western and 88% in Central and Northeastern Ukraine, but also by 79% of the citizens of Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia,
88% in Mykolayiv and Kherson, and 69% in Odessa and Kharkiv. The only region where the relative majority (32%) approved of the annexation of Crimea was the Donetsk region (where 27% were against it). But in July 2014 there were battles in the Donbas and a considerable part of its territory was controlled by the pro-Russian militants. So the annexation of Crimea united the majority of citizens in all the Ukrainian regions, including the Russian-speaking Southern and Southeastern ones.

The Only Unitary Country and Rejection of the Idea of Federalization

After the annexation of the Crimean Autonomous Republic, Putin's Russia began to put pressure on Kyiv, trying to impose changes to the Constitution regarding the federalization of Ukraine (in order to maintain Russian influence on the specific regions and prepare the ground for their future annexation). The idea of federalization was also supported by the Party of Regions leaders and the Communist Party in Ukraine. Although when President Yanukovych had a monopoly on power in 2010–2014, these politicians not only did not intend to amend the Constitution regarding federalization, they even refused to pass any bill to expand the economic or sociocultural rights of the regions. But their position changed dramatically when they lost the power monopoly in all the regions of the country. But the majority of Ukrainian citizens in all the regions are in favour of a unitary and unified Ukraine over a federalized country.

As the survey showed, in answer to the question “Do you think Ukraine should be a unitary and unified country or a federation of independent regions?” about three thirds (74%) of people expressed their support for the unitary system and only 10% supported federalization (others could not decide or chose different options). A unitary and unified Ukraine was supported by 87% of citizens in Western Ukraine, 84% in the Center and Northeast, 74% in the Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia regions, 75% in the Mykolayiv and Kherson regions, and 70.5% in the Kharkiv and Odessa regions. The only region in which a relative majority of citizens approved of the idea of federalization was the Donbas (with 46% for and 29% against).
But this information is not and cannot be solid and representative as there is fighting in this region. So regarding the federalization of Ukraine too, the Southeast is no longer the region that has an opinion entirely different to that of the other regions.

Armed Conflict in the Donbas: Assessments of Citizens in Different Regions

There are no fundamental differences in the attitude of citizens from the different Ukrainian regions regarding the war in the Donbas. The vast majority of Ukrainian citizens perceive the anti-terror operation against militants who seized a large area of Donetsk and Luhansk either as latent Russian aggression (49.7%) or as terrorist activities of separate groups (22%) and only 13% think that the events in the Donbas are a people’s uprising against the new government. It is important to point out that not only 86% of Western Ukrainian citizens and 83% of people from Central and Northeastern Ukraine think that the events in the Donbas are either Russian aggression or terrorist activities, but that 70% of the population of Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia, 69% of Mykolaiv and Kherson and 62% of Odessa and Kharkiv regions share this view. Only respondents in the Donbas differ fundamentally from other regions of Ukraine. This is so because in the Donetsk region 46% of respondents in July 2014 believed that armed conflict in their region is a “people’s uprising against the new government” and 10% thought that it was “latent Russian aggression” and 12% chose the option “terrorist activities of separate groups.” That is, we can assume that the militants in the Donbas have some support from the residents.

In general, the post-Maidan processes in Ukraine, external Russian aggression, annexation of the Crimea and the armed confrontation with militants in the Donbas did not strengthen the split in Ukraine on political grounds, indeed it even led to significant political consolidation of Ukraine’s regions except for the Donbas. Voters from different regions increasingly support the same political parties and presidential candidates, whereas pro-Russian parties are losing voters. However, the “wound of
the Donbas” still remains, as do as socio-cultural features of Southeastern Ukraine that have to be taken into account by public authorities.

Instead of a Conclusion: Do the Ideas of Federalization and of Separatism Have their own Foundation in Ukraine?

The accession of Crimea and the separatist movement in the Donbas have not only made the debates on the future of Ukraine’s federalization pressing issues, but have also created the real possibility of territorial enclaves, so-called republics whose status would remain unrecognized internationally (as is the case with Transnistria in Moldova) within Ukraine’s sovereign borders. The risk of this possibility has also increased with the adoption by the Verkhovna Rada (the parliament) of the Law “On special order of local self-government in some areas of Donetsk and Luhanska oblasts” on September 16, 2014. The critics of the law often deliberately misinterpret it as the law on “the special status of the Donbas.”

Now the question arises: Do federalization and separatism have their own foundation in Ukraine? In response to that question we would like to refer to the results of the survey conducted by the “Ukrainian Sociology Service” in March 2014.3 According to the survey results, no less than one third (32%) of Ukrainians believed that there were deep political contradictions, linguistic and cultural differences, and economic disparities between some Ukrainian regions. These contradictions could lead to the country’s future disintegration if the state does not settle the current sensitive issues of its regional policy.

However, and this is a very important point, only 6% of respondents wanted independence from Ukraine for their regions. In almost every corner of the country, the overwhelming majority of respondents stood for a united Ukraine. However, in the spring of 2014 the situation varied from region to region. The idea of separatism was rejected in Western Ukraine

3 The nation-wide representative survey was conducted by the “Ukrainian Sociology Service” in the period from 16 to 30 March 2014. 2010 respondents were interviewed in all the regions of Ukraine (including the capital Kyiv) and in Crimea according to the random sample, which was representative for all the population of Ukraine older than 18 years. Statistical error doesn’t exceed 2.3%.
(with only some respondents approving of it), and was welcomed by only 2% of respondents in the Central regions, and 7% of respondents in the country’s Southeast. Separatism was mostly supported by the respondents in the Donbas (Donetskaya and Luhanska oblasts) and in Ukraine’s Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Nearly a fifth (18%) of the respondents in these regions supported the idea.

It is also worth noting that the overwhelming majority (90%) of opponents to Ukraine’s territorial unity had a very vague understanding of the concrete forms and principles of the possible federalization they supported. Indeed, after all there are dozens of federation models in the world – which concrete form did they have in mind? If one looks at Russia, which is a federation according to its constitution, one can observe, for example, that its Smolenskaya or Voronezhskaya oblasts have no more autonomy than, say, Kharkivska or Vinnytska oblasts in Ukraine, which is not a constitutional federation. In my view, Ukraine may adopt the federative state model, but on one principal condition. This condition is the absence of actual external threats to the territorial integrity of Ukraine, that is, only if the country were safely protected in line with its EC and NATO membership status.

It is significant in this respect that, according to the survey results, 72% of the respondents believed that “there are serious threats to Ukraine.” In the mind of the public, the three biggest threats to the country were: the seizure of Ukraine’s territory by other countries (48%), the disintegration of the country into several parts (43%) and the collapse of the economy (42%). In the Western regions the respondents most feared foreign invasion, the respondents of the Eastern regions were mostly concerned about the threat of economic decline, and the respondents in the Donbas and Crimea were mostly afraid of the lost of governance and chaos in the country.

Summarising the sociological data (of this survey and of a similar one conducted almost simultaneously by the Razumkov Center, with comparable results) one can conclude that there were no evident internal reasons for separatism in the country, for separatism that would grow from “below,” from the peoples themselves, in any of the country’s regions, including even Crimea and the Donbas. Even taking into account the special sensitivity of the issue in the spring of 2014, sociological research provides strong factual evidence to insist that the separatist “movements” in Crimea and the Donbas were hardly internally grown themselves, but were inspired, organized and strongly supported by the predominantly external
factor, namely through direct military, organizational, financial and propagandist-informational interference by Russia in an attempt to influence Ukraine and its sovereign state policy.

References

In this paper we are examine regional differences in Ukraine, namely in two regional “poles” of the country: the Donbas and the Halychyna. This case study is mostly the result of the survey conducted in spring-summer 2014 in those regions. The conceptual framework of our analysis will comprise an approach to Ukraine as a regional system and also an understanding of mass consciousness (and public opinion reflecting it) as a functioning spiritual formation and shared values interwoven in the collective activity of the population.

Since the mid-1990s, whenever Ukrainian society has faced tough political decisions, the potential solutions have not been acceptable for all of the country’s regions. Ultimately, these solutions were restricted to the two poles regionally located in the Donbas (comprising Eastern Ukraine’s two regions, known as “oblast’,” Donetska and Luhanska) and the Halychyna (comprising Western Ukraine’s three oblast’ – L’vivska, Ternopilska and Ivano-Frankivska). This also happened in the course of the deepest social and political crisis in the history of independent Ukraine, which escalated into open civil confrontation when on November 21, 2013 the Azarov government announced it was postponing signing the EU Association Agreement. First, confrontation unfolded in the form of the Euro-Maidan and further moved to the phase of open struggle to overthrow the government. This dynamic was described by Haran and Burkovskiy thus: “… From euro-protests to national struggle against the regime.”1 In the east of the country, the local Maidan movement was not prolific. Its most active participants went directly to Kyiv, while on the spot the process was limited to sparse manifestations and pickets.

The situation began to change drastically from late January 2014. Seizures of state administrations by protestors in some regional centers (Lviv, Ternopil, Rivne, etc.) created an atmosphere of uneasy abeyance in the east of the country. The political forces then in power (the Party of Regions and its youth wing, as well as marginal formations) initiated the creation of “self-defense detachments.” Luhansk regional and city councils legitimized such paramilitary formations as the Don Cossacks and the Luhansk Guard. Throughout the March, the strengthening of pro-Russian forces was felt in the east of Ukraine as the flags of the Russian Federation were raised over the tents of various self-defense units. During attacks, there were also attempts to raise them over the buildings of Donetsk, Kharkiv and Luhansk regional state administrations.

In March/April, heated by the Russian mass media, Donbas residents were increasingly concerned about the activities of the extreme right in Ukraine. The cancellation of the Law on regional languages by Verkhovna Rada on February 23, 2014, as well as provocative statements on language issues by Oleg Tyahnybok and Iryna Farion (Svoboda Party) contributed to their anxiety. For pro-Russian residents of Donbas, the Crimean referendum on March 16, 2014 appeared to be a model offering a solution to their problems. Seizure of the regional office of the Security Service of Ukraine in Luhansk on April 6, 2014, which took place as a result of direct connivance by local and national-level bureaucrats, was a critical point in the escalation of the situation to the stage of armed conflict. “Referendums” in Donetsk and Luhansk on May 11, 2014 and further proclamations of the Donetsk and Luhansk peoples’ republics opened the door for direct military intervention on the part of Russia.

Under the acute social crisis, the public mood turned out to be both a reflection of the Halychyna people’s pro-European sentiments and a factor of crisis dynamics. The pro-European sentiments of Halychyna residents and their opposition to the regime, which was interpreted in Western Ukraine as anti-Ukrainian, largely presupposed their support of the Maidan. Most Donbas residents before Yanukovych’s flight perceived their region as a pillar of the constitutional order. There was no strong protest in the region, while the population’s stance on foreign-policy was concerned with the Customs Union rather than with the EU and NATO.2 Information on the appalling

embezzlement of the state funds by Yanukovych and his milieu, publicized after his flight, delegitimized the regime of the “Family” in the eyes of Donbas residents. However, this did not lead to the automatic legitimization of the new government in Kyiv. Experience of social confrontation created cognitive dissonance in the mass regional consciousness. Many residents of Donbas felt themselves to be alien in their own country. These moods were utilized by local cliental groups, which took the path of open struggle against the victors in Kyiv. To this end, local elites increasingly relied on Russian support. The Donbas was experiencing a mass failure in public spirit that we have suggested calling “Luhansk syndrome.”

The mass consciousness of the Halychyna found confirmation for its fears and expectations in the events of late 2013–early 2014. The regional community that was its producer and bearer found itself in a situation that fostered the development of internal solidarity. In the Donbas, everything happened antithetically. Due to cognitive dissonance, the mass consciousness of its residents lost consolidation. For this reason, it was impossible for the residents of the Donbas and the Halychyna to apprehend and explain the Maidan and the confrontation in the Donbas as identical phenomena.

Further examination of these differences will be based on several concepts. The basic concept envisions studying the space of Ukraine as a regional system. This is essentially a structural approach, but we believe that it provides a key for understanding the conduct of collective actors. Territorial communities of Ukrainian regions are connected with each other by ties of various qualities. Some are linked through the center, while others are established between regions directly. The regional system of Ukraine is polarized, the poles being the Donbas and the Halychyna. Their polarity is conditioned by different projects of nation building. Different paths of nation building in the process of modernization have been studied intensively by Roman Szporluk. In his opinion, one path is the formation of the nation through the process of industrialization, while the second is nation building based on leading the development of modern cultural forms. The Ukrainian phenomenon resides in the fact that the polar regions of the Ukrainian regional system simultaneously realize different means of

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establishing the modern nation. Therefore, on the everyday level they have
different grids of categories for interpreting social reality. Different ori-
entations in foreign policy are the tip of the iceberg. Certainly, when using
structural explanations for the formation of different forms of mass activ-
ity, one should remember their limits. As Alexander Motyl correctly noted,
“… while facilitating certain tendencies, structures may have probable, but
not determinative, influence on specific results.”

The second interpretative conception for us is the understanding of
mass consciousness as a functioning spiritual formation interwoven in the
collective activity. In this sense, public opinion is a valuation reaction of
the mass community. Regional communities are masses and we have rea-
son to speak of regional public opinion, which is formed in a certain infor-
mation field. The information fields of the Ukrainian regions in the period
of social crisis turned out to be an excellent environment for manipulative
influences. From the beginning of the Maidan, a real information war has
unfolded on the Internet (especially in social networks). The then govern-
ment and opposition have set incompatible ideological platforms. Initially,
most of the Donbas did not support the Maidan and its methods of struggle. The coverage of the Maidan events prevailing in central and western
regions did not correspond to the dominant public moods in the Don-
bas. In the information war actively conducted by Russia in that period in
order to discredit the Maidan ideas, the martial anti-Ukrainian discourse
and pro-imperial manipulation myths of “junta,” “banderivtsi” and “fas-
cists” proved to be more congenial and found support among the popu-
lation. Russia’s active information policy in the informational space of the
East resulted in the mass consciousness of the residents of these regions
largely beginning to perceive the ongoing events through the pictures and
interpretations of the aggressive Russian propaganda. Viktor Stepanenko
has already written that the Maidan was a movement for de-institution-
alization of the post-Soviet institutional system. He has also noted that an
institutional trap developed there, consisting of the gap between ideal aspi-
rations and the means of their realization. The Maidan itself arose when
Yanukovych’s family clan violently broke a kind of conventional pact of the
elites. Since the political space of Ukraine exists as a product of agreements

5 Motyl, A.J. Imperial Ends. The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires. New York: Co-
6 Stepanenko, V. Ukrainian’s Farewell to post-Soviet Politics. Religion and Society in East
among patrons of cliental groups, this actually meant the collapse of the autonomous political space of the country itself and created conditions for the deep engagement of external forces in the internal crisis.

We have posited these concepts as the foundation of the sociological survey program on “Existential worlds of the East and West of Ukraine.”7 Within its framework, a mass survey was carried out in the two regions. Donbas was represented by Donetsk oblast’ (number of respondents asked, \( n = 457 \)) and Luhansk oblast’ (\( n = 291 \)), while the Halychyna – by Lviv oblast’ (\( n = 454 \)) and Ivano-Frankivsk oblast’ (\( n = 277 \)). Samplings in each region were formed as representative according to the features gender, age and settlement type. Primary sociological information was collected in the method of standardized interviews at the place of residence of the respondents. Questioning was conducted from May 20 through June 20, 2014. It is also necessary to mention that the Halychyna is the region in which the population is predominantly Ukrainian (94.5% ethnic Ukrainians in Lvivska oblast’, 97.5% in Ivano-Frankivska oblast’). The demographic composition of the Donbas region is different in this sense and includes a significant number of ethnic Russians (in Luhanska oblast’ 58% Ukrainian and 39% Russian, Donetska oblast’ 56.9% of Ukrainians and 38.2% of Russians).8

The questionnaire included a question on the attitude to the Maidan and events in Donbas in spring 2014. The general results of the distribution of answers of the respondents in the two regions are presented in Table 1.

Table 1: “How would you characterize the events?” (% of those who answered).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>№</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>At the Maidan in winter 2013–2014</th>
<th>In the Donbas in spring 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Donbas ( n = 674 )</td>
<td>Halychyna ( n = 626 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>National revolution</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>59.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Struggle of one part of the ruling class against another (millionaires against</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>billionaires), in which a segment of the people was embroiled</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7 The survey was conducted with the financial support of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies. University of Alberta.
8 The data of the all-Ukrainian population census of 2001.
### Table: Evaluations of the Maidan events by Donbas residents and the Halychyna residents

<table>
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<tr>
<th>№</th>
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<th>At the Maidan in winter 2013–2014</th>
<th>In the Donbas in spring 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Donbas n=674</td>
<td>Halychyna n=626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Donbas n=678</td>
<td>Halychyna n=576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Rebellion of the people supported by the national bourgeoisie</td>
<td>39–2</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Struggle between the East and the West of Ukraine</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Struggle between ruling groups in Ukraine supported by external forces, in which a segment of the people was embroiled</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Struggle for national independence</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>53.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Struggle for human rights</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>55.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Struggle for social justice</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>41.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Spiritual purification</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Destruction of the state</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>51.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Coercive seizure of power*</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>External aggression</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>47.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Criminal revolt</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>28.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Attempt to escape from fascism</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Pursuit of proper foreign policy relations</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Desire to join another state structure</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>307.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>308.0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>322.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>283.2</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Respondents could select several variants of answer. The variant "coercive seizure of power" was absent from questionnaires in the Halychyna.

Evaluations of the Maidan events by Donbas residents stand in direct contrast to the evaluations of the Halychyna residents. 40% of Donbas respondents considered that the Maidan was a manifestation of struggle inside the ruling class, 40.2% considered it a coercive seizure of power, 39.2% the rebellion of people supported by the national bourgeoisie, 33.4% a struggle between ruling groups in Ukraine supported by external forces and by part of the population, 32.6% the destruction of the state. In
contrast to Donbas evaluations with negative connotations, respondents in
the Halychyna appreciated the Maidan events mostly positively: national
revolution 59.9%, struggle for human rights 55.6%, struggle for national
independence 53.2%, struggle for social justice 41.4%.

Turmoil in the Donbas was evaluated mostly negatively in both regions. However, the mass consciousness of the Donbas appears to be less consoli-
dated than the mass consciousness of the Halychyna in its response to this
upheaval. The most popular appraisals among respondents in the Donbas
were the following: rebellion of the people supported by the national bour-
geoisie, attempt to escape from fascism, struggle of the East and the West
of Ukraine, desire to join another state. Most Halychyna respondents saw
matters differently and understood the events as: destruction of the state,
external aggression, desire to join another state, struggle between the East
and the West of Ukraine, criminal revolt.

The use of factor analysis garnered revealing general positions that
go beyond the enumerated specific indices. Concerning evaluations of the
Maidan made by Donbas respondents, this analysis provided four factors
explaining 46% of variance. These factors may be defined thus: 1) national
revolution (18% of variance); 2) criminal revolt for the sake of coercive sei-
zure of power (12% of variance); 3) struggle between elites and external
interference (9% of variance); 4) struggle of the East and the West of Ukraine
(7% of variance).

Evaluations of the Maidan events by Halychyna respondents provided
five factors explaining 51% of variance: 1) national revolution (12% of var-
iance); 2) struggle for human rights and social justice (10% of variance);
3) destruction of the state (10% of variance); 4) struggle between elites and
external interference (10% of variance); 5) struggle of the East and the West
of Ukraine (9% of variance).

Appraisal of the events in their region in spring 2014 by Donbas
respondents are distributed into five factors explaining 51% of variance: 1) struggle for justice and against fascism (14% of variance); 2) destruction of
the state by criminals and external aggression (12% of variance); 3) struggle
between elite groups with coercive seizure of power and support from abroad
(9% of variance); 4) struggle between the East and the West of Ukraine with
ethnic component (9% of variance); 5) national revolution lead by bourgeo-
sie (7% of variance). The first, the fourth and the fifth factors may be con-
sidered pro-separatist platforms. The second and the third factor is the
platform for internal critics of the separatist movement in the Donbas.
In the Halychyna, evaluations of the events of spring 2014 in the Donbas are grouped into six factors: 1) *popular uprising for human rights and justice* (12% of variance); 2) *anti-fascism and search for proper foreign policy* (9% of variance); 3) *criminal revolt and external aggression* (9% of variance); 4) *destruction of the state and external aggression* (9% of variance); 5) *struggle between elites* (8% of variance); 6) *struggle between the East and the West of Ukraine* (7% of variance). Negative appraisal of the separatist movement in the Donbas dominates in the Halychyna and is understandable. The first and the second factors require explanation however; residents of the Halychyna probably considered it to be the struggle of the Ukrainian military against separatists. However, additional study is needed for an accurate interpretation.

In general, factor models demonstrate the presence of different interpretative macro-positions in the Halychyna and the Donbas. For instance, although the Maidan received mostly positive characteristics in the Halychyna, there are also positions of negative evaluation that correspond to those prevalent in the Donbas. The situation with appraisals of the events in the Donbas in spring 2014 is similar. However, the strength of representation of different models of description of the events is different and dependent on the concept of the state project dominating in the respective regions. Most adherents of the project, which may be defined as the pro/proto-Soviet model (point 8 of Table 2 is indicative in this sense), are detected in the Donbas. In its turn, the project of the national democratic state has significant support in the Halychyna.

Table 2: “What statements concerning the paths for the development of our country do you support?” (% of those who answered, respondents could choose up to four variants of answer).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>№</th>
<th>Variants of answer</th>
<th>Donbas n=721</th>
<th>Halychyna n=650</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Ukraine is, first of all, the state of Ukrainians, who should have certain advantages in their country. Other ethnic groups should agree to this</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>63.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Ukraine is the state of all citizens, irrespective of their ethnic origin. None of the ethnic groups should have advantages in our country</td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>43.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>In Ukraine, there should be a principle “One nation, one language, one church”</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>48.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>№</td>
<td>Variants of answer</td>
<td>Donbas n=721</td>
<td>Halychyna n=650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Ukraine should develop as a multicultural, multi-language and multi-confessional society</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>44.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>It would be good for Ukraine if most of the non-Ukrainian population left the country</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>It would be good for Ukraine if representatives of different peoples lived here</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Ukraine should renounce the cultural heritage of Tsarist Russia and the USSR and spiritually develop on its own basis</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>53.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Ukraine should retain everything valuable from the heritage of Tsarist Russia and the USSR, combining it with its own spiritual tradition</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>291.6</td>
<td>308.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The analysis of relations between variables provides the following results. Supporters of the model of the national democratic state in the Halychyna share the definition of the Maidan as a “national revolution” and refuse to see any destructive elements in it or a struggle between elites. At the same time, people in this region distinguish in the Maidan events a struggle against corruption and for social justice.

Most Donbas residents are committed to the project of restoration of the proto-Soviet internationalist identity largely devoid of national connotation. Its bearers have not perceived the Maidan as a national revolution or a struggle for social values and rights. For them, it was a coercive seizure of power, destruction of the state and struggle between ruling groups in Ukraine supported by external forces in which a segment of the people was embroiled. Only a minority in the region support the model of the national democratic state. In their evaluations they are united with Halychyna residents.

As for the events in Donbas in spring 2014, in the Halychyna there were few significant relations in their evaluation. Supporters of a national democratic state in Western Ukraine apparently saw the struggle of the Ukrainian military against separatists. For them it was not a struggle between ruling groups in Ukraine supported by external forces, but a continuation of the national revolution.
The picture in the Donbas is more integral. For those here who support the model of the national democratic state, events in the region were a criminal revolt, destruction of the state and external aggression, heated by the desire to join another state structure. Adherents to proto-Soviet identity in the Donbas in defining the events of spring 2014 do not accept the versions of national revolution, a struggle between the East and West, coercive criminal seizure of power and external aggression. Events in the region are interpreted as a people’s rebellion supported by the national bourgeoisie and as a struggle for social values, including rejection of fascism.

In general, we may conclude that attitudes to events of the Ukrainian crisis of 2013–2014 such as the Maidan and the war in the Donbas have been formed on the basis of different value platforms connected with concepts of the future of the state and nation that envision the combination of ethnic, cultural and civil solidarities. These value platforms are present both in the Donbas and in the Halychyna. The question lies in their weight in each region. Due to many factors, including the peculiarities of the historic development of the region, the demographic composition of the population, the structure and features of economics, the proto-Soviet (“internationalist”) project dominates in the Donbas, while the Halychyna is national-democratic and pro-European. This creates different spiritual atmospheres in these regions.

References


Sergiy Danylov

Crimean Tatars’ National Institutes under the Occupation: The Case of the Muftiyat of Crimea

With its annexation by Russia, Crimea became a challenging subject for studying the role and transformation of institutions under the conditions of foreign occupation. In this case study I will focus particularly on the Crimean Tatars’ religious institution, the Muftiyat. One can observe various tactics of the occupiers towards the Crimean Tatars and their institutions – ranging from carrots to sticks. And if the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people and also its leaders have found themselves under ongoing aggressive attacks and repressions, the Tatars’ religious institutions, particularly the Muftiyat, are engaged in a more sophisticated political game, the aim of which is to achieve the loyalty of the Crimean Tatars to (or, at least, their recognition of) the new Russian authorities in Crimea.

The collapse of Yanukovych’s government had a significant impact on the country’s security sector and allowed aggravation of the situation in Crimea. Part of the leadership of the Verkhovna Rada of Crimea (the Parliament of the Crimea) decided to follow the plan of the Kremlin to change the status of the peninsula.

From December 2013, Crimea saw an increasing presence of Russian special forces and special services, as well as Russian volunteers. On February 26, 2014 the Crimean Parliament scheduled an extraordinary session, at which it planned to adopt separatist resolutions. Then the session did not take place due to pressure from protesters who came out at the call of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people. However, in the night of February 27, the units of the Russian special operation forces seized all administrative buildings in Simferopol and Sevastopol. The forcibly assembled Verkhovna Rada of Crimea, behind closed doors and under pressure from armed agents, declared that it was taking full responsibility for the situation in Crimea and announced a referendum on “the improvement of the
legal status of Crimea.”¹ During the following weeks, armed forces of the Russian Federation entered Crimea en masse; they seized Ukrainian law enforcement bodies and blocked Ukrainian military bases.

It seems that although the annexation of Crimea envisaged coercive pressure, it also aimed at creating an illusion of a peaceful and voluntary change of state autonomy state in accordance with the will of Crimeans. Given the collapse of the state security sector, the only organized force that could resist that plan was the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people, who traditionally supported pro-Ukrainian movements and firmly opposed the separatist or irredentist movements. When the authorities of the ARC were seized, the Mejlis could rely on the steadfast support of the newly formed Crimean Tatar self-defense units of up to forty thousand people². These self-defense units were intended to prevent provocations and clashes in places densely populated by Crimean Tatars in all regions of the peninsula. Therefore, for the organizers of Crimea’s occupation, it was important to secure at least the neutrality of the Mejlis leadership. This neutrality or even assistance of the Mejlis could not be ensured unless its leadership understood the place of this representative body of Crimean Tatars in the new power system of the “Russian Crimea.” In order to influence the position of the Mejlis, on March 5, 2014 a large delegation from Tatarstan led by the Head of Russia’s Tatarstan Republic Rustam Minnikhanov came to Simferopol. According to the plan, Tatarstan was to become the guarantor of agreements and the main negotiator between the leaders of the Mejlis and Moscow. Under double pressure – from the military and negotiators from Kazan – the Mejlis reduced its protest activity and denied their support to pro-Ukrainian activists planning a manifestation in honor of Taras Shevchenko’s birthday. The action should have been held in Simferopol on March 9, 2014 and in the organizers held that it would have a significant impact on the political situation.³ As a result of the obvious compromise,

³ Danylov S. Interview with Andrey Shchekun, the head of the NGO “Ukrainian Crimea.” August 26, 2014 Kyiv. Interview materials collected as part of the project of the Institute of Oriental Studies, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, “Muslim
on March 11, 2014 the Crimean Parliament adopted the resolution “On the guarantees of the renewal of rights of the Crimean Tatar people and its integration in the Crimean community.” In particular, the resolution envisaged official status for the Crimean Tatar language and also guaranteed representation of Crimean Tatars in the authorities, calling for a 20% quota.

On March 29, 2014, the extraordinary session of the Qurultay of the Crimean Tatar people was held in Bakhchisaray. It addressed the issue of the “socio-political situation in Crimea and problems of national self-governing bodies of the Crimean Tatar people.” The resolution of the Qurultay actually confirmed the course for cooperation with the new government – two representatives of Crimean Tatars were delegated to the Council of Ministers of Crimea, Crimean Tatars were advised to adopt Russian citizenship, while the referendum on the statehood of Crimean Tatars as the main instrument of pressure on the Kremlin was actually canceled. The Qurultay was attended by the President of Tatarstan, the Chairman of the Council of Muftis of Russia, Rawil Gaynetdin, the Deputy Chairman of DUMER (the Religious Authority of Muslims of the European Part of Russia), and the Imam-khatib of the Moscow Memorial Mosque, Shamil Alyautdinov. The businessman and owner of the Crimean Tatar ATPTV channel Lenur Islyamov became the vice prime-minister of the Crimean government. However, on May 28, 2014 Lenur Islyamov was ousted from office and the compromise between the Mejlis and the Crimean authorities was destroyed.

There were a number of factors that did not allow this political structure to exist for long. The actions of Moscow in Crimea were apparently affected by the developments in eastern Ukraine. In early May 2014, the attempts to destabilize the situation and create a puppet “Novorossiya” in several regions of southern and eastern Ukraine failed. In mid May, Ukrainian armed forces began to put up armed resistance in the Donbas and demonstrate the potential for the recovery of their capacity for communities and Islamic institutions as part of civil society in Ukraine.” Personal archive of the author.

combat. Russia did not manage to create a land corridor from the mainland to Crimea with its isolated infrastructure. Although the conditions were difficult, presidential elections did take place in Ukraine, and a legitimate head of state was chosen. Mustafa Dzhemilev, the recognized leader with the most authority within Crimean Tatar society, keenly criticized the previous decisions made by the Mejlis. Its members oriented towards Dzhemilev consolidated and opposed cooperation with the occupying authorities. On the other hand, Moscow decided that it was able to control the situation by force and impose its decisions. Thus, the traditional Commemoration Day in honor of deportation victims on May 18, which used to be held annually and followed an established routine in the center of Simferopol, was radically reformatted by the Russian authorities and held in a different fashion in the suburban area.

That there were differing positions within the occupying authorities was confirmed during the off-site session of the Mejlis on the territory of mainland Ukraine in Henichesk on July 4–5, 2014. At this session, it was decided to withdraw the Crimean Tatar representatives from the government, and Mustafa Dzhemilev called for national-territorial autonomy of Crimean Tatars within Ukraine only. After the meeting, the Chairman of the Mejlis Refat Chubarov was prohibited from entering Crimea for five years. It was notable that the Mufti of Crimea and a permanent member of the Mejlis, Emirali Ablaev, was absent from that session. In fact, the Mejlis lost its leadership.

After successfully handling the Commemoration Day and preventing Dzhemilev from breaking into Crimea, Moscow rated the resistance potential of the Mejlis as low. Besides, there is an evident interdependence between the kinds of political structures imposed in Crimea and the security understanding of the region. Security issues have a decisive influence on the political processes on the peninsula. If Crimea is assumed to be located in the rear and to be without direct military challenges from both mainland Ukraine and external enemies, then some forms of guided self-organization may be allowed. However, if the peninsula is viewed as the “front-line,” as one big military base, and the threat is expected both from mainland Ukraine and the sea – because of the aggravation of relations between Russia and the West – Crimean Tatars, as in Stalin’s time, appear unreliable and a security threat. The triumph of such perceptions is certified by Moscow’s refusal to implement Crimean Tatar political projects even as alternatives to the Mejlis; Milli Firka and Qyrym Birlihi have united
pro-Russian Crimean Tatar forces and demonstrated absolute loyalty. As a result, at local elections on September 14, 2014, boycotted by the Mejlis, Crimean Tatars were present on the lists of several All-Russian parties. In these circumstances, the existence of such autonomous self-governing public institution as the Mejlis is considered by the Kremlin to be unacceptable and dangerous.\(^5\)

The practice of repressions and intimidation of Crimean Tatar activists became widespread in Crimea soon after annexation. However, only since the middle of summer and especially August could this practice be described as extensive and consistent.\(^6\) Searches were held in homes of active members of the local Mejlises and religious activists. Police raids affected Crimean Tatar schools and Muslim educational institutions. Finally, on September 16–17, 2014 armed men seized the Mejlis building in Simferopol, thus threatening the very existence of this representative body and driving its work into a semi-underground format. The main formal reason for carrying out searches in homes of Crimean Tatars was to find “banned” Islamic literature. In Russia, there is a long non-transparent practice of listing certain publications as prohibited literature. Storage of such literature can be subject to criminal prosecution. In the North Caucasus, according to human rights activists, such practice is widely used to combat the opposition. Thus, if the Mejlis is eliminated, the only self-governing body that could represent the interests of Crimean Tatars as a community at least to some extent will be the Muftiyat of Crimea.

The studies of social institutions formed in the Crimean Tatar community mainly focused on the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people. The Religious Authority of Muslims of Crimea (RAMC, the Muftiyat of Crimea) was paid much less attention. Such a secondary role was due to several factors. The Mejlis was always prominent in public debate, while the Muftiyat was perceived as a sector organization. The Mufti of the Crimea Emirali Ablaev was a member of the Mejlis and emphasized his affiliation with the national movement.\(^7\) To some extent, the Muftiyat was viewed as a department of the Mejlison religion. This is how it was presented by the

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\(^7\) For example, Emirali Ablaev used to wear a tie with the Crimean Tatar Emblem, the *tamga.*
opponents of the Mejlis among Russian nationalists and various groups of religious opposition among Crimean Tatars. The subordinate status of the Muftiyat and its dependence on the Mejlis was used by opponents to question its position and attack the Mejlis. Here is how one of the opponents explained the role of the Muftiyat: “Everyone knows that RAMC is a ‘pocket Muftiyat’ of the Mejlis, and if the Mejlis is unable to do something, then it is realized through RAMC.”

However, the role of the Muftiyat has been much wider and more important. Religion plays a prominent role in the dispute over historical rights to Crimea between the most socially active groups within various ethnic and quasi-ethnic communities. In Crimea, there have been several incidents of a “war of symbols,” where one party attempted to preserve and consolidate its dominance, and the other defended its rights to essential bonds with its home land. Religious symbols and objects of infrastructure were used to mark territory.

In addition, the authority of religion becomes a tool with which to legitimize certain ideological and political programs. Expanding the functions of religion to politics converts it into both a direct and an indirect source of power. Religious leaders become part of the political class (the ruling elite). Therefore, the exclusive status of the Muftiyat has always been questioned by other Islamic centers of power, first and foremost by the Religious Authority of Muslims of Ukraine headed by Sheikh Ahmet Tamim.

On the eve of the occupation, a certain status quo formed within the Muslim community of Crimea. Religious authorities, organizations and groups took their stable niches, built a system of communication with the political environment locally and in Kyiv, established a sustainable relationship with the leaders of ethnic communities, and worked out the ways of self-representation and the channels of information distribution among their target audience and wider Ukrainian society. The infrastructure of Islamic organizations took shape at an earlier stage of development. In Crimea, there began a process of emergence and development of self-governing groups and organizations of Islamic orientation,


functioning on the basis of civil society. Some of these groups – supporters and members of Hizbut-Tahrir, separate groups of Salafis, have competed with the recognized religious authority, the Muftiyat of Crimea, while others were born on civil grounds and have closely cooperated with the Muftiyat (Koydeshler, etc.). In their public self-representation and activities most of these groups and organizations have combined ethnicity and religion in different proportions, and sometimes have been viewed by their leadership as a platform for political participation and competition for resources (Sebat/Avdet, to some extent Hizbut-Tahrir).

The emergence of new entities (for instance of the Religious Center of Muslims of Crimea in Eupatoria in 2010) has completed the phase of expansion and optimization of organizational structures of Islamic organizations. Thus, the Religious Authority of Muslims of Ukraine headed by Sheikh Tamim has settled in Crimea.

The political upheavals of winter-spring 2013–2014 had a crucial impact on the Muslim community of Ukraine. The Muftiyat of Crimea and Emirali Ablayev himself actively participated in the Euro-Maidan, publicly confirming his position through his speeches from the stage at Maidan Nezalezhnosti. However, the occupation of Crimea has raised new challenges for the Muftiyat and its head Haji Emirali Ablayev. The attitude of the occupation authorities to the Muftiyat is defined by at least two factors. First, the Muftiyat is obviously seen as an uncontrolled Muslim organization in a state that has significant terrorist activity under Islamic slogans and a large share of Muslims in the population (much larger than in Ukraine). Terrorist activities and the importance of the Muslim factor in the political life of Russia apparently formed relevant culture-specific relationships between the government and formally independent Muslim organizations. Second, the Muftiyat is considered a part of the Crimean Tatar national movement, as an integral part of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people, the attitude to which, in turn, is currently evolving from cooperative (under certain conditions and concessions from the leaders of the Mejlis) to hostile. Both contexts pose existential challenges for the RAMC.

Additionally, the Muftiyat has found itself in a different organizational reality of Russian Islam that also has its centers of influence and rival projects competing for the loyalty of the state. In this situation, the Muftiyat focuses on searching for influential partners among Russian Muslim leaders, establishing links with Rawil Gaynetdin and other representatives of official Islam in Tatarstan, while trying to preserve its autonomy on most
issues, especially those associated with the provision of resources for current needs and programs. At the same time, within the framework of the strategy for marginalization of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis, there is a growth of contacts and relations between the newly established Taurida Muftiyat (formerly Religious Center of Muslims of the Crimea) and Muslim communities that are competing with Gaynetdin and referring to the rhetoric of combating Islamic extremism. Outside of this context, the Muftiyat is becoming involved in numerous projects and programs of Russian Islamic charitable and educational organizations.

In an attempt to stop the tide of searches and threats, on September 8, 2014 the Mufti of Crimea organized a round table that engaged the Council of Muftis of Russia represented by Gaynetdin and officials of the Crimean government. However, after September 14, 2014 searches at schools and homes of Muslims continued with renewed vigor despite assurances of the current prime minister of Crimea, Aksenov, that this practice would be stopped. Ablayev’s hopes to secure his status as the only representative of all Muslims of Crimea were equally futile. Instead, the Taurida Religious Authority continued to seize mosques previously belonging to the Muftiyat in different regions of the peninsula.

Both institutions that have represented the interests of the Crimean Tatars – the Mejlis and the Muftiyat – are in deep crisis under occupation. The Mejlis, cut off from resources, under constant pressure from law enforcement agencies, and deprived of any kind of self-representation and symbols with leaders in exile, will most likely cease to exist in the form in which it used to function in Ukrainian politics. The Mejlis as a self-governing, autonomous, organized institution is deeply alien and antagonistic to Russian political culture and viewed as a challenge to its security. In contrast, the Muftiyat is a conceptually clear and familiar institution that is still undergoing significant transformation. The absence of the Mufti from the Mejlis meetings and other significant steps (for instance, the holding of a “prayer for peace in Ukraine” in all mosques of the Crimea simultaneously with Christians) demonstrates his willingness to break relations with the national movement. Every new wave of repressions will reduce the Muftiyat’s degree of autonomy and strengthen its dependence on both the Council of Muftis of Russia and local authorities and security forces. If the leadership of the Muftiyat dares to resist, the authorities will always have the option of promoting the competing Taurida Muftiyat with its extremely aggressive policies towards Islamic dissidents.
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Sergiy Klymovskyi

The Donbas: An Uprising of the People or a Putsch by Slaveholders?

In my account from the local Donbas perspective I will try to examine some historical, political, socio-structural and cultural factors which made possible the “separatist scenario” externally imposed on the territory of the Donbas region.

For many years, the citizens of Ukraine were assured that compared to other regions the Donbas was something special and its residents were the best people in the country. This idea was more rigorously instilled in the Donbas and others after the Orange Revolution, when the Party of Regions and Communists in different ways repeated the old Soviet communists’ mantras that miners and steelmakers were the genuine working class. They stretched the idea that “the Donbas feeds Ukraine” to absurdity, but failed to prove its credibility. Yet, the Donbas enjoyed this flattery and its residents gladly believed that they were supermen, “true Arians” of the proletarian cult.

However, one cannot be fed with flattery. Thus, in the USSR, the Donbas was “nourished” at the expense of pickings from colonies, in the same way labor aristocracy was created in Great Britain, as described by Engels. The role of colonies was played by other industries and regions. Other people attached to the mines – *Komsomol* (the Soviet youth communist organization) functionaries, engineers, safety inspectors and others – also lived off that source. The high salaries of the miners and steelmakers of the Donbas were drawn by trading organizations that were obliged by the Communist Party of USSR to provide the region with food and consumer goods on the same level as Moscow, the exemplary “communist” city. Huge sums of money circulated in the Donbas and attracted criminals and clandestine entrepreneurs into the region.

By Soviet standards, Donbas residents were richer and enjoyed official esteem. However, the first cracks appeared in that coal-and-iron “communism” in the late 1970s, while after the collapse of the USSR it came
crashing down completely. The main reason was the end of the era of coal as a fuel. By 1980, the Soviet government, like the governments of Great Britain and France, understood the necessity to curtail the coal branch and began to implement this policy in line with the scheme of French socialists, with Soviet procrastination. The process became protracted, while the bureaucracy’s preparation for “carving up” the USSR did not allow its completion by 1991. Therefore, Moscow left the problematic Donbas to Ukraine without trying to “play” any Donbas republic or Novorossiya.

Privatization deprived the Ukrainian state of a capacious source of additional payments to the Donbas, and together with the collapse of Soviet industrial chains, the decline of military industries, the beginning of private capital accumulation and other factors led to the end of “Donetsk-type communism.” That inevitably resulted in resentment on the part of Donbas residents, which was exploited in 1993 by the former prime minister Kuchma in his struggle against President Kravchuk, when he organized the march of miners to Kyiv to demonstrate for higher salaries.

That march resulted in pre-term presidential elections, which were lost by Kravchuk, and the imposition of tribute paid to the Donbas by other regions of Ukraine as direct subsidies from the state budget went to the coal industry. Moreover, that tribute was paid through target programs, social security and pension funds. The pension leveling of the “early” Kuchma did not affect the miners, as they were protected by the law “On the prestige of miners’ labor.” Further, the base minimum pension of a miner should have been 3 times higher than subsidence level. In 2013, it constituted nearly 3 thousand hryvnas,\(^1\) while the salary of a teacher or a doctor in Kyiv was nearly 2.5 thousand and less in other regions. Subject to the length of service and other bonuses, the pension of a miner could reach 6 thousand hryvnas.

In 2009, 180 state-owned mines and mine associations employed 240 thousand people. Together they produced over 60% Ukraine’s coal. However, 70 of those 180 mines yielded only 4% of that coal. Direct state subsidies to them in 2006 amounted to 4.3 billion hryvnas, in 2009 5.9 billion hryvnas.\(^2\) That tribute constantly grew and reached 13 billion hryvnas in

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2013, while coal production slowly but steadily decreased. According to estimates of current prime minister Yatseniuk announced on June 3 2014, for 2014 the general volume of subsidies to the Donetsk and Luhansk regions was planned to total 34 billion hryvnas (about 2,8 billion US dollars in 2014). That equated to nearly 10% of Ukraine’s state budget income in 2013 – that was the approximate scale of the tribute paid by Ukraine to the Donbas by the end of Yanukovych’s rule.

That tribute, together with successful orientation of a part of the Donbas’s enterprises for export, partially returned the region to “Donetsk-type communism,” but on other premises and not for all of its residents. Those employed by private enterprises, export-oriented and owned by Rinat Akhmetov, Ukraine’s richest oligarch, who fully ate up the Donbas under Yanukovych, returned to the level of Soviet well-being and even exceeded it. Yet, now they did not have the Communist Party to thank for this, but Akhmetov personally and his Party of Regions. Those employed at subsidized state-owned enterprises and state-financed institutions might not have thanked Akhmetov, but still would have voted for Yanukovych and the Party of Regions.

Thus, the notorious sovok – the Soviet political system with its behavioral norms and conceptual discourse – became restored in Donbas under the guise of the Party of Regions and private property instead of communism. The Communists retained their influence only in the Luhansk region, which was not directly involved in export and took the place of the stepdaughter in the new economy of distribution managed by donetskije (the Donetsk elite and loyal residents). In that system of distribution, the Luhansk communist opposition was dissatisfied with their place. Yet, it barely grumbled and, looking back at Kremlin, raised the ghost of the USSR, thus competing with the “whites” and “Cossacks” who also meditated on the Kremlin, but were trying to raise the ghost of the Russian Empire.

The ideology of the new “Donetsk-type communism” was formed by the synthesis of Donbas nationalism, Orthodoxy in the format of Moscow’s Russian Orthodox Church, the Soviet version of class peace and the heroic cult of the USSR with its holidays and symbols. The Communists, who used to cover reams of paper with writings on how the bourgeoisie stirred

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up national hatred, took to opposing the East and the West of Ukraine and together with regionals (functionaries and supporters of the Party of Regions) began to create a specific Donbas nation. The quintessence of their common work was a scornful phrase of Internet forums, “This is Donbas, baby!,” with which donetskie addressed all others.

However, not everybody was included in the distribution system of the new “Donetsk-type communism.” Many people were left by the wayside – workers of small and medium-sized businesses, peasants and the self-employed, as well as the precariat (people employed occasionally), the most numerous group of whom were miners from kopanky (illegal mines). “Postindustrial gathering” – the search for and return of scrap metals – became a mass trade and bread-winning activity of the precariat. Those groups were poorly connected with the new “Donetsk-type communism” economically, but were not free from its ideological influence. One might say that the way of life deteriorated, but the conceit remained, as happened to a part of the Polish gentry in the seventeenth century. According to classical sociology, those groups formed the opposition to the bloc of the Party of Regions and the Communists. However, being did not determine consciousness as directly as Marx trusted. Donetsk particularism might have been stronger than Marx, though some representatives of those groups did take part in the Maidan revolution.

The putsch of the Party of Regions on Forgiveness Sunday of 2010, when with the connivance of Yushchenko their deputies seized the Central Election Committee and forced it to urgently announce Yanukovych the President elect, turned Donbas residents into a ruling class, if not really, then mentally. That made the whole of Ukraine soon pronounce unto them the famous line “Thank you, residents of Donbas, for the President – pederast.”


5 The phrase became well known in Ukraine after it was first used by the soccer fans at the game between Dynamo (Kyiv) and Karpaty (Lviv) in Kyiv on August 7, 2011. The phrase (a rhythmic line in Russian) gained wide-spread popularity through social networks depicting this episode from the match. Considering it offensive to former president Yanukovych, who was born in the Donbas and gained overwhelming electoral support from the region, the authorities initiated several criminal cases against the persons who attempted to popularize the phrase (particularly as a slogan on t-shirts).
From 2010, *regionals* actively began to fill the state machinery with Donbas residents and give preference to them in business, while the volume of tribute paid by Ukraine to “Donbas breadwinners” since Kuchma’s presidency began to grow rapidly. By 2013, it came to the point where miners of the Lviv coal basin were forced to buy coal from the Donbas for their everyday needs, while the natives of Donbas were brought to Kyiv to head the smallest municipal service offices. The then vice prime minister Tyhypko offered to resettle those not included in “Donetsk-type communism” to the Khmelnytskyi and Ternopil regions, obliging them to become farmers, but the Party of Regions resettled them to Kyiv and its satellite towns. Yet Kyivans had never invited them. In Kyiv, kiosks and businesses were largely taken away from locals and given to *donetskie*, who also received hundreds of new kiosks on a preferential basis. That way, *regionals* attempted to solve two problems: they moved their electorate to the restless capital and removed social tension in the Donbas.

The process of creating the new nation-class of *donetskie* was so aggressive that even people in the South who traditionally supported the Part of Regions understood: the yoke of *donetskie* is real, unlike the danger of mythical *banderivtsi* (coming from supporters of Stepan Bandera, leader of the Ukrainian national liberation movement during Second World War). They realised this fact over only four years, despite systematic intimidation with the myth of *banderivtsi* since 1945, and they joined the revolution, because the word *donetskiy* became synonymous with a complacent and impudent master of peons, as well as a despotic boss with gangster manners.

The revolution also ripened in the Donbas itself. It was not by chance that the *regionals* did not bring *titushki* (mercenary agents who supported the Ukrainian police force against protesters during Yanukovyčh’s rule) and flag wavers to Kyiv from there, as they were careful not to expose the rear and not to let the spirit of the Maidan spread to the Donbas. Since 2011, the Donbas has been noted for the protests of Chernobyl and Afghan war veterans, water, bread and medical shortages, as well as miners’ strikes. That is why from late January 2014 the *regionals* and the Communists prepared to protect administrative buildings in Donetsk, Luhansk, Odessa and Kharkiv from revolutionary attacks. But they did not happen there – Yanukovyčh fled earlier. Consequently, most Donbas residents turned out not to be involved in the revolution, they simply watched it on TV. The need for a sip of the freedom that was forcefully contained for three
months when Ukraine boiled up with the revolution should have inevi-
tably burst out, especially in the Donbas, where for 23 years nothing had
happened other than official pro-Yanukovych meetings and censure of the
“orange and brown plague.”

In March 2014, Donetsk and Luhansk belatedly burst out with the
euphoria of manifestations and barricades. Local oppositionists, demo-
crats and revolutionaries of all creeds spontaneously took to the streets for
their portion of revolution. But those who felt like the Germans when they
learnt that the Russians and Americans were coming to Berlin also took to
the streets. Both had a feeling of the end of “communism” of the German
and of the Donetsk type and a premonition of punishment. That is why on
the streets there were both the slogan “Yanukovych has betrayed us” and
the slogan “Yanukovych, return.” The Donbas authorities hurried to exploit
the mood, as they clearly understood “for whom the bell tolled,” and took
the grass roots manifestation movement into their own hands. They were
joined by pro-Russian groups, who earlier had been napping, and agents of
the Kremlin, which played its own game.

The Donbas revolutionary democrats did not have to storm anything,
as the regionals opened the doors of administrative buildings, brought
tires to them and urged people to overthrow the “Kyiv junta” that allegedly
resided there. Residents joyfully constructed barricades according to TV
recollections and expressed indignation that in Kyiv the protestors beat the
police, while they were prohibited from doing so, although in the Donbas
they also had if not a revolution, then a popular uprising, and they had
long wanted to beat the police.

The provisional government in Kyiv that emerged simultaneously
with the barricades in Donetsk and Luhansk (a unique case of a govern-
ment being overthrown before it appears) was busy with other things. It
had the problem of Russian intervention in Crimea to deal with, as well
as all the ordinary problems of an emerging administrative structure. An
awful “fascist Kyiv junta” had neither an army nor a local state machinery
and was constituted by a coalition of Yulia Tymoshenko’s Batkivshchyna
Party and the Party of Regions joined by Svoboda. Vitaliy Klitchko’s

6 In depth analytical account of Donbas and Southeastern peoples’ attitudes during
the revolutionary events in Kyiv can be found in: Vedernikova I, Mostovaya Y. and
UDAR Party represented a soft opposition and voiced some concerns, as did revolutionary initiatives of the non-partisan Maidan and the new parties born by it.

In that situation, the provisional president Turchynov and Batkivshchyna in return for loyalty offered the position of Donetsk regional governor to Akhmetov, in order to guarantee that the Donbas would remain the same state within a state as it had been even under Yushchenko’s presidency. However, Akhmetov had other plans and refused. Yet he recommended for this position his old adversary Taruta, thus demonstrating some loyalty. Batkivshchyna functionaries correctly perceived the manifestations in the Donbas as a belated revolutionary wind, intrigues of Kremlin agents and behind the scenes activities of the regionals to acquire new privileges. The last point became evident when the Party of Regions began talking about federalisation of Ukraine – the donetskie wanted to secure the status of the Donbas as a state within a state legislatively, rather than on the level of personal agreements with Turchynov and Tymoshenko.

The reason for this was that the authorities of the “junta” of Turchynov and Yatseniuk expired in two months and there was some question as to the likelihood of Tymoshenko being elected president on May 25, 2014, as was observance of agreements even if she was elected. Hence the regionals forming a parliamentary coalition with Batkivshchyna and Svboda demanded reliable guarantees from their partners to protect bureaucrats, especially in the Donbas, from lustration and their property all over Ukraine from revolutionary confiscations. Federalisation provided such guarantees, but in fact meant preservation of the yoke of donetskie over the whole of Ukraine. Naturally, even Batkivshchyna that hammered to find a compromise could not agree to this. Therefore, it offered them the option of tightening their belts and confining themselves to the Donbas within the framework of its project of de-centralisation and a parliamentary republic.

The project of two “banana” republics – the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and the Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR) – barely attracted regionals, as it broke the “unity” of the Donbas and led to losses in power and property in Ukraine. Akhmetov would have turned from an oligarch of all-Ukrainian scale into a modest owner of a complex of mines and plants within the DPR/LPR. He would also have faced the problem of structurally rebuilding that complex because of the inevitable confiscation of its partner companies in Dnipropetrovsk and other regions of Ukraine. Theoretically, the LPR’s “godfather” Yefremov, the head of the Party of Regions
faction in Parliament, the “feudal lord” of the Luhansk region, could have personally gained from its appearance on the map. But Yefremov was not the person to plunge into such risky venture, and a collision of DPR with LPR would have been inevitable.

The Kremlin either did not want the DPR and the LPR as new subjects of the Russian Federation, unlike Crimea, despite its assurances to street agitators that after a “referendum” “polite soldiers” from Russia would come there. Kremlin never wanted to subsidise unprofitable mines of the Donbas or liquidate them and provide other employment for miners. Neither did the Kremlin need bums cherished by the regionals, as there were plenty of them in Russia. The pocket DPR/LPR were convenient for the Kremlin as a springboard for its Novorosiiya project and a base for the “bridge on dry land” to Crimea, but as “independent” states, not as a millstone around the neck of Russia’s state budget. That is why there was no massive Russian military invasion of the Donbas after the referendum of May 11 2014. Kremlin feasibly worked on their diplomatic acknowledgement and hoped that the situation would settle down like 20 years ago in Transdnistria or better. Detachments of the DPR/LPR together with special forces of the Russian Federation, with the help of Russian weapons, would ward off the sluggish central government anti-terrorist operation (ATO) and become participants in international negotiations – this way they would be legally recognized and Ukraine would receive its own “Republic of Transdnistria.” If the pro-Russian troops were smashed, the Kremlin would bring in “peacemaking” forces as in Transdnistria and freeze the situation for years.

Turchynov’s provisional government understood that the regionals were bluffing and increased the pressure on them by supporting the DPR/LPR, but still attempted to agree with them. The government assumed that the regionals did not need Russian parvenus in the Donbas for long and that they did not want to abandon politics, but were trying to stay in it by changing signboards. Consequently, there was an opportunity to agree with them. The government also hoped to agree with the Kremlin that it would content itself with Crimea and stop expansion into the Donbas. Moreover, there was an opinion that it might be worth giving up the Donbas to Russia to alleviate the burden of the state budget of Ukraine. But when the Novorossiya project was started, it became clear that it was impossible to buy off the Kremlin even with the Donbas.

The hope that it would be possible to agree with everybody and that the regionals would make a rumpus and disband the DPR/LPR themselves
presupposed the Turchynov government’s flabby ATO that mostly consisted of truces. All the more so since the “Kyiv junta” did not have enough forces for conflict – 70–80% of the Donbas police consisted of Yanukovych’s supporters and there were even more of them in the local Security Service. Therefore, it was not surprising that in Severodonetsk, a town with 100 thousand residents, the “people’s rebellion” was able to seize the office of the public prosecutor, deploying merely four gunmen in balaclavas and without a single shot being fired.

In Donetsk, the flag of Ukraine hung over City Council for 3 months before the (pro-) Russian mercenary army came to the city from Slavyansk. All that time, in Donetsk there had been a peaceful polycracy of mayor–regional Lukianchenko, the DPR, the “Kyiv junta,” Maidan groups, Akhmetov’s security firm “Luks,” field commanders of Kharkiv “Oplot,” Kadyrov’s “Vostok” and smaller groups and gangs. The Donetsk police was a separate group that tried to maintain a semblance of neutrality – formally they were loyal to the “junta,” as they received their salaries from Kyiv, and simultaneously they worked for Moscow. How did the pro-Kremlin “left” and mass media see a “people’s uprising” in that?

Due to lack of forces and hopes for diplomacy, for three months Turchynov’s government organized off-site sessions, round tables and other meetings in the Donbas and its neighbouring areas, attempting to reach agreement, and was even ready to agree to a referendum. But the “Donbas” did not listen, and only dictated its conditions, complacently looking to Russian troops near the border. A cold comfort for Batkivshchyna was the quite evident fact that donetskie together with the DPR/LPR would not allow presidential elections to be held in the Donbas, thus increasing the chance of victory for Tymoshenko. However, this proved to be an illusion similar to hopes for diplomacy.

The primary success of the counter-revolutionary putsch in the Donbas was ensured by three factors: terror, power and fear. Since March 15, 2014, in Donetsk titushki and pro-Russian militant groups began to systematically beat and murder Maidan activists; on April 28, 2014 they committed a mass attack on the manifestation for the unity of Ukraine and revolutionary changes. People were beaten in the face of the police, who only occasionally protected demonstrators when the situation was critical.

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Terror organized by *regionals*, Communists and Russian agents covered the Donbas like in the 1990s, when the builders of “Donetsk-type communism” liquidated anyone who would not consent to it, from trade union activists to kiosk owners who did not want to pay tribute.8

To provoke mass discontent and psychosis, manager-*regionals* began to withhold from the salaries of their employees money for “reconstruction of the Maidan,” allegedly on Kyiv’s directive. Although there were no construction works at the Maidan and that was easily seen, there was a rumor in the Donbas that the “junta” demanded each resident transfer 5, 10, 15, 20 and even 30% of their salary for “reconstruction of the Maidan.” There was also a rumor that Kyiv had stopped subsidizing unprofitable mines in the Donbas, despite the fact that since April 1, 2014 the base settlement rate of miners’ salaries had been raised.

Under that atmosphere, on April 22, 2014 a strike started at five mines owned by Akhmetov’s companies, against incomplete payment of advance salaries, which was spun by the pro-Kremlin “left” as the beginning of huge proletarian upheaval in support of the DPR. But that “upheaval” ended in two days, when the DTEK accepted 15 points of the strikers’ demands. Only the 16th point on raising salaries from 5 to 10 thousand hryvnas as in other mines was not agreed to at once, but further salaries were raised, though not doubled.9 The Krasnodon strikers politely listened to DPR agitators and the deputy-*regional* Tsariov, who represented *Novorossiya* and was famous for promising to cover the Maidan with corpses and “clean up” the rest of Ukraine after the shooting of demonstrators in Kyiv on February 18, 2014, but they refused both the DPR and *Novorossiya*. The “upheaval of the miners” proved to be a fake of the pro-Kremlin “left” and mass media. Moreover, in Khartsyzsk, Stakhanov and Yenakievo, miners dispelled agitators and recruiters from the DPR/LPR.

While the “people’s rebellion” was a fake, the putsch of “*regionals*-slaveholders” and the mass psychosis of the Donbas were real. Residents

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8 The stories of cruelty and violence during the early accumulation of capital and of the formation of “wild” capitalism in the Donbas of the 1990s are documented in: Kuzin S., Penchuk B. Donetskaya mafiya. Kiev: Fond “Antikoruptsiya,” 2006. The book was banned from 2010 in Ukraine, under Yanokovych’s rule.

of the Donbas clearly understood why the whole of Ukraine said “Thank you” to them for President Yanukovych, and thus subconsciously awaited requital like the Germans in 1945 who had praised Hitler for 12 years for “lifting Germany from its knees.” Those feelings were heated with rumors spread by putschists that *banderivsti* were going to the Donbas to slaughter those who did not speak Ukrainian. Therefore, like the Germans who believed Goebbels that the Red Army was killing babies and decided they had better surrender to the Americans, the psychically agitated Donbas residents decided to surrender to their “Americans” – to join Russia without understanding that Russia did not want them and the Donbas, but rather wanted the whole southeast of Ukraine up to Odessa.

It is noteworthy that in March–April, the Donbas’s neighboring cities also expected an arrival, but that of the *donetskie*, who would come to restore their rule together with *moskals* (a derogatory term for *Russians*, or literally *Muscovites*). In particular, in Smila in the Cherkasy region there was a rumor among wrestlers that the *donetskie* were approaching, and a crowd of strong men guarded the bus station for several hours waiting for bearers of the Donetsk yoke. Yet the *donetskie* did not come to Smila and *banderivtsi* did not come to the Donbas. Instead, on April 12, 2014 in Slaviansk and Kramatorsk there appeared Russian special forces with machine guns, together with the former *Berkut* of Yanukovych. Everything happened almost just as one man had warned at a manifestation in Kharkiv: “While you are arguing, moskals will come and kill everybody.”

The appearance of *moskals* was inevitable. The psychosis concerning the arrival of *banderivtsi* and the total cleaning up of the Donbas by the “Kyiv junta” began to fade away slowly in April. Revolutionary lustration and confiscations did not happen, the army and the National Guard did not disperse the fighters of the DPR and LPR, who sat bored with machine guns near the buildings of the Security Service in Luhansk and the Regional Administration in Donetsk, while a part of the *regionals* were stuck in negotiations and agreements with *Batkivschyna* and were losing interest in the putsch. Residents of agrarian and industrial settlements not included in the Donetsk-Lisichansk-Luhansk agglomeration did not support the putsch at all. Among them, no more than 10% wanted to join Russia. The putsch was becoming more sluggish and was about to die of boredom and inanity, since the “Kyiv junta” demonstrated an unwillingness to disturb the system of “Donetsk-type communism” in the immediate future and
Sergiy Klymovskyi

was ready to keep it for Donbas residents, to whom it was so dear, safe and untouchable, for the sake of avoiding war.

The Kremlin understood that the putsch was falling back and feared that *regionals* could make a deal with the “junta,” which was tempting them with investments and other funds from the EU in addition to preservation of state budget subsidies, the ability to “milk” the Kremlin and trade with Russia, as well as retaining all the benefits of “Donetsk-type communism.” The Kremlin saw that time and money were being wasted, while the possibility of reaching a full agreement between the “junta” and the *regionals* was growing, since after Yanukovych’s flight democracy had entered the Party of Regions and it was no longer a detachment that obediently went to the Customs Union or the European Union or elsewhere at the leader’s command. Therefore, the Kremlin decided to give a second wind to the putsch with the help of bomb throwers, rocket complexes, tanks, *Nonas*, *Grads* and *Buks* (Russian terms for their heavy weapons and rockets). It also considered handing over aircraft, but that heat was somewhat cooled by the putschists themselves when they knocked out a Malaysian airliner out of the happy feeling that they had so many powerful modern weapons that they had bought, according to the Kremlin’s version, at the nearest village store.

The *regionals* that provided weapons to the DPR/LPR at the beginning of the putsch (this fact logically allows us to name those events a “putsch”) lost control over the situation after that “second wind.” From shadow leaders of the putsch they turned into “milk cows” for field commanders of the DPR/LPR and ran for protection to “junta” like the mayor of Donetsk. The system of “Donetsk-type communism” began to collapse, while Russia’s artillery, its mercenaries and crazy volunteers are working to return the Donbas to the Stone Age.

Residents of Rubizhne and other cities of the Donbas who yielded to the wave of mass psychosis about *banderivtsi* and prevented the Ukrainian army from approaching the border with the words “*We did not call you!*” hardly imagined that they were merely pawns in hands of slaveholder-putschists and the Kremlin. On the same grounds, the residents of Berlin in 1945 could have told Soviet soldiers “*We did not call you to free us from Hitler.*” Yet now the Ukrainian army, like the Soviet army in 1945, does not have time for long discussions – there is the war. And the war in the Donbas will result in the defeat of the Stalinist variant of fascism, and further in its collapse in Russia. Probably, the war will end earlier than
some of the ATO leadership would like it to end. What awaits the residents of Donbas? The same as awaited the Germans after 1945 – de-Nazification, the change of mode of thinking and behavior, escape from the propagandistic myths of Russian television and DPR/LPR, and finally the end of the system of “Donetsk-type communism.” Revolutionary changes await the whole of Ukraine, even though they have been slowed down by the putsch of the Donbas slaveholders.

References


Part V
Language, Media and Culture under Transformation
The Problem of Bilingualism in Ukraine: The Historical and International Context

They make war against Ukraine not for the sake of protecting Russians, but for a different reason. Freedom is contagious. The people of Ukraine rebelled against the gang of thieves. The fraudsters in the Kremlin cannot sleep at night because they fear that this fire may be passed on to Russia. The criminals in the Kremlin must suppress freedom in Ukraine because it is a vivid example for the peoples of Russia. They must strangle democracy in their neighboring country to protect their stolen billions, to preserve their unlawful power, and their own heads and asses from the wrath of the people. They have nowhere to run.¹

Viktor Suvorov

The problem of bilingualism in Ukraine used to be a subject of attention for linguists, educators and cultural workers and often resulted in never-ending discussions about the advantages for Ukrainians of mastering different languages, especially Russian, which is allegedly richer, more developed and used more widely in the world. Historians and political scientists addressed this issue less frequently, while economists virtually never did so. However, this problem, like most problems in any country, actually has an important economic component. Those who have denied the Ukrainian language's right to existence have ultimately denied the right of Ukrainians to decide how they want to live, what to build, and what to grow on their land. In the late Soviet era, they even questioned the importance for Ukrainians of living in their homeland, promoting the well-known slogan “My address is not a house or a street, my address is the Soviet Union.” Due to lack of education on the part of participants in this dialogue, or indeed quite intentionally, the discussion of the role and place of the Ukrainian language in the life of the country is still hidden or superseded by a specific philological discussion on the best usage of words or correct cases.

In reality, the problem of bilingualism, or more precisely, of a single language, in essence entails the fundamental right of the speakers to certain territories, along with the right to manage their land, finances, human resources, etc. In the not-so-distant 1970s, a traveler from Ontario visiting Montreal could say “Speak white, please” to a French-speaking taxi driver, meaning that he should switch from French to English as a primary language, relegating the former to a secondary language. While this probably was not a manifestation of white racism, as both participants of the cross-cultural dialogue could be either Caucasian or not, for a native English speaker, this language served to confirm his right to this territory, its resources, laws and culture. He was hardly aiming to undermine the language of the great Montaigne, Molière or Hugo, nor did he have any prejudice against Montesquieu or Voltaire. He most likely did not even know anything about them, rather he was demanding respect as a representative of the metropolitan center.

The problem of bilingualism in Belgium, which is well-known in Europe and has lasted for centuries, has similar economic origins, with some people believing that they are giving up too much to make allowances for their counterparts, while receiving too little economic welfare, respect and recognition in return. This can be experienced even now when entering the country and speaking to border guards from either language group.

This is the reason that the problem of bilingualism in Ukraine, which is traditionally presented as merely a linguistic, cultural and folkloric challenge or as a problem for writers and artists, is essentially an economic, territorial and political issue that is camouflaged in the cheap clothing of discussions about correct orthography or word usage.

Ukrainian, like most literary languages of the European continent, took on its modern form in the early nineteenth century, almost at the same time as other European languages. A broad and developed literature in all fields of knowledge has been created in this language. It is used in everyday life by 30 to 40 million people in Ukraine and elsewhere in the world. Therefore, ongoing talk that this language is artificial, useless, provincial and backward should have long become an anachronism or at least bad manners in a decent society. However, such theses continue to be discussed not only in tabloids, but are even defended at international conferences by respectable Russian scholars and their Ukrainian followers.
Most Russian opponents base their arguments on the assumption that the Russian language emerged first and that it is natural, while Ukrainian is artificially constructed and useless. However, if we look back further than two centuries in terms of the European history of language usage, we can see that, prior to that, educated communities on the continent mostly communicated in Latin. In the eighteenth century, this was replaced by French, which was written and spoken by the educated strata in most European capitals. Only in the late eighteenth–early nineteenth centuries were the languages of most European people diffused among all strata of educated citizens and began to acquire contemporary features.

In the late eighteenth century, King Friedrich the Great, one of Germany’s founders, who cannot be accused of prejudice against the German language or a lack of patriotism, wrote the following in his treatise De la littérature Allemande: “I see that this is a semi-barbarian language, which has as many dialects as there are provinces in Germany. And each group is confident that their patois is the best.”2 He further explained this by referring to Germany’s impoverishment due to long wars and the insufficient development of trade and the bourgeoisie. He also predicted that growth in prosperity would allow German culture and science to flourish, and that Germans would become civilized and rise to the same level as other nations.

Thus, the great German king legitimately drew a connection, first of all, between the underdevelopment of the German language relative to French and economic factors. However, as Germany created its empire throughout the nineteenth century through wars and revolution, it both developed and disseminated its language. At that time, Ukraine finally became a part of the Russian Empire, which, as all other known empires, aimed to spread its political, economic and cultural power throughout all its conquered territories. The problem of the Russian Empire was that most of the people it was trying to unite and subjugate had already developed a historical memory and legal traditions. They had already achieved a much higher cultural level than the majority of Russian speakers.

As early as the eleventh century, when Christianity (which came to Ukraine from Byzantium) was firmly established on Ukrainian territory, the kings of Central and Western Europe gladly married Ukrainian

princesses. They thereby confirmed a common Christian cultural space, extending from the Atlantic Ocean to the Dnieper River. The most famous of these princesses was Anna, the daughter of the great Kyiv King Yaroslav the Wise, who became the wife of the King of France, Henri I.

The fact that Kyiv was integrated in the cultural space common to the countries of its contemporary West is expressively certified, for example, by the frescos in the St. Peter and Paul Cathedral in Regensburg, which are virtually identical to the frescos of the St. Sophia Cathedral in Kyiv. Perhaps they were even painted by the same Byzantine masters. The undeserved downplaying in today's Western Europe of the role of Byzantium and of its fundamental influence on European culture has prompted many Europeans to perceive Ukraine as something different and culturally alien. We should have overcome such stereotypes long ago.

At the same time, in Russia, despite the widespread concept of a “single nation,” there always existed an understanding of the cultural peculiarity of Ukraine. In order to overcome this, Russian kings even risked the so-called “change of faith.” Historians consider this famous church reform, which took place in Russia in the mid-seventeenth\(^3\) to be an attempt not only to modernize the backward Russian Christianity, but also to bring it closer to Christianity in Ukraine, in terms of both language and ceremony. Otherwise, there would be no reason to pursue the policy of seizing Ukrainian territories, which has been justified by the unity of the Orthodox faith.

Other telling evidence of the recognition of the Ukrainian language as a separate developed phenomenon is represented by the laws of 1863 and 1876.\(^4\) They prohibited the use of Ukrainian in all spheres. Yet it is impossible to prohibit something that does not exist. Thus, the prohibition of the Ukrainian language became an additional powerful method for the economic expansion of the Russian empire. In addition to this, after the Hetmanskhyyna was finally abolished, non-Ukrainian merchants were permitted to trade in Ukrainian cities without paying taxes for 20 years.

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\(^4\) On July 30, 1863, the Minister of the Interior of the Russian Empire, Piotr Valuyev, issued a secret directive to territorial censorship committees, ordering them to halt the publication of books written in Ukrainian. According to the directive, the publication of religious, educational and enlightening books was prohibited. The operation of Valuyev's circular was secured and expanded by the Ems ukaz of Alexander II of 1876, which almost entirely prohibited publication of works in Ukrainian. See further: Aleksey Miller. *Ukrainskiy vopros v Rossiyskoy imperii*. Kyiv, Larus, 2013, 111–133.
thereby destroying the economic grounds for the existence of a Ukrainian bourgeoisie for many years. Nevertheless, despite numerous prohibitions and obstacles, the Ukrainian people, who constituted over 90% of the population of the territory of contemporary Ukraine, remained devoted to their language and culture, and it turned out that the empire was not culturally strong enough to replace the language and cultural code of such a huge homogeneous mass of the population. This is the reason why, immediately after the February 1917 revolution in Russia, a Tsentralna Rada (Central Assembly) was created in Ukraine as a representative body for all Ukrainians, followed, later on, by the Ukrainian People's Republic.

Unfortunately, Russian attempts at russification were much more successful under the Soviet regime.

Thus, after the February revolution occurring in the Russian Empire as an outcome of World War I, Ukraine declared its independence and began building its statehood. Incidentally, at that time, German, Polish, Greek and other national autonomous regions also started to appear in Ukraine. Schools were opened, as well as newspapers and administrations in the respective languages. However, the Russian-Ukrainian war, which started soon after, prevented Ukrainian statehood from coming to fruition. In terms of the number of victims and results, this war eclipses all wars occurring on the territory of Ukraine from 1914 through 1926. However, for political reasons, it is still called a civil war, even in respected academic works. In the short period of this war, the Ukrainian language gained the recognition of the Bolshevik government in Moscow. It actually became the means for Russia's colonization of Ukraine and its transformation into a totalitarian communist republic of the USSR.

As long as battles between Ukrainian patriots and Russian imperial troops lasted, the Ukrainian language was not significantly suppressed by the central government in Moscow. The creation of the Ukrainian communist state, as an equal member of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and with Ukrainian as the national language, was essentially a compromise that Ukrainians agreed to in the war with the Russian communist occupiers. However, this compromise did not last for long. Moscow gradually concentrated the full scale of military and repressive power in its hands and began attacks on the Ukrainian language, not only on the territory of Ukraine, but also in the places where many Ukrainians had settled in the Russian Federation, such as the Kuban, Povolzhye and the Far East.
The late 1920s brought mass repressions against Ukrainian native speakers, in the form of the Holodomor of 1932–33, which killed millions of Ukrainians,5 as well as the extermination of the majority of the higher cultural stratum of the Ukrainian nation. The staff of the Ministry of Education of Ukraine was almost entirely liquidated (twice). In 1934, after such cleansing (i.e. arrests, executions and deportations to GULAGs), only two out of 200 persons remained free.6 Most writers, artists, scholars and teachers met the same fate. It is known that 80% of teachers with pre-revolutionary experience were repressed.7 These repressions occurred under the slogan of struggling against Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism and involved squeezing the Ukrainian language out of all areas of usage within the state.

However, the occurrence of World War II suspended this process of Ukraine’s physical transformation into a single-language province of Russia.

After the war, the Russian government was forced to spend over ten years suppressing the Ukrainian anti-Soviet, or actually anti-Russian, movement, which developed mostly in Western Ukraine. Under those conditions, as in the 1920s, the Russian government in Moscow did not dare implement total russification. Besides, this was a period of activity for various anti-colonial movements in the world. Therefore, it was the wrong time to conduct a war against Ukrainians and eliminate the Ukrainian language. A short-lived pseudo-ukrainization began during the “thaw” of the 1960s: schools teaching in the Ukrainian language were opened in big cities, the works of Ukrainian writers began to be published, and new artists and cinematographers appeared.

Retrospectively, this “thaw” may be evaluated as a successful special operation of the KGB aimed at identifying naïve pro-Ukrainian cultural workers, most of whom were successfully cleaned out or intimidated later in the 1970s (over 1000 people were repressed8). In addition, in the 1960s, the Soviet Union was still trying to build its socialist camp and did not want to frighten potential “cell-mates” with excessive repressions in

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Ukraine. Nevertheless, after the “Prague Spring” was suppressed in 1968, such concerns about the international community lost their urgency. At the same time, the Soviet regime also became less bloodthirsty compared to Stalinist times. The physical annihilation of the bearers of a language and culture was replaced with the policy of “unity of languages – unity of cultures,” i.e. the policy of the gradual russification of all national groups of the Soviet Union. At that time in Ukraine, the number of schools teaching in the Ukrainian language significantly decreased. Most subjects at universities, with the exception of a few universities in Western Ukraine, then came to be taught in Russian. In the early 1980s, Russian was officially declared the state language of Ukraine. The remnants of the republic’s economic and cultural autonomy were destroyed, and decisions regarding all economic problems were totally subordinated to the central government in Moscow. Incidentally, Ukraine now has such large underground gas deposits because from the 1950s to the 1970s the imperial center developed them in order to support industry in Russia around Moscow.

Thus, like a Canadian demanding “speak white,” a bureaucrat coming to Kyiv or Lviv from Moscow could ask a Ukrainian speaker to speak “human” or “normally, not your calf dialect.” This was because he felt himself a full-fledged master on the territory controlled by the imperial center he represented.

This was the state of affairs when Ukraine faced the collapse of the Soviet Union and practically began to build its statehood from ground zero. For many people, even those who knew about the existence of some republics or could locate Ukraine on the map of the Soviet Union, their conception of this territory was somewhat as follows: somewhere behind the Curzon line there was a dull grey mass of “Russians” who hardly differed from each other from Murmansk to Baku or from Lviv to Magadan. At first sight, especially in the early 1990s, such an understanding was probably close to the truth. While today the staff at Turkish resorts is immediately able to distinguish Russians from Ukrainians or Kazakhs, such a difference was not fully evident for most foreigners at that time.

After enduring deep sovietization and russification, Ukraine entered this new era, divided into two uneven parts. However, it was not divided in the way imagined by S. Huntington, who was indifferent to Ukraine and

thus incompetent, or even the version espoused by the more benevolent and better-informed Z. Brzezinski.\(^\text{10}\) Despite the endeavors of Moscow political technologists, who, during the Orange Revolution of 2004, attempted to geographically delineate Ukraine into four areas, like dissecting a bull’s carcass, it remained divided not along territorial, but mental lines – between the old Soviet nomenklatura and people who were spontaneously, yet consciously, anti-Soviet.

Such a division influenced the further development of the Ukrainian state. At the same time, it caused numerous misunderstandings among its leaders, as well as those who did not wish Ukraine well and enemies from the north-east. This leads to the question: why is it then that these divisions, proposed by both the old Soviet and the new Russian political technologists, and sanctified by Western masters, finally proved to be erroneous?

The issue is that the cultural and mental codes of Ukrainians and Russians differ significantly. Today, under the conditions of the present Russian invasion of the Ukrainian territory, which is unreservedly supported by the majority of the Russian Federation’s population, this difference is becoming particularly evident.

For a non-biased researcher studying the formation of the Ukrainian state for a long time, it is clear that Ukrainians first and foremost strive for personal independence from the state, and that they do not respect the state as an institution, thereby relying on their own forces. They are mostly resourceful and able to self-organize in the case of danger. The main demand advanced by rebellious Ukrainians during the Orange Revolution and the latest Euromaidan movement was that the government adhere to European values, which, according to their beliefs, rest in the rule of law, transparent and invariable legislation, understandable taxes and their transparent usage, an independent judiciary, and non-corrupt public service and law enforcement systems. For over 23 years, these aspirations of most Ukrainians for a life they call “European” or “civilized” have been a major stumbling block for the post-Soviet nomenklatura in their efforts to return the people of Ukraine to the Russian empire of Yeltsin-Putin.

One of the instruments being used to achieve this goal has been the traditional policy of russification and attacks on the cultural space of Ukraine.

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Thus, during all Ukraine’s years of independence, there has been an ongoing and ceaseless struggle to renew the sphere of usage of the Ukrainian language within the Ukrainian state. However, this was often ineffective. To resist the dissemination of the Ukrainian language, its enemies resorted to all possible means and virtually unlimited resources, which were removed from Ukraine’s national wealth by an oligarchic nomenklatura controlled by Russia.

In the late 1980s, during perestroika, when the population received most of its information from newspapers, one of the most popular dailies was *Vechirniy Kyiv*. Since its establishment in the 1920s, it had always been published in Ukrainian, and only in the late 1980s, during the period of intensified russification, did a Russian edition finally appear. When there was no longer any pressure from the Communist Party, in a seemingly russified Kyiv, the daily circulation of its Ukrainian editions reached half a million copies compared to a few dozen thousand for the Russian edition. The phenomenon of *Vechirniy Kyiv*, as well as the anti-Soviet and anti-Russian student revolution on granite in 1991 and further events vividly prove the strong resilience of the Ukrainian language and culture to destruction.

However, in later years, the pro-Russian nomenklatura, which transformed into the pro-Russian bourgeoisie following the collapse of the Soviet Union, continued to conduct ongoing and purposeful attacks on the development of culture in Ukraine. First, with the help of corrupt commercial schemes, they smashed the old print media. Further, television and FM radio were totally russified, national cinema was ruined, national pop music was marginalized and guest artists from Moscow began to dominate all central stages of the country.

While the Ukrainian press and pop culture were being extinguished, the country’s humanitarian space became permanently tense with discussions on Ukrainian orthography, the language of instruction at schools, the content of textbooks on history and literature, and the law on languages. Those debates persisted continually and intensified when it was necessary to push a privatization law through Parliament in favor of the oligarchic groups in power. At that time, the attention of economically incompetent patriots was purposefully concentrated on essentially secondary “language” issues, rather than on the primary questions of economic development and property redistribution, which were the main interests of Ukrainian oligarchs and their Russian partners.

Although much money and effort have been spent, the history of the struggle for the renewed status of the Ukrainian language in Ukraine has
resulted in optimistic, rather than pessimistic developments, and has taken an unexpected turn. Today, the Ukrainian language is a symbol of Ukraine’s European choice, as well as freedom, the rule of law and progress, while, due to Moscow’s efforts, Russian has become a symbol of totalitarianism, terrorism and backwardness.

At the same time, the recent events of winter 2014 have proven to the whole world a fact that was understood long ago by many Ukrainian patriots in the west, in the east, in the north and in the south. Despite all the endeavors of the enemies of Ukrainian statehood, language in Ukraine has not become an absolute marker of either a pro-European or pro-Russian orientation on the part of its speaker. Language has not divided, but instead, has united Ukraine.

Several generations of Russian-speaking citizens have grown up in Ukraine to become patriots of their state, irrespective of their language of daily communication. Almost all Ukrainians are bilingual, if they want to be. It is for this reason that, for Russian-speaking Ukrainians, the official status of the Ukrainian language is not an obstacle for one’s personal career, but rather a state symbol, much like its flag, national anthem, emblem and territory. For this reason, during the parliamentary elections to the Verkhovna Rada in 2012, a few dozen thousand Russian-speaking residents of Kyiv consciously voted for the Svoboda Party, which was rather dubious in its political slogans and actions. They did so because it was the only party that managed to clearly come forward to protect the Ukrainian language from one of the “language” shenanigans committed in the Parliament by the Yanukovych-led majority.

Hence, the war that Russia has unleashed against Ukraine is not only a war concerning the economic assets of Putin’s clique or against Ukrainians’ European choice. This is a war against the alternative “Russian world” that has emerged in Ukraine, in which most Russian-speaking citizens have consciously stood in favor of an independent Ukrainian state, the rule of law, freedom of choice, and free mass media. Unfortunately, these European values have not spread amongst the wider population in Russia, despite the powerful support rendered to it by the West throughout the post-Soviet years.

In Ukraine, these values have gained a foothold and expressively manifest themselves despite all obstacles. Therefore, the further fate of languages in a new democratic Ukraine calls for optimism rather than pessimism among all their bearers, who are so different, yet so united.
References


In this paper I examine the Maidan and its consequences as a conflict and the process of social construction in the symbolic sphere. I will also try to interpret the Maidan and subsequent events as the historical trigger for Ukraine’s complex nation building, a process which is still underway.

Ukraine has ended the era of the “symbolic vacuum,” which lasted for more than twenty years. Its main feature was the absence of a single matrix of meta-meanings recognized by the majority of society with which individuals could understand and interpret all social processes and phenomena. Such a matrix provides both psychological comfort to its individuals as carriers and stability for the whole social system. Since 1991, when the Independence of Ukraine was proclaimed, Ukrainian society never experienced the domination of one of these meta-meanings matrices. We will call this matrix a “symbolic universe,” using the term of Thomas Luckmann and Peter Berger.\(^1\) However, our definition of this term extends the original definition proposed by these two scholars. The “Soviet” symbolic universe has lost its dominance and exclusive status. Nevertheless, the new symbolic universe did not show sufficient consistency and integrity of its meaning-value matrix and thus could not take the dominant position. Except for fundamental changes in the domain of economic relations, in the last twenty years some kind of parity took place between these two symbolic universes that allowed them to co-exist in different areas of influence in different parts of the country. This could be illustrated by many indicators. For example, the difference in value orientations, permanent debates on Ukraine’s foreign policy, the interpretation of Ukrainian history and of the consequences for the country of certain historical events. It is also important to mention the problem of the official status of the Ukrainian and Russian languages, their use in everyday life, in education, mass media

and state institutions. It is quite logical that a permanent lack of consensus on these major issues led to a split in Ukrainian society. Especially if we take into account that there were never serious attempts to find consensus. Such a state of affairs was beneficial for various financial groups and for Ukrainian politics. These problems became important topics for the public only because of the parliamentary or presidential elections. These manipulations of the public attention were possible because of the high degree of passivity of Ukrainian society, its disappointment and mistrust in the state institutions. Instead, people were more interested in their own welfare and the problems of their family and close friends. The Maidan events (late 2013–2014) reactivated and made urgent all these problems, actually forcing the hitherto passive part of citizens to choose one or another side of the conflict. This passivity was not overcome immediately, but decreased in the course of the Maidan events and their dramatization. The annexation of Crimea and war in the East of Ukraine also played a crucial role in this process.

The Maidan was the culmination and the strategic turning point in the war of symbols which has been waged for the last 20 years in Ukraine. The Maidan was possible because of the loss of cultural hegemony of the Soviet universe in the public sphere of Ukrainian society. The second important factor was the lack of an alternative value-meanings matrix which the ruling elite of Ukraine could offer society.

Moreover, the ruling elite was never concerned by this issue and simply used semantic complexes inherited from the old universe, slightly adjusting them according to the current social processes and phenomena. The only serious domain that has undergone fundamental and coherent modifications is the economic domain, which includes all kinds of economic relationships and relevant distribution of scarce resources.

The Maidan began as a civil response to the new foreign policy and a dramatic change of its course. In a short time it also demonstrated a fundamental difference between the value-matrix of the new generation of Ukrainians and that system of state-person relationships which crystallized during the years of independence and merely modified patterns of the Soviet universe. During the Maidan, this discourse embraced other issues – irritants that traditionally gained prominence only because of the election campaigns. As a result, the most common and coherent meanings-complexes were formed and defied old meanings-complexes.
As already mentioned, an old universe had lost its cultural hegemony, but it was still present in the public sphere, as the new universe has not been fully formed and articulated in the form of a core set of meanings and values. This new universe lacked an integrative idea that would unite these meanings and values into a coherent matrix. All this led to a permanent symbolic vacuum. Using the terminology of Antonio Gramsci, this situation can be described as “positional,” in other words it is “long-lasting,” a war of symbols. However, the Maidan has become what the scholar called the “frontal attack” when symbolic struggle enters the active phase.

During these periods, all the contradictions become visual in the public sphere. These periods of time are some kind of a test of the cultural hegemony of a definite universe. The old Soviet universe apodictically did not stand this test as it lost its cultural hegemony and played its role in society only because of the lack of a real competitor. That is why the state system and the ruling political elite, which appealed to this old value-meanings matrix, had to use the most extreme method, which is an indicator of a loss of cultural hegemony: legal violence.

This is the final argument and helps only to delay the replacement of one symbolic universe by another. As we know, that is exactly what happened in the Ukrainian case: legal violence did not help, but rather was the catalyst of the events of the Maidan, which can thus be regarded as the symbolic revolution.

This symbolic revolution was a turning point in the war of symbols which has lasted all these years in Ukraine. The loss of the cultural hegemony of the old universe over a larger part of Ukrainian society was manifested in its attempts to organize another symbolic area, in opposition to the Maidan. This attempt was not successful.

In addition to the loss of cultural hegemony of the old universe, a crucial factor was the long-lasting absence of the expert group of the old universe that would become deliberately and systematically engaged in the process of creating and spreading certain meanings. Its weakness in terms of the Maidan was that an old matrix could only offer a “denial.” That is why organized rallies against the Maidan were called the “Anti-Maidan.”

The turning point in the war of symbols, which occurred in January–February 2014 in Kyiv and other Ukrainian towns, was just the beginning.

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of large-scale processes. Unlike Ukraine, in Russia the old Soviet universe was successively transformed, taking into account the new circumstances – especially the change in the rules of the distribution of scarce resources in Russian society. In addition, Russia has not experienced a long period of symbolic vacuum caused by the change of symbolic universes. Russia, with its ethnic diversity and vast territories, could not afford such a situation – two Chechen Wars during the 1990s are the most colorful examples of that.

Despite the fall of the Soviet Union, in Russia there was no coexistence of alternative universes that could really compete with each other for cultural hegemony. Unlike Ukraine, Russia did not try to change its cultural traumas, which are crucial for integrative processes in society and for socialization of the new generations.

In turn, in Ukraine during the last twenty years there have been numerous attempts to replace the cultural trauma of the Great Patriotic War and to replace it with the great hunger of 1932–33, the Holodomor.

All this time the old universe mostly constructed in Russia has not lost its dominant position. The main symbols, such as victory in the Great Patriotic War, are still used as a cultural trauma for the integration of the Russian nation. Each year the same rituals as in the Soviet Union were repeated, be it a victory parade in Red Square or patriotic education classes during which veterans tell students about their experiences of the war. As in the Soviet period, the crucial point of Russia’s foreign policy is strong antagonism with the West, while in domestic politics the emphasis is on the uniqueness of Russian values, language and culture. Stabilization of the social system and the evolution of the dominant values and cultural matrix in accordance with the new social conditions in Russia have led, eventually, to its matrix trying to expand its symbolic space beyond the state borders – including Ukraine. Especially because of the symbolic vacuum which existed in Ukraine. But the events of the Maidan made their significant adjustments to this process. One could even argue that they have completely changed its course: the Maidan began to develop rapidly, outpacing its timeframes.

Because of the Maidan and its meanings, this matrix was obliged to give an immediate answer, i.e. an opposite meaning-system. As we have already mentioned, neither the Ukrainian ruling elite (Anti-Maidan), nor Russia (which tried to discredit the Maidan by all means) found such an answer.

Thus, a strategic defeat in the process of maintaining its cultural hegemony meant that in the near future for Russia there was only one possible option in the case of a loss in the symbolic sphere: the use of its
military power. This was also necessary, because it led not only to the loss of all opportunities for it to maintain its cultural leadership for the vast majority of Ukrainian society, but also pointed to a direct threat to Russia’s existing symbolic universe. Moreover, the recipe of the Maidan is extremely dangerous for the very existence of the Russian Federation, and not only for the ruling Russian elite. The example of the successful Maidan and subsequent social change and reforms would inevitably lead to an exacerbation of the hidden problems in Russian society.

We can emphasize two aspects. First, a fundamentally different view of the model of relations between society and the state. In contrast to the Russian model, the model of the Maidan rejects paternalism and the primacy of the state over the citizen and provides an example of direct democracy in action. The second aspect is a gradual shift in the discourse of the Maidan towards national identity in the wider European and not purely Slavic cultural field. This endangers not only the attempt to renew the cultural hegemony of the Russian universe in Ukraine, but could also serve as a catalyst for similar processes in Russia itself. Russian society is composed of many ethnic groups and nationalities, including those which consider themselves nations. Any instability in Russian society will inevitably renew the question of national independence, the theme of separatism and as a consequence – will lead to war. As already happened during the first and the second Chechen wars and is still ongoing in the North Caucasus in a more latent form.

Thus, to prevent the Maidan from setting an example which would become the dominant factor in the threat of a symbolic universe in Russia and a factor of instability in Russian society, which could very likely lead to an armed conflict, the leadership of the Russian Federation decided to start a military confrontation on the opponent’s territory. The war of symbols and its strategic turning point apodictically led to a real war and real victims.

As the real war is fought, the war of symbols also continues. The main collective term for the ideas opposing the ideas of the Maidan can be named the “Russian world.” However, this is more of a collective term than a unified and coherent idea.

This can be confirmed by the various attempts to construct different symbolic systems or simulacrums opposed to the symbolism of the Maidan and the renewed Ukrainian identity. Some of those simulacrums are “Novorossiya,” the “Southeast,” the Donetska People’s Republic, the Luhanska People’s Republic and others. This includes attempts to use the meanings and symbols of the Soviet era, especially victory in the Great Patriotic War (1941–1945).
In addition to the eclectics in identity, one can see the whole mix of opposite meanings and sets of concepts: it is religious fundamentalism and nostalgia for the Soviet Union (which was atheistic), and at the same time nostalgia for the Russian Empire, which was destroyed and reborn as the Soviet Union. All this raises all kinds of dissonances and the vulnerability of this symbolic system, which for convenience we call the “Russian universe.” Thus, a counterpart to the Maidan symbolic system cannot be characterized as a homogeneous, integral and coherent matrix.

In general, the events of November 2013–February 2014 in Ukraine did not become a social revolution in the classical sense of the term: the socio-economic structure has not changed, the largest enterprises still belong to a few oligarchs and financial-industrial groups and, furthermore, one of the oligarchs of the old guard has become the President of Ukraine. These events are, no doubt, revolutionary events, but not the Revolution itself. However, we can say that the events of the Maidan may be called a symbolic revolution.

Its main consequence is that in the public sphere of Ukraine there has finally appeared a semantic core capable of becoming a unifying matrix for society. Over the past twenty years of Ukraine’s independence, there has been a strong lack of such consolidating factors. The Ukrainian people were united only by dissatisfaction with their government and the economic situation in the country. For various reasons, Ukrainian citizens were not offered any unifying idea or concept. On the contrary, during the election campaigns there was much emphasis of the differences between the regions of Ukraine. All this has led to the fact that the political Ukrainian nation existed only formally, but essentially it has not formed even after several decades of independence.

Today the situation has started to change dramatically. Let us compare the data from surveys conducted before the events of the Maidan and after them. According to the annual monitoring survey of the Institute of Sociology, the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, undertaken in July 2013, when the situation in the country was calm, in answer to the question “Who do you consider yourself first and foremost?,” a little more

3 The annual nation-wide representative survey conducted by the Institute of Sociology, the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine in July 2013. 1800 respondents were interviewed; the survey covered all regions of Ukraine (including the Autonomous Republic of Crimea); sample was random and representative of the population of Ukraine aged 18 years and older.
than half of the respondents chose the option “a citizen of Ukraine.” The second most popular answer was the option “a resident of the village or town where I live”; about a third of the respondents chose this. According to the Institute survey conducted in July–August 2014, after the events of the Maidan and in the midst of a real war in the East of Ukraine, this time about 67% of the respondents considered themselves Ukrainian citizens, while 16% consider themselves first and foremost residents of their village or town. Thus, there is a clear shift in national identity. Under the threat to Ukraine’s territorial integrity and its existence as an independent state, the Ukrainian population demonstrates a shift from its regional or local identity towards the national identity.

If we compare the dynamics of national identity among the different generations of Ukrainian citizens, our attention will be drawn to the change of attitudes among young people (18–30 years).

Presently three quarters of those who were born and socialized in the independent Ukraine consider themselves citizens of this country. The self-identification of the older generation – those who were socialized under totally different circumstances and another value-matrix – also changed dramatically. Among both young and older people one can observe a clear increase in those who identify with the national identity and a decrease in those who consider themselves representatives of local communities. See table.

Dynamics of national self-identification of different generations in Ukraine, 2014 (% n=1800)

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<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>2014</td>
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</table>

4 The annual nation-wide (excluding the Crimea) representative survey conducted by the Institute of Sociology, the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine in July–August 2014. 1800 respondents were interviewed; the survey covered all regions of Ukraine (excluding Crimea); sample was random and representative of the population of Ukraine aged 18 years and older.
We should also mention the dynamics of those who consider themselves citizens of the USSR. Comparison of 2013 and 2014 shows us that the proportion of people with Soviet identity remains the same: 6%. That is more evidence of the loss of potential of the Soviet symbolic matrix.

<table>
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Conclusion

The first consequence of the Maidan of 2013–2014 is fundamentally symbolic. Violence, polarization of society, polarization of the elites, the system of values that occurred during a few months, have led to the old symbolic universe finally demonstrating the loss of its positions in Ukrainian society and the loss of its potential for further development. Under the new conditions, the de-Sovietization of Ukrainian society will be carried out more actively. It will be carried out both by those who sincerely believe in its necessity and by those who will join this process in order to preserve their power and influence.

However, this time it will also be held in the symbolic enclaves, especially in eastern Ukraine, where de-Sovietization was suspended and where Soviet identity was successfully used by local elites for their own purposes. The first steps can be observed today in such extremely important symbolic actions as the removal of the monuments to Lenin which can be seen on the central squares of all the towns in eastern and southern regions of Ukraine. The next step, apparently, is to rename the Lenin Square in honor of the heroes of the Maidan events or other personalities of Ukrainian history. There will be also significant changes in public discourse, in which all the positive mentions of the Soviet period will be aggressively eliminated.
An old symbolic matrix is being replaced by the new one. However, this new matrix got its clearly articulated idea and semantic core only a few months ago and this process is not finished yet. This is the idea of the Ukrainian political nation and national identity. After two decades of economic crisis, of plutocracy, of the passivity of the majority of the population, Ukrainian citizens finally discovered for themselves the value of the Ukrainian state and independence. Hitherto the young and middle generations had perceived it as a given, especially due to the bloodlessness and ease with which it was gained. The Independence of Ukraine became possible not just because of historic luck but as a result of mass struggle.

It is worth noting an important feature of the symbolic confrontation accompanying real military confrontation in the eastern regions of Ukraine: in contrast to the Ukrainian political identity, for which ethnicity is not as important, in the area of actual and potential conflict there is intense focus on ethnicity (Russian), and furthermore, on the denial of the very existence of Ukrainians as an ethnic group (the simulacrum “Novorossiaya” and “Novoross”).

In this war of meanings and weapons that became a direct continuation of the Maidan, each of the parties has its own objectives. For Ukrainian society this transition from the symbolic vacuum to the idea of the Ukrainian political nation and national identity is of specific importance, giving it a chance of stabilization and of the transition from mechanical to organic solidarity in the foreseeable future.

References

Lyudmyla Pavlyuk

Vocabularies of Colliding Realities: A Representation of Conflict and War in the Ukrainian Media

This article deals with media frames and means of persuasion used in the coverage of events surrounding the conflict between Ukraine and Russia. Based on the premise that the struggle for resolution of the conflict is a struggle for meanings,\(^1\) this article shows how the gradual clarification of distinctions between the concepts of war/crisis, rebels/terrorists, rights of regions/separatism, as well as the creation of argumentative systems focused on facts contribute to adequate decision making, enhance resilience, and consolidate society in Ukraine.

Framing the War: From “Crisis” and “Conflict” to “Patriotic War I”

Why do people give different, often completely opposite names to the same object or event? The pragmatic answer to this question is obvious: because they have different, even opposite goals with regard to the object. Giving a desirable name to a thing is a way to symbolically “own” it and exercise power over it. Changing that name is a weapon of war. “Divide and rule,” in a time of information wars, means “divide by the use of names and rule.”

During the Maidan events in winter 2014, the label “fascists” and affinitive lexical mutants like “oligarchic-fascist plot” aimed at a radical devaluation of revolutionary ideology. During the short-term militarized “campaign” before the Crimean referendum in March, billboard ads in the

peninsula reduced the choice facing citizens to images of two maps – one showing Crimean territory with a swastika, implying Ukraine’s allegedly “Nazi” policies, and the other, postulating a “liberating” alternative, a map of Crimea in the colors of the Russian flag. Turning “Ukro-fascism” into absolute hyperbole was necessary if Russian propaganda was to distract attention from a number of ugly facts: 1) there was a war between Russia and Ukraine for Crimea in March 2014; 2) Russia violated international law; and 3) it remained unpunished.

Right after the Crimean referendum, there were two divergent lines in the naming of the Russian-Ukrainian clash: the moderate expressions “conflict” and “crisis”; and a resolute approach of “let us call things by their proper names.” Those who insisted on “war” as an apt term for the situation referred to definitions of war in international law documents: “According to Article two of Geneva conventions of 1949, the occupation of one country by another, even if the former does not resist the enemy, is recognized as an international military conflict. From the juridical viewpoint, Ukraine and Russia are now in a state of war.”

The distinction between “crisis” and “war” has not only rhetorical, but also legal significance. How a conflict is resolved depends on its definitions. The understated Crimean war served the function of an “invitation” for Russia to begin intervention in the East. After Russian regular troops invaded the Azov coastal area on August 26, the Ukrainian media referred to this new phase as “Patriotic War I.” Those who had called the Russian-Ukrainian encounter a war from the very beginning turned out to be right. Yet those who resorted to “mild” and “middle” names were right too: the world needed time to think over possible responses to the aggressor, just as Ukraine needed time to concentrate forces for efficient self-defense.

From a linguistic viewpoint, semantic markers and rhetorical figures in political discourse often show how “cautious” and “diplomatic” descriptors clash and interact with the “the proper” ones in the collision of senses, highlighting a need for honesty in the policy of naming. Irony is one such means that warned against underestimating the escalating conflict and showed how spontaneous radical consequences can result from a lack of

decisive steps: “There will be no second cold war. There will be such sanctions that a single stone will be left.”

Branding the War: From “Hybrid,” “Informational,” “Organizational” to “Full Scale Aggression”

It was the non-eruptive, creeping nature of the war that surprised many during the rather prolonged initial phase of the Russia-Ukraine encounter. During its “no single shot, no blood” period, Ukrainians were learning about the power of various non-explicit martial layers in this interaction: informational, psychological, organizational, and economic. All of them can be viewed as separate “types” of war and furthermore they are also considered multiple fronts of a “hybrid war.”

Throughout the conflict cycle, Russia showed that it was equipped for the “informational” war as professionally as it was for the actual one. Its offensive “capabilities” were represented not only by troops amassed at the border. They included armies of lobbyists in Western countries as well as armies of “trolls” on the Internet. The channel “Russia Today” received almost 12 billion rubles of subsidies in 2014; and in 2015 it may receive more than 15 billion. The media have become a part of the state’s military machine to a grotesque degree. Russian journalists who accompanied “green men” during the occupation of Crimea received state awards from Putin, including the Order of Alexander Nevsky, “for great professionalism and objectivity in covering events in Republic of Crimea.”


The *Organizational* component of a “hybrid war” appears as a set of coordinated destructive actions against state institutions and citizens’ feeling of safety. Since May 9, when the first terrorist alerts took place in many cities, the Security Service of Ukraine neutralized tens of diversionist groups in territories outside the ATO zone. The apotheosis of organizational war is the creation of a *humanitarian catastrophe*, and that “goal” was achieved with particular success in the Luhans’k area. There also exist other, more subtle, means of organizational war; for instance, Sergey Kurginyan mentions a method of “the friendly suggestion to accept destructive goals that appear to be positive, but are I reality dangerous for the opponent.” Russia’s “peaceful efforts” in Ukraine, followed by the immediate introduction of the word “Novorossiya” (“New Russia”) as the eastern region’s “casual” name in Russian diplomatic documents, is one example of this strategy being implemented.

The most striking “hybrid” attribute of this war is a combination of reality and lies about it. Russia “does not see” its troops in Ukraine – which sounds like a serious cognitive disorder. Military men enter Ukraine “by accident,” and columns appear out of nowhere while Putin’s propaganda denies allegations and invites us into Orwellian or Berklian reality. In the meantime, Crimea is annexed and parts of the eastern territories are occupied. With reference to this mix of denial and quick assaults, the concept of “*postmodern war*” is used to stress a lack of restraint in response to the Russian leadership’s performance: even if lies are uncovered, the liars proceed with attaining their goals.

In mid-August, journalist Serhiy Rakhmanin described a non-authored “humanitarian” convoy entering Ukraine as a sign of transition from “hybrid loutishness” to “open loutishness.” Russia’s opening a new front near Mariupol also served as proof that the state was moving from “hybrid” aggression to a full-scale conflict. It was not any “organizational” and “informational” tricks, but Russian military forces that changed the course of events at the end of summer. Larry Diamond called Putin’s methods “postmodern fascism,” and the goals that Russia eventually revealed,

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8 Rakhmanin S. *HiBred pod konvoiem*. Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 2014, 15 August.
through occupying two territories in succession, show that the current
Russian variety of this ideology is no less dangerous and banal than its
“classical” type from the last century, since the country is interested in cap-
turing “vital spaces,” not sustaining its own vast environment.

The metaphorical characteristics of the Russian policies also followed
an ascending pattern in describing the danger they posed. In 1999, the
world was struck with a troubling question: “Who is Mister Putin?” Fifteen
years later, the enigma has been revisited: “What kind of game does Putin
play?” During the “Crimean crisis,” many hoped that it was something as
rational as chess, and this assumption prompted the idea of sanctions. Yet
many noticed the progressing de-rationalization of Putin’s behavior with
an increasing tendency toward bluffing. Hence “It is not chess any more,
it’s poker.”

The Russian invasion in the south of the Donetsk region has
confirmed even worse suspicions: it is Russian roulette – the only game
that ends with the physical removal of the player, and the only one where
big money is at stake alongside people’s lives.

“Terrorists” vs “Rebels”: Horror-tales from the Terrorland

Donets’k, “a city of one million roses,” and Luhans’k, “a city of flowers,”
became half-host settlements after militant groups took power in the
region. Since chaos replaced a formerly normal life, new criminal leaders
have been trying to institutionalize themselves through legitimizing con-
cepts. In particular, Soviet-style clichés of “people’s republics” are among
the main nominative vindications.

Since the beginning of separatist activities in the east, pro-Ukrainian
discourses have reconceptualized the means of self-justification in separ-
ratist rhetoric and have shown, through the use of alternative tropes, that
the “rebels’” illegal names designate illegal deeds: “the terrorist-diversion-
ary groups from the RF, which Russia calls ‘peaceful protests’ in the Donetsk
region”; “the bandits with rifles are drawing the fake numbers” (on the ref-
erendums preceding proclamation of the “Donets’ka People’s Republic”

(DNR) and “Luhans'ka People's Republic” (LNR)). Political discourse at times of acute conflict highlights a clash of “us vs. them” positioning in the most irreconcilable linguistic forms.

The pragmatic scenario of the Ukrainian conflict and its representations in the media includes such a character as the “terrorist,” whose attributes as an anti-hero become apparent through his merciless treatment of his victims. According to accounts of both media and witnesses, here is what the DNR/LNR terrorist does to deserve this name of terrorist: 1) kills soldiers and people suspected of helping the National Guard; 2) captures and tortures pro-Ukrainian activists; 3) downs planes; 4) shells settlements, blows up bridges and railways; 5) forcefully “mobilizes” men for the separatist gangs; 6) packs school buildings with explosives; 7) uses people, civilians, as well as whole cities, as “live shields,” etc.

In the city of Sloviansk, pro-Russia separatists took with them four members of an Evangelical church in the middle of the service without a word of explanation, and later all were found dead with signs of severe torture. The scenes of psychological and physical abuse of Iryna Dovgan', who was tied to a post, wrapped in the Ukrainian flag and beaten in Donetsk, is not an accidental and isolated incident. In Iryna's native city of Yasynuvata, where the Vostok battalion became notorious for its especially brutal treatment of Ukrainians, the torture cells were filled with local “enemies of the people,” mostly pro-Ukrainian activists and businessmen who were being pressed for money.

Survivors of the torture cells from other eastern cities speak not only of endless beatings that resulted in broken jaws and ribs, but also of the use of electric shocks and cutting the body with knives, specifically carving Ukrainian symbols into the skin, then forcing the captives to write apologies to the criminals in their own blood. Given this atmosphere, the reported cases of suicide in these cellars do not even look like suicide, but rather murder. The rape of women? It also is in the list of crimes. In Yenaki-evo, terrorist leaders participated in the trade of women slaves.\footnote{SBU arestovala glavarya yenakievskih terroristov. <http://censor.net.ua/news/301584/sbu_zaderjala_glavarya_enakievskih_terroristov_dnr> (accessed 7 September 2014).} According to report from Yasynuvata in late September, after a girl was taken from her home by armed people, her mother found the daughter’s mutilated corpse near the front door: no teeth, they were beaten in, signs of sexual attack to
the degree that the lower part of the body was smashed, and the tryzub, the Ukrainian trident, was carved into her chest.12

In Slovians’k alone, after their retreat the separatists left about two thousand explosives. Unsurprisingly, some of them detonated. The nicknames of some gang leaders and members allude to the surreal world of fiction rather than to reality: “Leshyï” (hobgoblin), “Babai” (kids’ scare), “Bes” (“demon”). Yet in their essence numerous documented stories from the “terror-land” are not fantasy at all. They are in fact true horror tales and represent every possible category of crimes.

The current war-related atrocities in Ukraine’s east resonate with the levels of cruelty that are demonstrated in the abuse of women committed by Boko Haram, the extremist group in Northern Nigeria, and decapitation of hostages by ISIL (Islamic State). They all are symptoms of “time out of joint,” a craziness that calls for solutions at the level of global consciousness. What the Ukrainian media and Ukrainian society can do for now is to give criminals the names they deserve. Yes, the people responsible for the DNR and LNR terrorist activities have become a side in the “peaceful” talks. It does not mean that they have become legitimate. It means that Russia has used force to support them and thus shares the responsibility for their crimes.

Federalization – Autonomy – Annexation: Federalism for Whom?

There is no better example of dramatically different meanings of the same concept in various contexts than the word “federation” with regard to political order in Russia and, in contrast, relating to territorial units in Russia’s imperial suburbs. While federalism for Russian “insiders” is supposed to mean space of opportunities (and that is normally the principal assumption of this term for global practices), in the case of “outside” autonomies and “people’s republics” surrounding the Russian Federation, “federalism” is

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a cynical and utilitarian tool for separation from the former center and assimilation with Russia.

The struggles for new republics include such consecutive stages as referendums, acts of “self-defense,” and calls for Russia to “protect” a particular territory. These tactics look like steps in a full-cycle cooking process – peeling, cutting, and frying – before “serving” new territories to Putin’s imperial table. Crimea enjoyed the status of real, non-formal autonomy, and was devoured and digested. After that, any talk of “federal” order in the eastern regions is no more than an invitation to the next step of annexation by Russia.

Since the purpose of creating and supporting a “golden ring” of autonomies around Russia is so nasty, people who speak of “giving the East a chance” are 1) naïve; 2) unable to overcome their pro-Russian biases; 3) devoted to the “fair” ideal of decentralization and refuse to notice that it does not apply to the “big elephant” case. “Clever federalization”\(^\text{13}\) is indeed possible, but not at a time when Russian tanks are crossing the border. Actually, the only objection to the Donets’k and Lugans’k secessionist projects is that they are in Russia’s backyard and can trigger the loss of other regions in the southeast of Ukraine. Otherwise, experimenting with the status of territories may be good advice, especially for other countries such as Canada, which 1) does not have borders with Russia; 2) is large, civilized, and democratic; 3) has already resolved its “separatist” question through juridical decisions and legitimate referendums, when the law-abiding citizens obeyed the law-respecting country.

What is outlined above is all about the double standards concerning “domestic” and “external” federalism, or, to put it in Christian terms, the violation of the simple principle of “do not do to your neighbor what you do not wish for yourself.” Russia has been applying many rules it dislikes itself to its so-called brothers. What followed could be called “Operation Clarification,” or “Boomerang,” which is a series of naturally occurring events in the RF that have made clear to Russia its mistake of playing with its neighbor’s sovereignty.

When Russia first amassed its troops at Ukraine’s border in March 2014, Ukrainians channeled their frustration into debate focused on possible solutions. Numerous articles in the media and talks in audiences were

devoted to a search for answers. One suggestion was related to Ukraine: “We should be united and become stronger.” Another proposal was related to the West: “In spite of risks to destroy its own comfort, it should react somehow […] because we are in the same boat, or submarine.” The third group of expectations was related to Russia itself: many believed that Ukraine would be saved because of a) revolution in Russia; b) an intensification of federalization in Russia resulting in its fragmentation and weakening.

Many authors traced “weak chains” in future geopolitical scenarios, but hardly anybody expected that signs of disintegration would start to appear any time soon in a repressive state. During the summer, a series of “federal marches” were announced in the RF to call for more rights for the Kuban, Ural, and Siberia regions. The citizens have learnt very quickly from their government a non-complicated but useful skill of ideological renaming. After authorities in Moscow and then in Novosybirsk prohibited a march entitled the “March for the federalization of Siberia,” the organizers came up with a new title for the event: “For the unshakeable constitutional order.” Endemic yet symptomatic, not loud but brave, the “marches” served a “mirroring” function: they parodied Russia’s claim to decide which part of Ukraine needs federalization, autonomy, or immediate union with Russia.

All regions in Ukraine want and deserve more rights. Did they demand this? Not too loudly and with no harm to the nation’s unity. There has always been a suspicion concerning isolationist tendencies in Halychyna, but the majority of people in the region consider separatism of the West a taboo in the same way they condemn eastern secession. The Western Ukrainian regions led Ukraine to the EU, but they did not want to enter as a fragment. A well-known joke about compromise between the guardian pro-state spirit of Halychyna and its attraction to the West goes: “Those who wanted to join the EU have already done so individually: they emigrated.” To be precise, the majority of people in the east did not show a strong intention to disjoin Ukraine. The DNR and LNR were created under enormous external pressure.

Spatial scales for mapping the conflict between Ukraine and Russia vary from focusing on a microscopic local site of direct military clashes to addressing the global dimension in the scenario of events. Media analysis is based on three levels of “size ratio” in descriptions of the situation: mini-capsule – “civil conflict”; mezo-core – Russian-Ukrainian war; and macro-shell – “civilizational” conflict. It is about discourse, its frames and tropes, but also about the reality on the ground, according to the “as above, so below” rule.

1) So, is it a civil war? If not – why not? If it is – in what sense?

Given the factor of Russia’s involvement, undeniable from the initial phase of the conflict, the Ukrainian war in the east is not “first of all” a civil war. Yet a civil “crack” in the construction of national identity was a factor enabling Russia’s interference. A nature of the “crack,” or split, provides a key to something “qualitative” that should be not only recognized, but also accentuated. The people from Donets’k and Crimea who participated in the Maidan revolution became the first victims of “civil” clashes in their regions, like the deputy of the local council in Horlivka Volodymyr Rybak, tortured to death by DNR terrorists. By and large, this struggle has been a fight for higher levels of consciousness. Not senseless tribal squabbles, but a battle of senses.

We should not be afraid to call this war a “civil war,” since it is about protection of civil society and the human rights of people in Ukraine. The ABC’s correspondent Alex Marquardt, who came to Kyiv on 20 February, the day of the greatest number of victims on the Maidan, concluded after his communication with the youth on the square: “They are ready to die for their rights and freedoms, the ones that Americans already enjoy.” In a short interview, a young Ukrainian near the barricades responds in English to Alex’s question about the “goals of their struggle”: “Basic rules of what you have and what you were fighting for two hundred years ago. We are fighting for it now.”

Since this war is a war against a narrowly perceived approach to ethnicity, it is an anti-fascist struggle, like that of WWII. It has been in Russia’s interest to artificially deepen the ethno-cultural split through hysteria in its xenophobic media and turn Orthodoxy into a variety of “Slavic Islamic fundamentalism.” The result? Armed men from Luhans’k and Donets’k who never in their lives had encountered problems using their Russian language kill their Russian-speaking “enemies” from Dnipropetrovs’k battalions. The Russian Orthodox army in Luhans’k (RPA) kills the same Orthodox men from the National Guard who come from Volyn or Vinnytsia. At the same time, the closure of Ukrainian higher education institutions, and the prohibition of the Ukrainian language in schools in the eastern “people’s republics” have shown who really needs protection. The front of a centuries-old battle for equality and human rights has come to the Ukrainian-Russian border.

2) Russian–Ukrainian Interstate War

Some documentary shots from Horlivka in early April 2014 that appeared on TV showed how Russian officer Igor Bezler explained to a group of local militia men that he should be addressed as “comrade lieutenant colonel,” instructing them that wearing St. George ribbons would signify their cooperation with him. Both Bezler’s presumptuousness and the locals’ submissiveness were astounding in that “pattern-setting” communication. Russian military and FSB “organizers” like Bezler or Borodai played an outstanding role in transforming the amorphous dissatisfaction of the local population into a destructive force undermining the Ukrainian state.

When the anti-terrorist operation was announced, there was little doubt that the goal of this “domestic” affair was to stop Russia’s offensive. The final conclusion “It’s not ATO, it’s war with Russia” was made after

heavy shelling of Ukrainian units from Russian territory – the “from Russia with ‘Grads’” message in July. In that period, the Russian leaders were looking for a disguise for direct intrusion; Russian armored fighting vehicles, painted in the colors of “peacekeeping forces,” stood near the border ready to enter. On August 8, Samantha Power provided a remarkable linguistic diagnosis of Russia’s attempts to find a justifying cause for aggression: “A Russian peacekeeper in Ukraine is an oxymoron. […] Peacekeepers are impartial, yet Russia fully supports Russia’s armed separatists in this conflict.” Some weeks later, not caring about any ritualistic casus belli, Putin simply invaded when the separatists started to lose.

3) “War Against The West”

Since March 2014, Russia’s aggression was spiraling not only deeply into Ukrainian territory, but also in an extensive way. Following Obama’s definition of Russia as a “regional power,” Moscow delivered messages about its global presence in the wings of planes approaching American, Canadian, British, Dutch, and Norwegian airspace. This display seemed to be performed as a reminder of the practical meaning of the symbolic word “civilizational” in Russian ideological discourse: “If NATO has an intention to expand, we are not going to let it happen.” Ukrainian observers raised awareness concerning “three wars in one box” and their interconnectedness: “What is taking place now is not a Ukrainian conflict, not even a Russian-Ukrainian conflict. This is a war that Putin started against the West. […] And Ukraine is now on the frontline of this war.”18 The “macro-parameters” of the conflict looked rather theoretical at the beginning of the war: during the Crimean annexation, the international order was put under threat. Later on, “the global level” became salient as a more intense phase of the conflict, when the interests of the international actors were harmed. “Globalization” of the conflict became visible in a series of events – from detention of the OSCE observers in spring to the downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 plane over Ukraine on July 17.

Global drama activates global players, even formerly dormant ones. After years of gas wars with Ukraine, Russia signed a major gas deal with

China in a shift toward the Asian power. Closing the door to the West may turn out to be a self-imposed punishment, ranging from economic dependence, international isolation, to loss of the vast regions of Siberia. Bloggers have vividly described the dangers of territorial fragmentation that Russia may encounter one day as a “karmic” response to creating danger for others: “Putin has taken Crimea. China will take Putin.”19 What is especially “global” in the Russian-Ukrainian war is a potential to trigger WWIII. When the survival of the planet is at stake, Ukrainians cannot be egoistic; and they try to understand that moderate international decisions, including those that leave Ukraine alone with its disaster, are devoted to preventing a bigger, global catastrophe. On the other hand, Ukraine should also survive – physically and as a state. If Russia proceeds with aggression, sufficient international help should arrive at a decisive moment. And this will be a test for the global community and a model solution to a vital problem – whether indeed any country, even in Russia’s neighborhood, can be protected from a large and dangerously armed aggressor.

If the world does not currently have enough power to restrain the big appetites of overly ambitious players, it means that it is in need of a reloading of responsibilities. That is why discourses at the time of war raise questions about the most radical options, from creating a global government20 to manage international security to tearing up the NATO-Russia Treaty and establishing a renewed mission for the US and European military allies. This could be a mixed blessing, but the level of current challenges invites a debate about all available prospective options. Meanwhile, from the Ukrainian perspective, much simpler things remain unclear – first of all why Russia still retains its veto at the UN. In the Ukrainian case, “local, national, and global” parameters merge: war-torn Ukraine is a symptom and topos of a global split. Tensions in the smallest “matrioshka doll” can cause the outside “shell” of the doll to crack. Conversely, a doll with a large shell can balance the situation.

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Civilization and cultural processes, especially in their crisis stages, are always the focus of scholars. Studies of civilization fractures and new cultural paradigms require particular responsibility from researchers performing analysis in the thick of events. Today, this is the task facing Ukrainian scholars, who must collect the diverse empiric facts on Ukraine’s choice of civilization and generalize them rationally, while emotionally experiencing every moment of their country’s revolutionary changes.

The artistic factor has always been constitutive for Ukraine, where passionate political activists have often been recruited from among the country’s artists. During a long historical period in which Ukrainians did not have their own state, they combined both creative artists and politicians in their spiritual leaders. This phenomenon may be characterized with the words of the Ukrainian poet Yevhen Malaniuk: “if a nation does not have leaders, poets are its leaders.” Artists did not only preserve the nation, they raised it, taught it, and created it.1

Richard Wagner, in his work *Art and Revolution*, underlined that art could sanctify a revolution and give it real beauty.2 Indeed, art has a special place in the Ukrainian revolutionary events of 2013–2014. Detailed analysis of rich empirical material gathered by the author certifies that at the Maidan there were different kinds and genres of art: performance, installation, cinema, music, painting, sculpture, and literature – the full diversity of the creative artistic pallet. Professionals and amateurs, famous artists and artistic youth – the Maidan united them all and became a great artistic work in itself – a total installation.

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At the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the American artist Robert Henri expressed and justified the thought that an artist had the right to depict anything on the basis of his personal experience alone. The artists at the Maidan endured all of the events. Most of them came there as protestors, they took part both in severe confrontations and everyday activities. Yet they remained artists and began to depict the Maidan in this way or that. Some reacted instantly in their creative work, while others needed longer to reflect.

For Kyiv artist Glib Vysheslavsky, it was not the first revolution. He was an active participant in both Maidans, of 2014 and 2004 – when his book of photographs *Maidan of Freedom* was published. After the tragic events of February 2014, the artist created the triptych *The Sky of Maidan*. This is an expressive assemblage, in which Vysheslavsky utilized the things collected after street battles and the fire at the Trade Union house: paving stones, gloves, a Molotov cocktail bottle, a gas mask, yellow and blue ribbon and metal wire.

Artistic practices do not have clear limits, they constantly expand, especially in the context of such collective artistic expression as the Kyiv Maidan. There one could see different forms and genres of painting – from street art to portrait or decorative painting. There appeared various murals and graffiti that are most consonant with the revolution. Painters decorated tents and shields for the self-defense fighters.

Instant creative reaction to the events was reflected, first of all, in posters. Kyiv became the poster capital of the world. Revolutionary creativity in posters quickly became popular: from self-made satirical posters to the Internet communities *Strike Poster* and *Drop in the Ocean*, which blazingly reacted to all developments with timely posters. Outdoor advertisements were also brought into play, including industrially printed posters like the *I breathe freely* or *Angry Ukrainians* series, as were simple writings on empty advertisement boards: *It is prohibited to prohibit*, etc. The Ukrainian revolution substituted the populaire game *Angry Birds* with *Angry Ukrainians* and reconsidered the American street art painter Shepard Fairey (*Obey* poster).

Posters as an important means of expressing civil position appeared during the first march on November 24, 2013, when thousands of people crowded the streets of Kyiv to demonstrate their longing for European integration. Most of them were self-made posters with direct political demands or sharply satirical content. Painters worked anonymously and
quickly found general images. One of the first was the poster *Kryvava Yolka* (Bloody Christmas Tree). Many participants of the “march of millions” on December 1, 2013 held these posters.

*Yolka* became the main symbol of the Maidan – decorated with various posters, a huge metal construction of the New Year tree, the mounting of which became an official reason for the dispersal of students in late November, 2013. Depending on the situation, the posters on it were replaced and supplemented. In the epoch of digital technologies, painters were joined by masters of meme posters and others: nobody expected such a huge number of posters, photo jokes, de-motivators, and drawings. In the *Museum of Posters* in Kyiv, the only one of its kind officially registered in Europe, museum workers began to monitor poster creativity, and unlike communities, where authors work anonymously, attempted to identify and preserve the authorship. Certainly, that was not always possible, since anonymity protected the authors of the strongest poster messages from political persecution. “The Maidan has given rise to an extraordinary artistic wave that no one can explain,” Viktor Trygub, director of the *Museum of Posters* and editor of the *Museums of Ukraine* journal, wrote in early February 2014. “Revolution is lingering. Thus, there will be new masterpieces! Artists, go out to the Maidan.”

Live music was heard at the Maidan almost right away. It sounded from the stage, where professional musicians performed, it was born near the barrels, where protestors warmed themselves, and even on the first lines of barricades. Musicians played a great unifying and motivating role and considered it an honor to perform before the protestors. Singing of the Anthem of Ukraine at the Maidan deserves special attention. It was sung many times a day, but its performance on the New Year’s Eve was an extraordinary happening. Then, nearly half a million Ukrainians sang it and created a new world record. During mass singing of the Anthem of Ukraine, participants lit and raised torches. That was a mega performance of the Maidan.

The famous composer and participant in the protests Valentyn Silvestrov remarked: “The Anthem of Ukraine was sung at the Maidan, one of the best anthems in history. Even compared to the very good German anthem, which uses the music of Haydn’s quartet, the Ukrainian one is

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very intimate and original. And what happened at Anti-Maidan? People were silent, listened to some Soviet songs with some stupid words and did not sing.\textsuperscript{4} The composer stressed that he simply could not avoid being at the Maidan. An artist expresses his attitude through creative work or barricades, through active position or high professionalism, but he cannot stand aside. After the tragic events at Hrushevskogo street he created a diptych dedicated to the memory of the fallen Sergiy Nigoyan, and after killings at the Maidan on February 18–20, 2014 the composer wrote a new diptych that resembles the famous requiem fragments \textit{Dies irae} and \textit{Lacrimosa}.

On February 26, 2014 the National Philharmonic of Ukraine gave a charitable concert in memory of the \textit{Heavenly Hundred}. The musicians played Shostakovich, Grieg, and Beethoven. The entrance was free and the concert was broadcast by several Ukrainian TV channels. One of the most famous Ukrainian conductors, Roman Kofman, took the conductor’s stand. He addressed the audience, asking them not to applaud the orchestra, as it was actually a requiem for the heroes who perished a hundred meters from the Philharmonic …

A special context of the Maidan was created by barricades that experienced a quick evolution: from small symbolic barriers that looked more like art installations, rather than defense structures, to strong fortifications made of ice, snow, tires, and bags with garbage.

Transformation of Lvivska Brama barricades: December 22, 2013 and January 24, 2014 (all pictures are by the author).

On the corner of Instytutska and Khreschatyk streets near *Lvivska Brama* barricade, protestors began to put together wooden plates with names of different cities and villages, as well as districts of Kyiv. As a result, there appeared a creative construction symbolizing the unity of Ukraine. It grew every day. We called it “geographic installation.” There were a few plates with names of foreign cities, but mostly it was an exciting trip all over Ukraine. When the frosts started, some plates went to bonfires for warming, and during the bloody days of February 18–20, 2014, it was practically ruined by conflagration.

Sculpture was represented at the Maidan with wooden figures by Yaroslav, a master from Kolomyia. One can learn about him in the film *Citizen* by director Oleksandr Shkrabak and cameraman Andriy Kotliar. The authors – students of Kyiv National University of Theatre, Cinema and Television – were arrested during the protests. Yaroslav’s parents and he himself were victims of political oppression during the Soviet times. At the Maidan he created the wooden sculptures of *Praying Mother*. “Someone can sing, someone can play, and my instrument is this” – says the sculptor and continues to carve the figures of *Praying Mother* for the Maidan.

French street artist Roti expressed his support and solidarity with the protestors by presenting the sculpture *New Ukraine*, which depicts a woman emerging from the depths, an allegory of the Ukrainian revolution. Installed on a quiet Orthodox Christmas Day on January 7, 2014, the sculpture survived all the stormy and tragic events of the Maidan. The heroes of February 18–20, 2014 died beside it. The sculpture appeared under the
remnants of barricades, garbage and fire. Like the whole Maidan, it was further cleaned, decorated and covered with flowers honoring the fallen.


From the first revolutionary days, cinema began to record the events of the Maidan. There a civil initiative involving filmmakers called BABYLON’13 was created. They shot few-minute mini-documentaries. Their main goal was to motivate the viewer to work hard for the sake of the future, rather than to create chronicles.
The famous Ukrainian filmmaker Sergiy Loznytsia shot the film *The Maidan*, the events of which were happening in real time, and like all others, he did not know how they would finish. The film was shot over 90 days and consists of four parts: *Prologue*, *Triumph*, *Warfare*, and *Postscript*. The director narrates the course of the revolution from peaceful manifestations to bloody street battles. Loznytsia presented the film at the 67th Cannes festival, where a pavilion could not accommodate all who were interested.

Political actions at the Maidan turned, this way or that, into performances. Law enforcers were bombarded with toys, faced with mirrors instead of posters. Yet, a separate bright page belongs to numerous performances with yellow and blue pianos with the EU stars. In the depth of the protests on December 7, 2013, a young musician from Lviv Markian Metsekh put the instrument in front of the police cordon and played Chopin's 64th opus. The piano got the name *Instrument of Freedom*. Further, it was moved to Khreshchatyk. There, near the Kyiv city council offices, musicians played it in the cold at the street for people who came to this building occupied by protestors for shelter. Yet further, it migrated to the barricades on Hrushevskogo Street.

The revolutionary Kyiv Maidan gained the support of artists beyond the borders of Ukraine: Arnold Schwarzenegger, George Clooney, Gogol Bordello, etc. In winter 2014, outside of Ukraine there was a range of artistic manifestations in support of the Ukrainian revolution, including:

- In Berlin, performer Alessandro Rauschmann arranged an action of solidarity with the Maidan, the participants of which lay for several hours on icy ground in front of the Brandenburg gate wrapped in thermo-foil and symbolized those killed in Kyiv.
- In Vilnius, there was a charitable marathon concert *Together with Ukraine!* It gathered funds for medicines for the injured protestors in Kyiv.
- On all channels of Polish TV, the song of Tartak group *Podayruku Ukrayini* (Give a hand to Ukraine) sounded simultaneously.
- Artistic Maidan in Paris – a manifestation that included performances by musicians, singers, artists and actors – went through the boulevards of San-Jermaine and San-Michel and culminated in the performances of artists near the Pantheon.

The artistic revolutionary drive of the Kyiv Maidan inspired the artists of the world.
Conclusions

The world humanities will be interpreting and analyzing the civilization fractures in Europe at the beginning of the twentieth century that went through Ukraine for years to come. In fact, the country found itself on the edge of two epochs. Since Ancient Rome, this period has been called an *inter regnum*. The participants of the Maidan of 2013–2014 felt this: it was obvious that the ruling regime was doomed and the new epoch was being born. The birth of the new was marked by the incredible outburst of artistic creativity at the Maidan. The unity of academic analysis and artistic vision will offer the right approach to understanding the Ukrainian events of winter 2013–2014, which went down in history as the Maidan and drew modern comprehension of Europe anew.

References

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